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What Happens if CPI Isn’t Released?

September 27, 2023 Leave a comment

One thing I’ve stopped worrying very much about is a government shutdown. It could even be a good thing, given the bloated deficit, except for the fact that the government basically keeps spending anyway. The federal government employs about 4.5mm workers, and no more than 800k have every been furloughed – moreover, many of those furloughed workers often receive back pay. Social Security gets paid, Treasuries get paid, and the wheel keeps turning. That’s not a guarantee, of course – it’s possible that an extended shutdown could cause Treasuries interest to not be paid, but we all know that before that happens, the Fed would just print the money and make sure the checks go out. At worst, there could be a one-day technical default, if important people had given the heads-up to insiders to get really long CDS.

But my cynicism is getting the better of me so let’s turn to what could happen in a shutdown that impacts the inflation markets: in the past, some data releases of federal agencies have been delayed (or their quality impacted), and if the delay was long enough then it could affect TIPS. Lots of people are asking about this, so I thought I’d lay out what would happen and how.

First of all, the quality of the CPI data could potentially be impacted. That has happened in the past, because data collection agents are not ‘essential workers’ so if the government shuts down, a lot of the data collection stops. This is less of a problem than it has been in the past, though, because a lot more of the data is collected electronically than in the past. For example, the new cars sample is no longer collected by hand but is sourced from J.D. Power. Prescription drugs data is partly supplied by one large firm that didn’t want to allow data collectors to collect data in store. A similar story applies to apparel. Many of these ‘big data’ changes are discussed in this BLS white paper, but the point is that these changes also mean that the quality of the data won’t be impacted as much as would be the case if data collection was entirely done by hand as it once was.

The bigger potential problem is that the CPI report could be delayed.[1] The NSA CPI is used almost exclusively as the index in inflation swaps, and is the index that determines escalation of TIPS principals. Other subindices are used in contract arrangements (for example, in long-term airplane purchase contracts), but those applications are generally less urgent.

If the BLS is unable to release the CPI on October 12th, what happens? The first thing to know is that the September CPI (which is what is released in October) is only relevant to swap payments and TIPS accruals in November and December. For each day in November, the inflation index is interpolated between the August and September prints; for each day in December, the inflation index is interpolated between the September and October prints. Ergo, missing the September print would make it impossible to settle inflation swaps payments – but more importantly, every TIPS trade that settles in November or December would be impossible to settle because the invoice price couldn’t be calculated.

Fortunately, the Treasury thought about that a very long time ago. Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) spells out what would happen if the BLS didn’t report a CPI by the end of October (it also spells out what happens if the BLS makes a large change to the CPI, or stops calculating it). In a nutshell, the Treasury would use the August CPI index, inflated by the decompounded year-over-year inflation rate from August 2022-August 2023:

I’ll do the math for you. If the CPI isn’t released, the figure for September will be 307.94834, which is +0.3004% on the month. While that sounds very convenient, since economists are forecasting a +0.3% m/m change for this data point, remember that the economists’ +0.3% is seasonally adjusted while the +0.3004% change is NSA. The difference is that 0.3004% NSA is about 0.50% SA this month.

Naturally, this wouldn’t matter very much in the long run; once the October CPI was released at the proper level the artificial change from Sep-Oct would wash out the artificial change for Aug-Sep.

Except, that is, for one pain-in-the-ass way, and that is the second part of the code snippet shown above: the Treasury would never adjust the official number back to match the BLS back-dated release of September CPI. Forever after, if you ran the sequence of monthly Treasury CPI Index numbers and the BLS CPI numbers, they would be exactly the same except for the one data point. The economic significance of that approaches zero, but the Inflation-Guy-Irritation figure on that approaches infinity.

So let’s hope cooler heads prevail.


[1] How likely is this? Kalshi has a market for this as well as markets on the probability of a government shutdown and the length of a government shutdown. As of this writing, Kalshi traders are saying there is an 18% chance that the CPI data will not be released in October.

Union Power and Inflation

September 19, 2023 2 comments

One of the biggest stories of the past week has been the synchronized strike by the United Auto Workers (UAW) against the Big Three auto makers in Detroit. Although so far only 13,000 workers out of the 146,000 who pledge allegiance to the UAW have struck, the strategy of striking against each of the Big Three at the same time is interesting. In the past, the UAW would choose a particular automaker to strike, win concessions from that company, and then use the new contract as the basis to cudgel the other automakers into a similar deal. This would completely shut down one company, but not the entire country’s car-making capacity. In this case, the UAW is significantly impacting operations at all three while not completely shutting down any of them – although the implicit threat is that they could, at any time, do so.

What is also interesting is that the demands of the union are aggressive, not to say ambitious. The union is asking for a 36% increase in pay, implemented over four years…plus a reduction to a 32-hour work-week while being paid for 40 hours. Combined, those two demands represent a 70% increase in compensation per hour for a union employee (or, put another way, assuming that a car can’t suddenly be made with 20% less labor, it means the cost of labor going into the vehicle will increase 70%). Additionally, they want a restoration of defined-benefit pension plans and contracted cost-of-living adjustments, which isn’t included in that 70% figure.

Whether or not the union is able to get a sizeable portion of its demands (so far, the auto companies have offered 20% over four years, but the other components of the deal are at least as important), this clearly stands out as one of the most audacious labor asks of the last quarter-century. The timing should not be surprising. Historically, union size and activism is positively related to the level of inflation (see chart, source BLS).

You might think that unions also strengthen when unemployment is high. This is not as true as you would think: when unemployment is high, the union would be asking a company to deliver jobs even though there is no work to be done and the company’s viability may be threatened by a weak economy. Consequently, union actions in a recession tend to be less vigorous (the UAW in fact points out that they made concessions in the Global Financial Crisis to help keep automakers afloat), and unionization is less valuable to the workers in those cases. But in inflation, the union is asking the company to give more to the workers it has and needs, out of its growing revenues and profits (even though those revenues and profits look less impressive, and may even be shrinking, after inflation). Moreover, while unemployment hurts the workers who are unemployed (and unable to pay union dues, also), inflation hurts all workers. Consequently, it is inflation and not unemployment that energizes unions.

Naturally, this is part of the feedback loop that concerns policymakers. When I talk about the wage-price feedback loop, I’m generally talking about how it manifests in core services ex-shelter (“supercore”), where a large part of the cost of the product is labor. In the case of a car, labor is only about 15% – although the exact figure depends who you ask and whether you’re asking about the percentage of cost or the percentage of price. So a 70% increase in that cost would “only” add about 10% to the cost/price of a new car whereas a 70% increase in the cost of an accountant would raise the cost of getting your taxes done by something pretty close to 70%. However, union power has its own momentum, and it manifests in things like (for example) automatic cost-of-living adjustments and persistent pressure on fringe benefits and pensions from a union whose influence in this sort of environment is growing.

That’s not to say that it’s good or bad – but this is another cost of letting the short-term inflation spike linger on by not addressing it by aggressively shrinking the balance sheet early on. The longer inflation stays higher, the more power unions have. And the more power unions have, the more momentum inflation has.

Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (August 2023)

September 13, 2023 2 comments

Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy. Sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Individual and institutional investors, issuers and risk managers with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments! Check out the Inflation Guy podcast!

  • Welcome to the #CPI #inflation walkup for September (August’s figure).
  • At 8:30ET, when the data drops, I will pull down the data and then run a bunch of charts. I think I’ve figured out how to autopost these again, fingers crossed. Then I’ll comment and post some more charts.
  • Later, I will post a summary of these tweets at https://inflationguy.blog and then podcast a summary at inflationguy.podbean.com . Thanks again for subscribing!
  • This month, after some low prints recently, we’re going to get some higher ones. Not terrible like last year, mind you, but higher. The economist consensus…which I’m again closer to than the swap market estimate…is for a high 0.2% on core and a low 0.6% on headline.
  • That will raise y/y headline and drop y/y core (all the way to 4.3%!). Core should also fall again next month due to a harsh comp from Sep 2022. After that, progress will be slower. If there’s progress.
  • The last couple of prints have been very low: core of +0.16% in both June and July. These were due to non-repeatable things, and I’ll talk about some of them in a bit.
  • But the point is that we’ve gotten most of the positive surprises for a while I think (although I guess that’s the nature of surprises!)
  • A positive (drag) today, and ongoing for a while, will be the deceleration in rents. Last month Primary Rents were +0.42% and OER was +0.49%. I am penciling the combined ‘rent of shelter’ in for +0.41% this month. That might be aggressive. But it will  keep slowing for a while.
  • But there are a few things that are going to be reversing soon. One is health insurance. I wrote about this recently https://shorturl.at/agtCX . It will still drag today but that will reverse in October.
  • Used Cars is a little indeterminate. I would have thought it was overdone on the downside but am less sure of that now. Here’s why:
  • Black book implies continued downward pressure on used car prices. This is partly because auto finance companies have really jerked back on lending, sharply raising rates along with their cost of funding and actually checking credit occasionally.
  • The rates make sense but the rationing not so much – delinquency rates have risen from the 2021 covid-funding inspired lows but are still at normal rates. Anyway the result has been downard pressure on used car prices.
  • The rate effect is what people had been expecting from housing – the difference between a 5% car loan and a 0% car loan for 7 years is about 13% higher cost for the non-cash buyer so a budget-conscious buyer lowers his price somewhat as a result. Hasn’t happened in housing.
  • But in housing the seller also has a loan with value and so is reluctant to sell at a lower price AND lose the low rate. That symmetry doesn’t exist in autos. I suspect that’s why used car prices have fallen farther than I expected (and I should have seen that).
  • The Fed though is done (at worse, ALMOST done), and rates will level off for car loans. So this downward pressure will eventually ebb. And they should end up adjusting to a higher overall price level.
  • Used cars will still be a drag today (I have a -3.5% fall in used cars penciled in), but that too should ebb soon.
  • The real mystery from last month was airfares. That has been down >8% two months in a row, and the current level is about 15% too low for the level of jet fuel (which is rising).
  • Do airfares recover 3%? 8%? 15%? I’m wild-guessing 6% but every 1% is worth 3/4 of 1bp on the core m/m. So I’m projecting it to add 4bps, basically. This is a big source of uncertainty, but mostly on the upside, this month.
  • Now, we should also recognize that last month’s CPI was also pretty BROADLY low, which meant that median CPI also printed low.
  • That would be wonderful if it happened again (but it’s unlikely). Indeed, between higher headline, core, and median, it will be very easy for some people to get carried away with negativity.
  • But still, we’re talk ing about 0.23% on core, maybe rounding up to 0.3% if we get stuff a little high. That’s settling in towards the high-3s, low-4s, which is where I think we are going. But watch the breadth, and median.
  • The markets, on net, have done almost nothing this last month. Real yields and nominal yields went up a touch, but longer breakevens and swaps are almost exactly unchanged. Shorter breakevens are wider on the strength in gasoline.
  • I think markets recognize that the narrative is turning, from “we are in an inflationary spiral” to “inflation is coming down” to “okay now it gets harder.” And that leaves breakevens a bit aimless for now.
  • I do think breakevens are too low!
  • Energy is back rising, and this time there’s nothing left in the SPR to hold down gasoline prices. Government deficits are ballooning again, partly because interest costs are skyrocketing.
  • Navigation from here, both macroeconomically and in a trading sense, starts to get difficult again. Good luck out there today!

  • A bit on the high side. Core 0.278 to three decimals. Working on downloading data now.
  • As I said, core was a little higher than expected, but still at the low end of what we’d seen for the prior year.
  • CPI for Used Cars and Trucks was -1.23%, less than I expected. Airfares were +4.89% (I had +6%), so in the ballpark.
  • M/M, Y/Y, and prior Y/Y for 8 major subgroups
  • Core Goods: 0.234% y/y    Core Services: 5.9% y/y
  • Primary Rents: 7.76% y/y    OER: 7.32% y/y
  • Further: Primary Rents 0.48% M/M, 7.76% Y/Y (8.03% last)         OER 0.38% M/M, 7.32% Y/Y (7.66% last)         Lodging Away From Home -3% M/M, 3% Y/Y (6% last)
  • Some ‘COVID’ Categories: Airfares  4.89% M/M (-8.09% Last)     Lodging Away from Home  -2.97% M/M (-0.34% Last)   Used Cars/Trucks  -1.23% M/M (-1.34% Last)    New Cars/Trucks  0.27% M/M (-0.08% Last)
  • A little surprising that we aren’t seeing the same effect on New Cars (loan interest rate effect) that we are on used cars.
  • Here is my early and automated guess at Median CPI for this month: 0.328%
  • OK, this is what I expected. The broad everything-was-soft month was a one-off. Median is still slowwwwwly decelerating, but not collapsing like it appeared.
  • Piece 1: Food & Energy: 1% y/y
  • The energy story is known – OPEC is cutting supplies in anticipation of weak growth, but so far the main economic driver globally (the US) isn’t having the weak growth. And supplies are low. So headline was bubbly and will probably get more of that next month.
  • Piece 2: Core Commodities: 0.234% y/y
  • Core Commodities driven lower this month partly by Used Cars of course. But it’s going to be challenging to push it a lot lower. That said, the strength of the USD is putting constant pressure in the traditional way here – but nearshoring is still going to make this sticky.
  • Piece 3: Core Services less Rent of Shelter: 3.88% y/y
  • This is a little interesting…it’s just a little hook to the upside, but remember one of the big downward pressures here is Health Insurance and that’s due to reverse soon.
  • But the other big input is wages, and labor’s recent muscularity along with increases in minimum wage in California is going to keep this from decelerating as much as it ‘needs’ to.
  • Piece 4: Rent of Shelter: 7.33% y/y
  • This is going to keep decelerating. But not back to zero!
  • I had penciled in Rent of Shelter as +0.41%. OER slowed to +0.38% m/m, while Primary Rents (about 1/3 of the impact) was faster this month at +0.49%. But ‘Lodging Away from Home’ dropped about 3%, and that’s why Rent of Shelter was so soft. This should rebound next month.
  • Interesting and important dichotomy continues: Food at Home was +0.09% (NSA); Food Away from Home was +0.34% (NSA). The latter is wages. Keep an eye on that.
  • Medicinal Drugs was +0.61%m/m. Series obviously bounces around a lot but to my eye it’s creeping higher. I remember in 2020 and 2021 it was confounding that with COVID, there was downward pressure here. Looks like that’s ebbed.
  • Doctors’ Services was +0.11% m/m, and remains sort of soft. But Hospital Services (2.3% of CPI) was +0.67% m/m. It had been one of the soft categories last month at -0.44%.
  • Lodging Away from Home, as I’d mentioned, dragged down the overall Rent of Shelter. But it’s at the low end of its monthly range of wiggles and will probably add next month rather than subtract.
  • Worth pointing out because it’s been in the news. Motor Vehicle Insurance, which is 1.7% of CPI – has been steadily increasing. Causes are higher car prices, and big increases in carjackings as well as some natural disaster losses. This doesn’t look like it’s going away. (charts show m/m and y/y)
  • Core ex-housing is down to 2.36% y/y. This sounds low, but prior to COVID it hadn’t been over 2% since 2012. As noted earlier, core goods has squeezed out most good news already and core services – outside of housing – still faces wages growing faster than 5%.
  • The biggest-losers list (annualized monthly figures) among core categories is led by Lodging Away from Home (-30%), Misc Personal Goods (-25%), Infants/Toddlers’ Apparel (-20%), and Used Cars/Trucks (-14%).
  • Biggest gainers are Public Transportation (+58%), Motor Vehicle Insurance (+33%), Car/Truck Rental (+17%), Footwear (+15%), Car Maintenance/Repair (+14%), Misc Personal Services (+12%).
  • The dispersion stuff is actually decent news. Broadly, things are slowing down. That doesn’t mean we are going back to 2% inflation; in fact there are very few signs of that yet. But it does mean that the broad upthrust in the price level is ebbing.
  • It would be nice to go back to worrying mainly about relative price changes instead of absolute price-level changes. We aren’t there yet. The volatility of prices, and some of the broad pressures like trade and wages, remind us that we are still in the inflation episode.
  • This only FEELS like inflation is low, because we saw what high feels like. But 4% core/median inflation is no picnic. And it will keep correlations elevated.
  • Last chart. Here is the weight of categories inflating faster than 4%. Obviously we are getting close to 4% being the median. Now, about a third of the basket is housing so that third is in the >4% category. But if we flip and look at <2%, it’s still not back to the old normal.
  • …implication being the same as with the diffusion index, volatility, and correlations – we are on the right path, but not there yet.
  • NOW – that does NOT mean that the Fed needs to keep raising rates. That’s fairly ineffective anyway although it looks meaningful in used cars. That’s not the issue though. What the Fed should, and probably will do, is just keep rates steady here. And I think they will.
  • The real problem comes later: with burgeoning deficits and upward pressure on long rates (I worried about this here: https://inflationguy.blog/2023/08/02/three-colliding-macro-trends/ ), at some point the Fed is going to be under pressure to start buying Treasuries again.
  • That’s a bad path, but it’s going to be hard to resist.
  • That’s all for today. Thanks for tuning in! I’ll have the summary posted to the blog in an hour or two, and then the podcast later today. Have a good day.

The CPI number this month delivered broadly as expected (and, as expected, broadly). Used Cars continued to slide, and airfares did not repeat the -8% again. The surprise drop in Lodging Away from Home will likely reverse next month, and airfares will be another add. While Used Cars will remain soggy, we only have one more month of Health Insurance drag of 4bps/month before that reverses.

The upshot is that the balance of this year will likely see more 0.3s for the most part, with some high 0.2s (meaning that it rounds down). The easy lifting on core has been done. Due to base effects core will still drop next month, but after that…it is going to get difficult. Decelerating housing inflation will be a persistent following wind, but all of the other things that were rowing in one direction while housing was rising…are about to be rowing in the other direction. And housing’s drag is already reversing. (If you were looking 12 months ahead at the possible future declines in rents, to be fair you should be looking now at 12 months ahead when we’re going to start to see percolating through the re-acceleration that we’re seeing in spot rents and home prices.

There is no need for the Fed to tighten further. Rate hikes don’t really help very much (except in some categories like used cars!) to restrain inflation, and short rates are a bit above normal. But as noted in the tweet stream, we are converging on what will be a more difficult path to navigate. The Fed made a mistake and overdid the COVID response, and then held it too long. It deserves credit, on the other hand, for pivoting and throwing off the dovish history of the last two decades to begin shrinking the balance sheet and for being steady on that path even as the rate hikes cease. But those were, or should have been, easy decisions from the monetary policy standpoint as the central bank was leaning into the prevailing wind by pursuing restraint when the economy was robust.

Before too long, the Fed is going to face a circumstance where restraint remains necessary because inflation is sticky at too high a level, but longer-term interest rates begin to tick higher. This will put pressure on economic growth, and on the budget deficit, so that their restraint will be seen as wrong-headed. That’s the danger zone, and I think it probably is a 2024 problem. My fear is that it will be very difficult for the Fed to not give in, arguing to itself that “hey, slower growth means lower inflation” even though there’s no evidence for that, outside of energy, and start to temper its hawkish stance.

That would be a big mistake. But it’s probably next year’s mistake. For now, we can sit back and watch the core and median inflation numbers come down. Not as fast as people will be expecting, but the direction is right.

Asset Class Correlations Convict Central Bank Activism

September 6, 2023 2 comments

A couple of months ago (Inflation Volatility Tells Us This is Probably Not Over), I argued that one characteristic of higher-inflation environments is that the volatility of inflation numbers is also high. While it does not automatically follow that high inflation volatility implies that inflation itself will remain high, it is suggestive that cries of relief for the end of the inflationary episode might possibly be premature.

Today I expected to make a similar observation about correlations, but as you’ll see my investigations took a different turn. Previously I’ve noted that when inflation rises above roughly 2.5%, stocks and bonds tend to become correlated – which messes up a key part of the value of a 60-40 portfolio. Here’s an updated version of my favorite chart, illustrating that phenomenon. Sure enough, now that inflation has been above 2.5% for 3 years, correlations between stocks and bonds have returned to what they were back when inflation last mattered to investors: the 1965-2000 period. This has happened before, and it really isn’t surprising.

But it’s more than just stocks and bonds. I recently had the opportunity to look at the three-way correlations between stocks, bonds, and commodities. It is very unusual for all three of these correlations to be positive with each other: stocks to bonds, bonds to commodities, and stocks to commodities. Generally, if you average those three correlations you get something positive but right now the rolling 12-month correlations of those three asset classes average nearly 0.8.

In fact, the recent peak in this average of the three correlations (the heavy blue line) is the highest since TIPS were first issued in 1997.

It’s actually a little strange, when you think about it: rising inflation ought to be bad for stocks, and bad for bonds…but good for commodities! But because we are looking at rolling 12-month correlations, it’s actually more about the cointegration of financial markets. Commodities can go up over time, while bonds are going down, and they can still be correlated month-wise as long as the commodities ups are bigger, and the downs smaller, than the bonds ups and downs. (See the following hypothetical example where bonds fall 61% and commodities rise 124% in a year, but they have an 0.91 monthly correlation).

So while the high correlation is not unrelated to being in an inflationary period – after all, unless stocks and bonds are positively correlated you couldn’t get the average to 0.8! – I think it’s more likely to be an indicator of how markets overall are just chips floating about on the tide of the global liquidity cycle as it flows in and out. This hypothesis is reinforced (although it remains a hypothesis!) when we back up even further and look at these correlations going back to the 1960s. To do this, we have to use the Enduring Investments synthetic TIPS return series, which I first wrote about here. When we do this, we find out that three-way correlations haven’t been nearly this high going all the way back to 1960.

The overall level of correlation has been generally rising since…approximately September 2008. Interestingly, that’s approximately when the Federal Reserve first started the waves of QE. Coincidence?

It’s even less ambiguous if you look at rolling 36-month correlations. Since the Global Financial Crisis, the correlations have almost always been higher than the highs from the prior five decades!

It isn’t like we needed more evidence that the Fed’s heavy hand has changed markets. But it is always a good reminder that there is a cost to the endless money fountain. While central bank largesse may undergird returns (at least most of the time), it does so while increasing portfolio risk by increasing asset class correlations. There is no free lunch, indeed, even when it looks like there is.

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