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No Need to Rob Peter to Pay Paul

April 26, 2023 1 comment

So, I suppose the good news is that policymakers have stopped pretending that prices will go back down to the pre-pandemic levels. My friend Andy Fately (@fx_poet) in his daily note today called to my attention these dark remarks from Bank of England Chief “Economist” Huw Pill:

“If the cost of what you’re buying has gone up compared to what you’re selling, you’re going to be worse off…So somehow in the UK, someone needs to accept that they’re worse off and stop trying to maintain their real spending power by bidding up prices, whether higher wages or passing the energy costs through on to customers…And what we’re facing now is that reluctance to accept that, yes, we’re all worse off, and we all have to take our share.”

I think it’s worth stopping to re-read those words again. There are two implications that immediately leap out to me.

The first is that this is scary-full-Socialist. “We all have to take our share” is so anti-capitalist, anti-freedom, anti-individualist that it reeks of something that came from the pages of Atlas Shrugged. No, thank you, I don’t care to take my share of your screw-up. I would like to defend my money, and my real spending power, and my real lifestyle. If that comes at the cost of your lifestyle, Mr. Pill, then I’m sorry.

But the second point is that…it doesn’t come at the cost of someone else’s lifestyle. This is why I put “economist” in quotation marks above. There is still a lot of confusion out there between the price level and inflation, and what a change in the price level means, but if you’re an economist there shouldn’t be.

You see statements like this everywhere…”food prices are up 18%. If people are spending 18% more on food, it means they’re spending less elsewhere.” “Rents are up 17%. If people are spending 17% more on rent, it means they’re spending less elsewhere.” “Pet food is up 21%. If people are spending 21% more on pet food, it means they’re spending less elsewhere.” “New vehicle prices are up 22%. If people are spending 22% more on new vehicles, it means they’re spending less elsewhere.” “Price of appliances are up 19%. If people are spending 19% more on new appliances, it means they’re spending less elsewhere.”

You get my point. All of those, incidentally, are actual aggregate price changes since the end of 2019.

This is where an actual economist should step in and say “if the amount of money in circulation is up 37%, why does spending 18% more on good or service A mean that we have to spend less on good or service B?” In fact, this is only true if the growth in the aggregate amount of money is distributed highly unevenly. In ‘normal’ times, that might be a defensible assumption but during the pandemic money was distributed remarkably evenly.

Okay…the amount of money in circulation is a ‘stock’ number and the prices of stuff changing over time is a ‘flow’ number, which is why money velocity also matters. M*V is up about 24% since the end of 2019. So a 20% rise in prices shouldn’t be surprising, and since there’s lots more money out there a 20% rise in the price of one good does not imply you need to spend less on another good. That’s only true in a non-inflationary environment. The world has changed. You need to learn to think in real terms, especially if you are a “Chief Economist.”

(N.b. to be sure, this is somewhat definitional since we define V as PQ/M, but the overarching point is that with 40% more money in the system, it should be not the slightest bit surprising to see prices up 20%. And, if velocity really does act like a spring storing potential energy, then we should eventually expect to see prices up more like 30-40%.)

Here’s a little bonus thought.

Rents are +17%, which is roughly in line with a general rise in the prices of goods and services. Home prices are up about 36% (using Shiller 20-City Home Price Index), which is roughly in line with the raw increase in M2.

Proposition: since the price of unproductive real assets is essentially an exchange rate of dollars:asset – which means that an increase in a real asset’s price is the inverse of the dollar’s decrease – then the price of a real asset should reflect the stock of money since price is dictated by the relative scarcity of the quantity of dollars versus the real asset. But the price of a consumer good or service should reflect the flow of money, so something more like the MV/Q concept.

Implication:

Discuss.

Who’s Afraid of De-Dollarization?

April 19, 2023 3 comments

Do we need to worry about the end of dollar dominance in international trade – the de-dollarization of global finance?

I am hoping to do a podcast on this topic in a few weeks, featuring a guest who is actually an expert on foreign exchange and who can push back on my thought processes (or, less likely, echo them) – but the topic seems timely now. There is widespread discussion and concern in some quarters, as China and Russia push forward efforts to establish the Chinese Yuan as an alternative currency for international trade settlement, that this could spell the sunset of the dollar’s dominance. Some of the more animated commentators declare that de-dollarization will dramatically and immediately eviscerate the standard of living in the United States and condemn the nation to be an also-ran third-rate economy as its citizens descend into unspeakable squalor.

Obviously, such ghoulish prognostications are ridiculously overdone for the purpose of generating clicks. But how much of it is true, at least on some level? What would happen if, tomorrow, the US dollar lost its status as the world’s primary reserve currency?

One thing that wouldn’t change at all is the quantity of dollars in circulation. That’s a number that the Federal Reserve exerts some control over (they used to have almost total control, when banks were reserve-constrained; now that banks have far more reserves than they need, they can lend as much as they like, creating as many floating dollars as they like, constrained only by their balance sheet). The holders of dollars have absolutely no control over the amount of them in circulation! If Party A doesn’t like owning dollars, they can sell their dollars – but they have to sell it to some Party B, who then holds the dollars.

What also wouldn’t change immediately is how many dollar reserves every country holds. From time to time, people get concerned that “China is going to sell all of its dollars.” But China got those dollars because they sell us more stuff than we sell them, which causes them to accumulate dollars over time. How can China get rid of their dollars? Their options are fairly limited:

  1. They can start buying more from us than they sell to us. We’ve been trying to get them to do this for years! Seems unlikely.
  2. They can buy from us, stuff priced in dollars, but only sell goods to us that are priced in Yuan. To get Yuan, a US purchaser would have to sell dollars to buy Yuan. Since China doesn’t want to be the other side of that trade (which would leave them with the same amount of dollars), the US purchaser would have to go elsewhere to buy Yuan. This would strengthen the Yuan. This is also something we’ve been trying to get them to do for years! The Bank of China stops the Yuan from strengthening against the dollar by…selling Yuan and buying dollars. Hmmm.
  3. They can just hit the bid and sell dollars against all sorts of other currencies. This would greatly weaken the dollar, and is perhaps the biggest fear of many of the people worried about de-dollarization.

Supposing that China decided on #3, they would be making US industry much more competitive around the world against all of the currencies that China was buying. Foreign buyers of US products would now be able to buy US goods much more cheaply. It would cause more inflation in the US, but it would take a large dollar decline to drastically increase US inflation since foreign trade is a smaller part of the US economy than it is for many other countries.

A much lower dollar, making US prices look lower to non-US customers, would help balance the US trade deficit. Yay!

A tendency towards balance of the trade deficit would have ancillary impacts. When the US government runs a fiscal deficit, it borrows from essentially two places: domestic savers and foreign savers. Foreigners, having a surplus of dollars (since they have trade surpluses with us), buy Treasuries among other things. If the trade deficit went down drastically, so would foreign demand for US Treasuries. That in turn would (unless the government started to balance its fiscal deficit) cause higher interest rates, which would be necessary to induce domestic savers to buy more Treasuries. Or, if domestic savers were not up to the task, the buyer of last resort would be…the Federal Reserve, which could buy those bonds with printed money. And that’s a really bad outcome.

Now, does any of this cause a collapse of the American system or spell an end to US hegemony? No. If policymakers respond to such an event by refusing to get the fiscal house in order, then things could get ugly. But it would be hard to blame that outcome on the end of the dollar as the medium of international trade – blame would more appropriately be directed at the failure of domestic policymakers to adjust in response.

In the end, it is hard to escape the idea that good or bad economic and inflation outcomes in the United States track mainly, one way or the other, back to domestic policy decisions. Whether the US economic system remains a dominant one is…fortunately or unfortunately…in our hands, not in the hands of foreign state actors.

Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (March 2023)

Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy, but subscribers to @InflGuyPlus get the tweets in real time and a conference call wrapping it all up by about the time the stock market opens. Subscribe by going to the shop at https://inflationguy.blog/shop/ , where you can also subscribe to the Enduring Investments Quarterly Inflation Outlook. Sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Individual and institutional investors, issuers and risk managers with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments! Check out the Inflation Guy podcast!

Note that since the post-8:30am charts were tweeted rapidly and commentary added to it by later re-tweets, the summary below is rearranged to eliminate the redundancy and improve readability.

  • Welcome to the #CPI #inflation walkup for April! (March’s CPI figure)
  • A reminder to subscribers of the tweet schedule: At 8:30ET, when the data drops, I will post a number of charts and numbers, in fairly rapid-fire succession. Then I will retweet some of those charts with comments attached. Then I’ll run some other charts.
  • There is a small wrinkle this month: I am going to be a guest on a Twitter space hosted by @Unusual_Whales while I’m busy tweeting. That shouldn’t impact you subscribers. Tune in if you want!
  • After the tweeting dies down, I will have a private conference call for subscribers where I’ll quickly summarize the numbers. After my comments on the number, I will post a partial summary at https://inflationguy.blog and later will podcast a summary at inflationguy.podbean.com .
  • I will also record that call for later call-in if you’re not available (and of course later there will be my tweet summary, and my podcast, so you can consume my opinions however suits you).
  • Thanks again for subscribing! And now for the walkup.(Some of this I’ve related over the last few days and am summarizing/repeating here.)
  • The whole banking-collapse thing seems to have blown over for now, but interest rates are still lower than they were a month ago. And breakevens are higher. This is one reason stocks are doing well – steady infl expectations and lower real yields is a sweet cocktail for equities.
  • It’s also likely fleeting, but it helps explain why the market is doing so well for now.
  • Today’s CPI print might be very interesting. There are a lot of crosscurrents and everyone seems to be interpreting them differently. The spread isn’t super wide, but the swaps market is almost a full 0.1% below economists’ estimate for headline inflation.
  • (The swaps market tends to be more accurate than economists in this regard, but I hope this month they aren’t because I have the over.)
  • The drag on inflation is not going to come from food; raw foods are again spiking and there’s still the wage issues for food-away-from-home. I have gasoline adding 3bps, while some others see it flat or subtracting slightly. But the big drag is piped gas.
  • As I noted on Monday, piped gas is part of household energy and normally it is too small to matter. But the massive recent decline pulled down February CPI and should pull down March. I have the effect worth 13bps.
  • But also, lower utilities implies that primary rents will have a small tailwind UPWARD and most people will ignore that. The reason it happens is the BLS backs out utilities when rents include utilities, so sharply lower utilities implies slightly higher rents.
  • Anyway, that’s the big drag. But why does the swap market see it as so much bigger than economists do? That’s odd. Or it could imply the Street sees a real drag on core…but that’s a hard sell right now.
  • Last month, Used Cars did not rise along with the private indices, but those indices rose again and so it’s likely we’ve seen the end of the price retracement from Used Cars. Indeed, Core Goods is showing signs that it is not going to gently go to -1%.
  • Heck, in my view the economists are too low on core anyway – they’re 0.05% below the traders on Kalshi’s core inflation market, and 0.1% below me. Is it possible we can get 0.4% or lower on core? Sure. But there are a lot of upward pressures.
  • This chart shows median wages minus median CPI. For years, it has been stable at about 1%, other than in the aftermath of disaster. Right now it isn’t, b/c Median CPI is still rising while median wages have ebbed although just a little.
  • Now, this chart might say something different to you than to me. My interpretation is that employees will fight against further declines in wage growth, until inflation comes down. But you might argue that this gives room for CPI to decelerate.
  • Since we are focused on the wage-price feedback loop in core-services-ex-shelter (as I was saying long before the cool kids dubbed it “supercore”), the resolution of this question is very, very important.
  • Anyway, I think we will see 0.5% on core inflation. But even if we only see 0.4%, y/y core will rise. Not many will get too exercised about that, though, because the easy comps are coming. By May, we will likely see y/y core start declining again.
  • Of course, I’m focused on median CPI, which is still hitting new highs. But it also should start ebbing soon. As always, the question is “how much” and I continue to say “not as much as the market is pricing in.” With breakevens in the low 2s, they’re very cheap in my view.
  • We will see what the number brings. But unless it’s even higher than I have it, and with an alarming breadth, I think the Fed is likely done hiking. As I said last month, 25bps doesn’t do anything at this stage anyway.
  • But +0.5% on core will be taken very badly by the stock market, I think, and probably pretty bad for bonds as well. Everyone wants fervently to believe with the inflation swaps market that this inflation episode is over.
  • Doesn’t look like it to me. Not yet! Good luck today and I’ll be back live at 8:31ET.

  • Definitely better than expected. Swap market as usual is closer than economists…and core was actually was .053%
  • m/m CPI: 0.053% m/m Core CPI: 0.385%
  • Kneejerk observations: Used Cars dragged again (?). RENTS WERE SHARPLY LOWER FROM TREND. Medical Care was a drag.
  • Last 12 core CPI figures
  • Inflation Swap market gets closest-to-the-pin. In fact, Headline rounded UP to 0.1%. Core was actually kinda close to expectations (but lower than I thought!).
  • M/M, Y/Y, and prior Y/Y for 8 major subgroups
  • The big story here is going to be housing. Housing 0.3% m/m is a big decline. Some of that is piped gas, but…
  • Core Goods: 1.53% y/y                       Core Services: 7.13% y/y
  • Now, notice that core goods turned up. That’s even though CPI for Used Cars declined. Again, that is unexpected since private surveys have said used car prices are going back up.
  • Primary Rents: 8.81% y/y                    OER: 8.04% y/y
  • …still not peaked, but peaking? Actually y/y higher this month, so it’s possible there’s some seasonality issue.
  • Further: Primary Rents 0.49% M/M, 8.81% Y/Y (8.76% last)         OER 0.48% M/M, 8.04% Y/Y (8.01% last)         Lodging Away From Home 2.7% M/M, 7.3% Y/Y (6.7% last)
  • (This really is the big story today. Actually, core being that high despite housing…is surprising.)
  • Actually core ex-shelter rose very slightly to 3.81% y/y.
  • Here is my early and automated guess at Median CPI for this month: 0.401%
  • Some ‘COVID’ Categories: Airfares 3.96% M/M (6.38% Last)          Lodging Away from Home 2.7% M/M (2.26% Last)          Used Cars/Trucks -0.88% M/M (-2.77% Last)          New Cars/Trucks 0.38% M/M (0.18% Last)
  • Piece 1: Food & Energy: 2.63% y/y
  • A lot of the recent plunge here is piped gas…which is just about done.
  • Piece 2: Core Commodities: 1.53% y/y
  • Piece 3: Core Services less Rent of Shelter: 5.53% y/y
  • Supercore coming down! But just a little. Still not sure this is thrilling enough for the Fed.
  • Piece 4: Rent of Shelter: 8.26% y/y
  • The distribution here is going to be really important. Unfortunately my data scraper is having a strange issue and that feeds my distribution stuff. Obviously the middle shifted, which is why median CPI decelerated, but I want to see the diffusion stuff. Tech delay for me…
  • Piped gas actually fell only -8.0% m/m NSA, versus -9.3% last month. I thought it was going to be greater, so there was a slightly SMALLER drag on headline than I expected there.
  • Also encouraging is that Food and Beverages was only 0.02% m/m. I’m a little surprised by that, but it’s good news. Non-core of course.
  • I will say the bottom line is that IF the housing data is real, then this is a really happy inflation number. But outside of the housing data…core was still 0.4%! So not GREAT data. The distribution data will be important, which is why it’s even more frustrating atm.
  • I can also report that the biggest decliners in core m/m were Car/Truck Rental (-37% annualized monthly change), Energy Services (-24%), Misc Personal Goods (-14%) and Used Cars/Trucks (-10%). Latter I’ve already mentioned is really odd.
  • Biggest gainers are Public Transportation (+46%), Lodging Away from Home (+38%), Motor Vehicle Insurance (+16%), Mens/Boys Apparel (+13%), and Personal Care Products (+10%).
  • We are obviously not going to have the conference call today…too late to be of any use. But I have some thoughts anyway about the Fed and the positive market reaction.
  • Totally understand the positive market reaction. The headline figure ALMOST rounded to unchanged, and core was a little light although not very much. The rally makes sense.
  • The dive in longer-term breakevens doesn’t, as much. If you think this big deceleration in shelter is real then it means inflation is probably peaking even in a median sense…but long-term breakevens already impound a 2.2% average inflation rate.
  • There is nothing to make me think that rents are going to go flat, with median wages rising at 6% and home prices advancing again. This is not 2009-10 and there is still a big shortage in shelter and plenty of income to support rents. So 2%…is still very unlikely IMO.
  • That said, let’s think about the Fed. Start from the premise that their model is assuming high-frequency rent data is predictive, even though it’s been predicting rent deceleration for a long time and this is the first sign of it.
  • But if your null is “I’m waiting for rental inflation to turn” and then you see a sign of a turn…well, it’s bad econometrics to “confirm” a hypothesis but that’s how humans work. I think this makes a further hike fairly unlikely unless the Fed wants to make a symbolic gesture.
  • With Fed funds at 5% and at least SOME concerns about banking, the juice doesn’t seem to be worth the squeeze to hike again. Which is, of course, why markets are ebullient today.
  • I don’t think we’re out of the woods on inflation yet. I should have missed this number by a LOT more than I did given I was 0.25% off on the largest part of core. It means the strength is still broad.
  • But the question has never been “WILL inflation go back down someday.” It has been about WHEN. And how far…but not so many people are questioning that when it goes back down, it’ll go to 2%.
  • There’s just no natural reason that should happen. It’s a pleasant wish, but there’s no mechanism to cause inflation to go to the Fed’s target naturally. And as I’ve shown recently, there’s actually not much evidence that inflation mean reverts at all…even if the mean IS 2%.
  • So…good news today, and the Fed will take it as such. As will markets. But here is the chart of m/m primary rents. This doesn’t seem entirely plausible to me. Give me another month or two and I’ll be a believer.
  • Anyway, thanks for tuning in, and bearing with me despite the tech issues. I will update the diffusion index when I get the problem fixed.

Today’s inflation data was clearly positive, but how positive it is depends on whether rents are suddenly decelerating in the way the data says they did in March. That seems implausible to me, but it’s possible. As I said above, the question was never whether inflation would stop going up, but when, and how far it falls back. We thought median inflation had peaked in September, and then it went higher. It now looks like it has peaked again – and this is likely the case. But we’ve been fooled before.

Here’s a crucial point to keep in mind, though, when we are predicting Fed action. What’s their null? If my null hypothesis is that inflation is unlikely to slow below 4%, say, then I need a lot more evidence before I stop hiking rates. I know that many of you reading this fall into that camp. But does that mindset characterize the central bank’s thinking? What I think we know about the Fed right now is that they are moderately (but only moderately) concerned about the banking system; they are concerned about core services ex-shelter because of the wage-price feedback loop I’ve been highlighting since long before they did; and they believe that higher-frequency data on rents suggests that rent inflation should be ebbing ‘soon.’ Chairman Powell has said all of these things.

So if that’s the case, how does it frame today’s data?

There’s nothing new in this about banking. But there does seem to be information which would confirm what I am assuming to be the Fed’s ‘priors’ about rents. To me, that one month doesn’t mean a lot, but to someone who has been expecting a deceleration, this probably looks like one. There’s also nothing here about wages per se, although “supercore” is decelerating some. However, I think the Fed already believes wages are declining, because they tend to focus more on “Average Hourly Earnings” from the Employment report. That’s a terrible measure, but it’s widely used. (In fact, for most economic data you want to ignore “average” measures if the composition can change a lot from report to report, like the employment report can). Here’s a chart of AHE, against my preferred measure of median wages of continuously-employed persons, from the Atlanta Fed (in blue).

If I’m right and the Fed is focusing on the black line rather than the blue line, and I’m right about how they are thinking about rents, then I think if you took a poll of Fed thinkers you’d find that most of them think they’ve broken the back of inflation and the only question is how quickly it gets back to 2%. I suspect most of them would prefer to keep rates where they are, and not lower them quickly, because you want to keep the pressure on…but I believe the argument for pushing rates a lot higher is substantially weakened by recent data – that is, if you share those priors.

My view is unchanged, although I will keep an eye on rents. My model has them coming down to 4% or so, but then my model never had them getting much higher than 5%. Some of that is an overshoot thanks to the correction after the eviction moratorium was lifted, but a lot of that in my opinion is supported by the big shortage of shelter and by strong wage growth. I’m not sure why we’d expect rents to fall drastically, especially if a landlord’s cost of financing and of maintenance are still rising. Overall, I think inflation is in retreat thanks to a contracting money supply although that is offset by the rebound in money velocity. But I don’t expect inflation to get to 2% any time this year or in 2024. More likely, we will settle in around 4%-5% later this year. That’s my null hypothesis!

The Phillips Curve is Still Working Just Fine

April 5, 2023 1 comment

About five and a half years ago, I wrote a blog article entitled “The Phillips Curve is Working Just Fine, Thanks”, in response to the exhaustively-repeated nonsense that the ‘Phillips Curve is Broken.’ This nonsense never really goes away, but last week Fed Governor Waller delivered a speech on “The Unstable Phillips Curve,” derived from the same nonsense, and I felt duty-bound to resurrect my prior article and update it. The Phillips Curve has not been unstable at all, over the last quarter century at least. Here is my original article, linked here:


I must say that it is discouraging how often I have to write about the Phillips Curve.

The Phillips Curve is a very simple idea and a very powerful model. It simply says that when labor is in short supply, its price goes up. In other words: labor, like everything else, is traded in the context of supply and demand, and the price is sensitive to the balance of supply and demand.

Somewhere along the line, people decided that what Phillips really meant was that low unemployment caused consumer price inflation. It turns out that doesn’t really work (see chart, source BLS, showing unemployment versus CPI since 1997).

Accordingly, since the Phillips Curve is “broken,” lots of work has been done to resurrect it by “augmenting” it with expectations. This also does not work, although if you add enough variables to any model you will eventually get a decent fit.

And so here we are, with Federal Reserve officials and blue-chip economists alike bemoaning that the Fed has “only one model, and it’s broken,” when it never really worked in the first place. (Incidentally, the monetary model that relates money and velocity (via interest rates) to the price level works quite well, but apparently they haven’t gotten around to rediscovering monetarism at the Fed).

But the problem is not in our stars, but in ourselves. There is nothing wrong with the Phillips Curve. The title of William Phillips’ original paper is “The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957.” Note that there is nothing in that title about consumer inflation! Here is the actual Phillips Curve in the US over the last 20 years, relating the Unemployment Rate to wages 9 months later.

The trendline here is a simple power function and actually resembles the shape of Phillips’ original curve. The R-squared of 0.91, I think, sufficiently rehabilitates Phillips. Don’t you?

I haven’t done anything tricky here. The Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker is a relevant measure of wages which tracks the change in the wages of continuously-employed persons, and so avoids composition effects such as the fact that when unemployment drops, lower-quality workers (who earn lower wages) are the last to be hired. The 9-month lag is a reasonable response time for employers to respond to labor conditions when they are changing rapidly such as in 2009…but even with no lag, the R-squared is still 0.73 or so, despite the rapid changes in the Unemployment Rate in 2008-09.

So let Phillips rest in peace with his considerable contribution in place. Blame the lack of inflation on someone else.


Before I add to my rant, let me update the chart above with data since then, including the pandemic. The green dots in the chart below correspond to the dots in the chart above; the blue dots are for the period since then.

Amazingly, even during the pandemic and post-pandemic period, the Phillips Curve did a pretty decent job of describing the basic shape of this relationship. The dots overall are a bit higher; that’s attributable I think to the fact that inflation itself is higher and I’ve done this chart in nominal terms. There is some money illusion operating (or else the latest dots would be a lot higher), but it’s still a pretty nice fit, considering. I’ve preserved the prior regression line, but it doesn’t really shift very much.

In fact, the deviation prior to the pandemic – the little knot of blue dots to the left – are somewhat more surprising in a way, given the much lower economic volatility that there was when those points were laid down. But in any event, though, there is nothing obviously wrong with the Phillips Curve.

Now, it is true that the Unemployment Rate and the rate of consumer inflation have not been particularly well-behaved. But that isn’t a new phenomenon; that particular inconvenience has been that way for decades. The reason is pretty straightforward, and only confusing if you spent too much time getting a PhD and getting taught dumb things: the connection between wages and prices is not 1:1. It’s not constant. And there’s no particular reason that it should be, because labor is just one input into production costs, and the cost of production just affects the supply side of the supply/demand interplay which determines price. The really weird thing is that anyone ever thought that prices would be set by taking the current wage cost and adding a simple and stable markup.

A wage is just the price of labor, which is set in the market for labor, which involves the demand for labor and the supply of labor. The supply of labor changes very slowly. The demand for labor moves with the economic cycle. When the economic cycle is ebbing, the demand for labor falls – and that causes the quantity of labor demanded to decline (the unemployment rate goes up) as it also causes the price of labor to fall. That’s what happens when a demand curve shifts leftward on a mostly-static supply curve: Q down, P down. When the economic cycle is flowing, the demand for labor rises, which causes the quantity of labor demanded to increase (the unemployment rate declines) and the price of labor to rise. It isn’t that hard. In fact, you learn that in pretty much the first semester of economics.

It’s those later semesters that screw up economists, encouraging them to design complicated models that are very pretty but don’t necessarily relate to real-world dynamics. We should not be at all surprised when those models don’t work in the real world.

But don’t blame Phillips.

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