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The Twin Deficits – One Out of Two IS Bad
From time to time on this blog, I circle back to the question of the balance of deficits. In my mind, as our economy goes through whatever the “Trump Transition” is, the biggest risk to the bond markets is not from some fear about whether the Treasury will default or whether the US dollar will cease to be the world’s currency of choice for reserves (neither of which I think is going to happen any time soon) but that large secular changes in the balances of savings and dollar demand could lead to outsized moves in interest rates.
First, let me remind you that the deficits are all intertwined. When the US Federal Government runs a deficit and borrows money, they have to get it from people/entities that have saved that money. One place that the government bond salesmen know they can turn to is non-US investors, who are in possession of those dollars because the US runs a large trade deficit with most other countries. When we run a trade deficit, it means we are importing more stuff than we are exporting or, equivalently, we are exporting more dollars than we are importing. Those dollars are pretty useless except to buy things that are dollar-denominated. By construction, we know that the new owners of dollars aren’t buying goods, because if they did there wouldn’t be a deficit; the main other thing they buy are securities or real property.
So if you don’t want other countries buying US stocks, buildings, and farmland, run a big trade surplus and they won’t have the dollars to do it.
It’s a good thing they have all of those dollars, because the Federal government needs them! The federal deficit needs to be funded by those foreign dollars, or by domestic savings (banks, individuals, companies, e.g.), or by the central bank buying up those bonds. And that’s pretty much it. Over time, the trade balance plus the budget balance plus the central bank balance plus private savings equals zero, more or less. During COVID, the massive expansion of the federal deficit was only possible because the Fed bought about the same number of bonds as the government sold. Had they not, interest rates would have risen precipitously because private savers would have had to be induced to put those dollars into bonds.
(Or, the government would give incentives for banks to hold more govvies, say by exempting them from the SLR. Not that such a thing would ever happen!)
Let’s pivot this then back to the Trump Transition. The stated goal of the Administration was to lower the trade deficit a lot, lower the budget deficit a lot, and lower interest rates. That all makes sense and is internally consistent. It could happen that way, if all of it happens that way.
What if, though, the President’s team makes more progress on one front than on the other? Early returns on the tariff front seem to imply that the US will face a smaller trade deficit going forward. Now, the latest spike higher (smaller deficit) here is at least partly and maybe mostly due to a ‘payback’ of the pre-tariff front-running that led to massive deficits in the prior three months. But it should not surprise us that increasing tariffs should cause the trade deficit to decline. That is, after all, sort of the point.
If we concede that the trade deficit is actually heading back towards some better semblance of balance, then that’s plank 1 of the Trump agenda. That will supply fewer dollars to cover the federal budget deficit, though. As long as the federal budget gets into something closer to balance…
That was the promise of DOGE, and of the revenues from tariffs. The latter will indeed be yuge, and will help balancing the budget. Or it would, if we weren’t about to run an even bigger deficit with the Big Beautiful Bill soon passing into law. The trailing-twelve-month budget deficit is just less than $2 trillion, which was a number we never even sniffed prior to COVID. So that’s the demand for savings: the feds look like they’re going to keep on spending more than they take in.
Unlike during COVID, too, the Fed is now letting its balance sheet shrink. No help there.
Now, there is also a movement in Congress to pass legislation preventing the Fed from paying interest on the reserves that banks hold at the Fed. For decades, the way the Fed managed the money supply was to adjust the quantity of reserves, which rationed credit and caused the price of credit (interest rates) to move as well. But it was the rationing of credit, not changing the price, that affected the money supply. Beginning with the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed flooded extra reserves into the system, forcibly deleveraging banks (look at that chart above again) – but, since that would also crush bank earnings, they started paying interest on reserves (IOR). Since, if banks were not being paid to hold reserves, they would hold as little as they could, the Fed had to pay interest or the excess of reserves in the overnight market would cause interest rates to always be zero. So the Fed started to manage the price of credit, rather than its quantity. The central bank fully intends to always hold way more in securities and therefore force way more reserves into the banks, going forward – but has gradually been reducing its portfolio securities. As I said, no help there.
If Congress succeeds in preventing the payment of IOR – and the politics on this looks good since the Fed now runs operating deficits, so that it is basically paying banks interest with taxpayer dollars (see chart below…Fed remits to the Treasury have dried up completely), then as I said above banks will try to hold fewer reserves and overnight interest rates will drop as banks compete to lend their excess reserves at anything above zero, unless (a) the fed increases the reserves banks are required to hold (really unlikely) or (b) the fed makes reserves scarce so some banks will have to buy them and some will sell them (the old way) (also really unlikely). In neither case does the Fed expand the balance sheet as a first intention, so unless we get another crisis the expansion of the Fed balance sheet is unlikely in my view.
So that leaves private savings. If the trade deficit declines and the budget balance doesn’t move significantly towards balance, then interest rates will have to rise, potentially a lot. I think the President’s stated plan makes very good economic sense. I just wonder if it’s going to be derailed by the desire to keep the Federal spend going.
The Road to Crypto Conversion
While this isn’t exactly the conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus, I came to a realization recently that subtly changes the way I look at the potential for large cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin.
Historically, my attitude has been dismissive about the value of bitcoin itself. While I recognize the amazing reach of blockchain technology and the genius of using asymmetric key cryptography to secure the public record of private transactions, I’ve always thought that bitcoin didn’t really achieve the promised goal, which was to be a better money than fiat dollars. After all, bitcoin is not backed by anything more than the dollar is – nothing. Its value is based on scarcity, and scarcity by itself is not a source of value (if it was, my toenail clippings would be immensely valuable). So in my 2016 book What’s Wrong with Money? I wrote in a chapter on bitcoin:
“But is bitcoin money? Calling it a virtual currency, or a digital currency, or a crypto-currency doesn’t make it money. At some level, it is of course money in the same sense as cigarettes are to prison inmates. It serves as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account – but only within the special community that already accepts bitcoin as credible…It is not yet broadly a credible currency. It doesn’t have universal value because not everyone believes that everyone else will accept bitcoin.”
Even in that chapter I recognized that bitcoin may someday be money-like. And I underwent a partial conversion and even worked for a while on a paper with my co-authors Kari Walstad and Scott Wald to define a measure (“Crypto Trust Index”) that would objectively measure how much like money the cryptocurrency world was becoming. [That paper ended up being overtaken by real-world developments, as stablecoins fully backed by fiat balances are obviously crypto money by identity, rendering the question moot.]
But in my mind bitcoin, eth, etc aren’t money but speculative vehicles – they are distinctly separate from USDC, USDi, and other fully-backed coins. It may be that they belong in a portfolio with stables and/or securities, but since bitcoin has no intrinsic value I have always held the view that I don’t want to own it as it can go to zero in a nonce.[1]
Recently, as I said, I’ve had a mild conversion as a result of two realizations.
The first realization is that even in the traditional securities world, we sometimes invest in things which have no intrinsic value in many states of the world. For example, we buy out-of-the-money options, or equity in a firm that is highly leveraged so that if the business goes under, the equity-holders get nothing. I am not sure this is a good excuse to buy bitcoin, though, since even if a far out-of-the-money option is unlikely to ever have intrinsic value there are at least future states of the world in which it could have intrinsic value. Similarly, that penny stock might end up being worth something if business booms. So we could think about bitcoin as being an option that may go to zero or may go up a lot. The problem with this, and the reason this reasoning alone is not compelling to me, is twofold. First, those far out-of-the-money options and long shots tend to have low prices, not high prices, and bitcoin certainly does not seem to have a low price. Second, there is no state of the world in which bitcoin will ever have an intrinsic value. Therefore, it doesn’t make a lot of sense to think of it as a real option, but at best as a speculation with an option-like payout (low in many states of the world, but massive in a few states). Put another way, while the value of that penny stock or out-of-the-money option can go to zero for some clearly-defined reasons, bitcoin can go to zero for any reason or no reason and it wouldn’t be wrong.
The second realization, though, relates to scarcity. Yes, scarcity alone cannot be the basis for value (see: my toenails). For scarcity to matter, there needs to be exogenous demand. And that demand need not be rational. If someone wants to hold bitcoin, not caring that it has no intrinsic value (or erroneously believing that it has some), then scarcity matters. The realization is that scarcity goes from not mattering at all, to mattering a great deal, as soon as there is any demand. To be sure, if that demand goes away, then scarcity again ceases to matter.
(By the way, it is entirely possible and even likely that someone else has pointed this out.)
So the case for speculating in bitcoin (no, I won’t call it investing) is that since the total supply is independent of price, the supply curve is vertical and moving to the right at an ever-slower rate. As this happens, it takes less and less increase in demand to push price higher.
It also takes less and less decrease in demand to push price lower. Since there is no slope to the supply curve, it means that oscillations in demand are responsible for all of the oscillations in bitcoin’s price. And we can say more about the volatility dynamics. Early in bitcoin’s development – when demand was very low, supply was relatively high compared to demand, and the price was as a result very low – we were operating at the far left end of the demand curve where demand was relatively more elastic and therefore there was a lot of volatility. As bitcoin matures, and demand catches up to the existing supply, we should expect price volatility to decline. And this is, in fact, what has happened (chart below, source: Bloomberg, shows rolling 100-week historical volatility (about two years, but I like round numbers today), now at the low-low level of 43% (about 3x equity market volatility).
The fun part comes later, when the supply curve shifts get slower and slower as the bitcoin halving converges to zero and the bitcoin supply gets closer and closer to its absolute maximum. At that point (and here is where the uberbulls get really excited), if there is a steady secular increase in demand, price just goes up without bound.
Don’t get too excited, uberbulls, because we aren’t there yet. When we are starting to get close to that point I would expect that we will also see volatility start to go up again. If historical volatility continues to decline, it means (a) we aren’t close enough to that point that the vertical singularity is nigh, and/or (b) people are losing interest in or diversifying away from bitcoin so that the steady increase in demand is not manifesting and interest is fluctuating less and less. So, I am waiting for that volatility to begin to expand at higher prices.
In any case, I am much more likely to invest in tokenized real world assets than I am Bitcoin or Ethereum. I am not a speculator at heart. Heck, I’m a bond guy which means I worry more about return of my principal than return on my principal. But if you are already long bitcoin, I will no longer sneer at you, because I recognize at last that one way or the other I will may be driving your car someday – either because it was repossessed and I bought it at auction, or because I am your chauffer.
Did You Know? Want to buy USDi, the inflation-linked stable coin, but don’t own any crypto you can exchange for it? You can actually use the coin as an on-ramp. Accredited investors need merely complete onboarding with USDi Partners and then can invest fiat dollars and receive USDi coins.
[1] Pun intended.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (May 2025)
Well, this was an odd one to sort out.
Going into the CPI announcement this morning, the economist consensus was for +0.17% (seasonally adjusted) on headline CPI m/m and +0.28% on core. Market changes this month have been very contained, partly because of the usual summer doldrums kicking in and partly (most likely) because of the degree of uncertainty surrounding all of the chaotic policy changes that have taken place in 2025. The effects of these changes (and more to come!) are still making their way through the system.
This is a calm surface over a roiling ocean. Economists continue to debate (and their analysis, to me, seems in many cases to be colored by the political lens they are looking through) about the impact that the current tariff structure will have, about the effect of future tariff changes – and what those will be, about the impact of the Most-Favored-Nation policy on pharmaceutical pricing and availability, about the effect the deportation of illegals (and self-deportations) will have on housing (rent inflation softer, but how much?) and labor supply (wages upward, but how much?) and Lodging Away from Home.
Actually, I’m overstating that a little bit. Most classically-trained economists mostly agree about how horrible this will all be, because tariffs bad. My own estimates have tariffs pushing inflation a little higher in the near-term, but not terribly. I also think that mass deportations would be very disinflationary because of the effect on rents but it is looking less and less like ‘mass deportations’ means tens or hundreds of thousands, not millions, and that effect likely won’t be huge.
Meanwhile, the Fed is keeping rates slightly above neutral but money supply growth has re-accelerated to a level that’s not likely to be consistent with inflation at 2%. Underlying trend median inflation is running about 3.5% or so, and is unlikely to fall a lot further given the current configuration of fiscal and monetary policy.
Let’s get into the data, then. The actual CPI was +0.08% (SA) on headline and +0.13% on core. That’s a significant miss, especially on core.
Core inflation has recently been missing low on a fairly regular basis, although most of the misses have been small. Median inflation in most cases hasn’t been confirming those misses, because they’ve generally been one-offs that don’t really wiggle median too much. It’s still a positive sign if the ‘tails’ are to the downside so that core CPI is below median CPI, but Median tells us not to get too excited. This month, though, Median also showed an effect. My estimate is that Median CPI will be the lowest since last July, at +0.25% m/m. It’s still difficult to see a major disinflationary trend here.
There’s more uncertainty than usual around my Median guess, but let’s take it as a given for now.
You don’t have to look too far to see one of the major culprits for the miss this month. Primary Rents were up +0.21% m/m, which is a lot slower than they had been running at.
Owners’ Equivalent Rent was also soft, and between those two surprises it’s probably roughly 5bps of the Core CPI miss. Let’s be clear – rents are not collapsing and indeed, we’ve just converged with our model.
Let’s be clear: if you are in the camp that we’re going to get back to 2%, you need this to not be an aberration. You need shelter inflation to continue to decelerate. But as you can see from the chart of month/month primary rents above, sharp movements in rents tend to be reversed in subsequent months. This looks a lot to me like last July’s surprise, which was reversed in August. We will see. But ex-shelter, year/year Core CPI rose, to 1.87% from 1.78%.
What is interesting to me as I write this, looking at some of the other commentary, is that folks don’t seem to be focusing on this. Of course it’s all tariffs, all the time, and everyone is scratching their heads over why we are seeing price declines in some of the categories where you’d expect the tariffs to help. Key example (and significant example) is autos, where the CPI for Used Cars and Trucks was -0.54% m/m after a similar decline last month, and New Cars were down -0.29% m/m. If there is one place that economists were certain we would see tariff-induced inflation, it was in autos. Not so much, at least yet. This might be because the lags are longer than we expect in a just-in-time manufacturing world, or it might be because demand elasticity is bigger than people thought.
But even with autos, Core Goods inflation accelerated to +0.3% y/y from +0.1% last month.
Remember, above I said that core goods ex-shelter had accelerated. I don’t want to fall into the trap of taking out all of the things that go down, to make the insightful conclusion that everything else went up – but that acceleration in core goods included the weighty autos contribution to the downside so you can tell that there are indeed upward pressures. Just not in the big things.
One place we saw increases was in Tenants’ and Household Insurance, which rose 0.84% last month, and in Motor Vehicle Insurance, which rose 0.68%. That helped keep core services inflation at +3.6% y/y, even with the slowdown in housing. On the other hand, Airfares suffered a third straight significant decline, -2.74% m/m. And while we are surprised to see auto prices decline, given the tariffs, we are also surprised to see Medicinal Drugs prices increase, given Trump’s new “Most Favored Nation” policy. Pharma prices were +0.54% m/m (although the y/y increase slackened some and is only +0.35% y/y). Core Services less Rent of Shelter (aka “Supercore”) is down to 3.11% y/y, and that’s good news even if it’s still quite a bit higher than it was pre-COVID. The trend is your friend, and this is a good trend for now.
As with the market itself, then, we’re seeing a lot of movement in both directions; it’s just all canceling out into a relatively tame increase in the overall CPI basket. That’s not likely to be the ultimate outcome. The last four year/year increases in Median CPI (assuming I’m vaguely right about the m/m, and we’ll know that in an hour or two) have been 3.53%, 3.48%, 3.46%, and 3.44%. That does not give the impression of a series that is in a hurry to get down to 2.25%-2.5%, which would be roughly consistent with sustainable core CPI around 2%. Again, you need to get shelter prices to really decelerate significantly further.
Now, even if that does happen, it isn’t going to keep y/y measures on a steady deceleration track for the next year. While we haven’t seen a major impact from tariffs yet, and my view is that it won’t be a huge impact in any case except for particular items, I am pretty sure we will see something and median and core inflation will see acceleration over the balance of this year and into next year. Thereafter, it depends on what happens with policy in the interim. On that score, while the current numbers still give the Fed no good reason to ease it also should pretty much remove any notion that monetary policy is about to get tighter. M2 growth is back to 4.4% y/y, and 6.4% annualized over the last quarter. That’s back to what was normal when we were experiencing the tailwinds of globalization and positive demographics. It is too fast now that those are headwinds.
But as I said, that’s the story for later this year and it could change. In the meantime, we keep waiting for the tariff effect. If three months from now we still haven’t seen an effect, then things will get very interesting.
One final announcement. If you’re an investor in cryptocurrencies (in particular, stable coins) and have a Telegram account, consider joining the read-only USDi_Coin room https://t.me/USDi_Coin where the USDi Coin price is updated every four hours or so…and where these charts are also posted shortly after CPI just as I used to do on Twitter before they changed the API to make auto-tweeting charts very difficult.
