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Time to Choose Your Inflation Adventure with Velocity and Money
We have CPI coming up in a few days, but M2 came out recently and it is worth commenting about, so let me drop some thoughts about the state of money and velocity right now and the context we are operating in.
M2 grew 0.88% in February, causing the y/y change to rise to 4.88% (quarterly, however, it is 6.65% annualized). I saw somebody recently observe that money growth was about 6ish back before COVID, so this level is not very worrisome to that pundit. I think that’s wrong – not that this level is worrisome in the big picture, but the trend is bad and the current level is actually not consistent with low and stable inflation as it was prior to the late twenty-‘teens.
Before we get to that, let’s review the state of play for money velocity. Remember when velocity plunged early in COVID, and people said inflation wouldn’t happen because the transmission mechanism was broken? That comment was so funny it made me blow milk out of my nose, even though I wasn’t drinking milk. It was entirely an artifact of the different time frames over which the money supply was changing, compared to the time frames required for prices and output to change. MV=PQ, and M was changing suddenly. Since GDP can’t suddenly change 20%, money velocity became the capacitor that held the excess charge which slowly bled into prices. In my podcast, and occasionally in this blog, the image I shared was of a car rapidly accelerating away from a trailer hitched to it by a spring. At first, inertia keeps the trailer from traveling as fast as the car, and the spring stretches. Once the car stops accelerating, though, the spring compresses and the trailer catches up. The illustration below is courtesy of Lovart.ai.
So where are we? Here is the US monetary system over the 2019-2025 period showing total growth from December 2019. The x-axis shows the total percentage growth in money as a percentage of real output (M/Q). The y-axis shows the total change in the price level. Now, I have to point out that when I was talking about this, in 2021 or 2022, we were very far away from the diagonal line showing where the two changes are equal. And I said we would be going back to the line, and we went back to the line. People really ought to listen to me more.
The other way to look at this is that velocity is back almost to where it was prior to COVID.
So is there any problem here? Velocity is back to where it was, but if it’s stable and money is growing at 4.9% y/y, then P+Q grows at 4.9%, so 2% inflation with 3% growth…sounds pretty good.
This is where we review the “but 6% worked!” argument.
You can see from the chart that yes, since the late 1990s M2 grew at 5-10% and we never had much of an inflation problem. Why now? Well, during that period velocity was steadily declining – and that is the only way that you can sustain 6% money growth with 3% real economic growth and get 2% inflation. The question, then, was why velocity was declining. Remember, some people think this is a trend, because they don’t really understand what drives velocity. During that period, interest rates steadily declined. This was also a period of increasing globalization and a demographic dividend (more workers relative to the aged). Now, whether the interest rates declined because of those trends because both trends were disinflationary, or if interest rates declined because of a dovish Fed and they only got lucky because of those trends…I don’t know. But the point is that the largest driver of lower money velocity during that period was lower interest rates.
And interest rates are now approximately fair. Some people think they’re too low with inflation too hot, some people think they’re too high with economic growth seeming to slow, but let’s just say they’re not 300bps wrong at this point. Here is our velocity model. With lots of crazy volatility, it has velocity pretty close to on-target. Here’s the problem: the last time prior to COVID were as high as they are now (I’m looking at 5y Treasuries), it was also prior to the Global Financial Crisis and the regime of interest rate repression. Back in 2007, 5y rates were this high, and money velocity was about 2.0, some 40% higher than here. What is holding velocity down right now in our model is a very high level of economic policy uncertainty, which causes people to hold more cash than they otherwise would given the level of interest rates. Thanks to the war between the President and his allies on one side, and the minority party on the other side, not to mention the Iran war, there is a lot of uncertainty right now and that is causing people to conserve cash.
It won’t always be that way, but with M2 growing near 5%…it really needs to be that way. By the way, the money growth situation is a bit worse than it looks, too: there has in the last couple years been a fairly dramatic rise in the amount of non-M2 money that is growing in defi/crypto space. Bitcoin isn’t money, but stablecoins are very much like money. The scale of the Stablecoin money supply is small compared to the ‘off-chain’ money supply, but it is starting to get large enough to matter. Anyway, we know the sign of that growth, and it’s a big fat plus.
So no, 6% is not a stable rate of money growth going forward from here. This is not the early 2000s. It is not the 1990s. If we could manage to just have 6% growth, then we’re probably going to end up being in the mid-to-high-3s on inflation, and that’s tolerable. But if that’s the midpoint of money growth, then mid-to-high-3s is the midpoint on inflation with some periods a little below that and some periods a little above that.
Economies adapt, and an economy can work fine at 4-5% inflation or even higher as long as it is stable. But 4% inflation feels different than 2% inflation, and the economy will work differently in that sort of regime. Businesses will be more likely to pass through cost increases rather than absorb what they think are short-term variations (see “How Expecting Inflation Un-anchors Manufacturers’ Pricing Strategy”). Equilibrium equity prices are lower. Menu costs and search costs go up. And so on. We may already be seeing some of these long-term structural changes. The Fed just published a FEDS Notes entitled “Is the Inflation Process in Advanced Economies Different After the Pandemic?” The short answer? Yes it is. The question is, are we on track to get the inflation process back to the way it used to be? And the answer there appears at this juncture to be: no.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (January 2026)
Let’s start by setting the context for today’s CPI number.
A couple of months ago, we missed a CPI because of the shutdown. The BLS simply didn’t have any data to calculate the October 2025 CPI. That wasn’t the real problem. The real problem was that the BLS’s handbook of methods more or less forced it, in calculating the November CPI index, to assume unchanged prices for October for some large categories – in particular, rents. This caused a large, illusory decline in y/y inflation figures. Importantly, this was also temporary – there has been some catch-up but the big one comes in a few months when the OER rent survey rotation will cause a large offsetting jump in that category, exactly six months after the illusory dip. Until then, inflation numbers will be more difficult to interpret and the year-over-year numbers will be simply wrong. So when you read that today’s figure resulted in the “smallest y/y change in core inflation since 2021, and consistent with the Fed reaching its target” – that’s just wrong. The true core y/y number is roughly 0.25%-0.3% higher than what printed today. The CPI ‘fixings’ market is currently pricing headline CPI y/y to rise to 2.82% four months from now, and that isn’t because of a coming rebound in energy prices.
I guess what I am saying is this:
Ladies and gentlemen, please take your seats. We will be experiencing some mild turbulence.
January, in general, is already a difficult month in CPI land because of the tendency for vendors of products and services to offer discounts in December and then implement annual price increases in January. But those price increases are not systematic, which means they are difficult to seasonally-adjust for. Ergo, January misses are rather the norm.
So with that context, the consensus estimates for today’s number were for +0.27% m/m on the headline CPI, and +0.31% on core. Some prognosticators were quite a bit higher than that – I think Barclays expected +0.39% on core CPI. The question was basically whether there is still any tariff increase that needs to be passed through; if so then January is a good time to do it. That didn’t really happen. The actual print was +0.17% on headline and +0.30% on core.
The miss on headline happened because while gasoline prices actually rose in January, the average price in January was lower than the average price in December – because in December, gasoline prices dropped sharply. While Jan 31 gas versus Dec 31 gas was $2.87 vs $2.833 (source AAA), January 1 vs December 1 was $2.83 vs $2.998. So, even though gasoline prices rose over the course of January compared to the end of December, that’s now how the BLS samples prices.
Be that as it may, core inflation was pretty close to target. One way to look at it is that y/y Core CPI, at 2.5%, is the lowest since March 2021. Another way to look at it is that the m/m Core was the third highest in the last year, and annualizes to 3.6%. So is it ‘mission accomplished’ for the Fed? Erm, nothing in the chart below tells me inflation is trending gently back to 2%. You?
The core number was actually flattered by a large drop in used car prices, -1.84% m/m. Used car prices actually rose in January, but less than the seasonal norm so that resulted in the large drop and that caused a meaningful drag. (Let’s not get in the habit of just dropping everything that doesn’t fit the narrative, though.) Anyway, core goods as a whole dropped to 1.1% y/y from 1.4%, while core services eased to 2.9% y/y from 3.0%.
While core goods fell more than expected because of that Used Cars number, it’s not surprising that it is moderating some. The question isn’t whether core goods prices will keep accelerating to 3% or 4%; the question is whether it stays positive, or slips back to the negative range it inhabited for many years. That’s an important story even though core goods is only 20% of the CPI. Until now it has been a ‘tariffs’ story, but going forward it’s an ‘onshoring’ story. My contention is that we should not expect a return to the persistent goods deflation that flattered CPI for a generation thanks to offshoring of manufacturing to low-labor-cost countries, because the flow is reversing. That is the story to watch, but it isn’t January 2026’s story.
While we are talking about autos, I’ll note that New Cars showed a small increase. I wonder (and I don’t have a strong forecast here) what the changes in car sales composition now that electric vehicles are no longer being pushed by the executive branch. Obviously non-electric cars are cheaper, so if we had a real-time measure of the average sales price of a car it would probably fall as consumers go back to buying cars they want instead of cars that look cheaper because of tax breaks. I don’t know though how much actual sales will change (auto production will certainly change as carmakers no longer have to check the box by making a certain number of cars that were hard to sell), and I don’t know how detailed the BLS survey is and whether it takes into account fleet composition. I guess we know that if there’s any effect, the sign should be negative. I suspect it is a small effect.
Turning to rents, as we do: Owners Equivalent Rent was +0.22% versus +0.31% last month. Rent of Primary Residence was +0.25% vs +0.27% last month. The chart below shows the m/m changes in OER… except that it does not show the 0 for October. There’s clearly a deceleration here, but my model says it should be flattening out right about at this level. Also not January 2026’s story, but it will be 2026’s story.
There was a small decline, -0.15% m/m, in Medicinal Drugs. Some folks had been eagerly waiting for that to show a large drop, thanks partly to the Trump Administration’s efforts to force drug manufacturers to align prices in the US market with prices in the ex-US market. There is not yet any discernable trend. Potentially more impactful is the Trump RX initiative, which by bringing transparency and cutting out the middleman in the really-effed-up consumer pharmaceuticals pipeline (dominated by three big wholesalers and three big pharmacy benefit managers, each of which is highly opaque about pricing) could well cause a significant decline in consumer-paid drug prices. But…remember that when those drugs are paid for by the insurance company, it isn’t a consumer expense and only shows up indirectly in the CPI. Yeah, that makes my head spin also. Bottom line: pharmaceutical prices are likely to decline some for consumers, but we just aren’t really sure where that will show up in the CPI and how soon it will happen.
The best news in the report today is the continued deceleration in core-services-ex-rents (‘Supercore’), which decelerated even with Airfares being +6.5% m/m.
Psych! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders! This is again a y/y figure that is flattered by the lack of October data. On a m/m basis, supercore had the biggest jump in a year, +0.59% (SA). Still, I think this is decelerating along with median wages deceleration. Of course, all of that data is messy right now as well, but the spread of median wages over median inflation remains right around 1%.
There is some early evidence that the downward slide in wages might be leveling off; if it does, that will limit how fast supercore can moderate. There are also some cost pressures in insurance markets that are probably going to show up in the next 6 months or so. But that’s not January 2026’s story.
The story in January 2026 is that the waters remain muddied by the government-shutdown-induced gap. The current y/y figures are all flattered by that event, and exaggerate how good the inflation picture is. That’s how the Administration can trumpet victory while the reality on the ground is that inflation is not converging to trend.
I’m working on the assumption that the Fed knows this, and the combination of core inflation that seems steady around 3.5% (abstracting from the shutdown gap), better-than-expected labor market indicators, and a distinct animus among current Fed leadership towards the President means that there’s no reason to expect an adjustment in overnight rates any time soon. Frankly, I think the argument is better for a rate increase than a rate decrease. On the other hand, rents do appear to be continuing to decelerate even if we ignore the October gap. My model says that isn’t going to continue, and even if I’m wrong I’m likely to be closer than the folks calling for deflation in housing. And moderation in Supercore is encouraging, even if – again – I don’t think that continues to the point the Fed needs it to be. Core goods inflation appears to have peaked, and the question is whether we go back to core goods deflation or not.
In each of these cases, my modeling suggests that the current level of median inflation of around 3.5% (ex-gap) is likely to end up being an equilibrium-ish level. But it isn’t ridiculous to look at the current trends and see good news on inflation. Either way, there’s not a Fed ease coming imminently. But if those trends continue until Warsh is confirmed and becomes Fed Chairman, there could be a rate cut later in the year.
But that’s not January 2026’s story.
What Makes a Stable Coin Stable?
The early growth of Bitcoin and the cryptocurrency space was originally stimulated by the mistrust of centralized control of monetary policy and financial institutions. While Bitcoin is a fiat currency, in the sense that it is not ‘backed’ by anything and has value only because other people believe it has value, the rules for the expansion of the total float of Bitcoin are mechanical and so the unit benefits from being isolated from the whim of flesh-and-blood central bankers. Milton Friedman once said in an interview with the Cato Institute that “We don’t need a Fed…I have, for many years, been in favor of replacing the Fed with a computer [which would, each year] print out a specified number of paper dollars…Same number, month after month, week after week, year after year.”[1] And, with Bitcoin, that is exactly what you have. Management of Bitcoin is decentralized, automatic, and the rules are stable.
Unfortunately, ‘fiat’ cryptocurrencies are anything but stable. Moreover, since their value depends entirely on the trust[2] of other actors in the economic system that these currencies will have value, it is entirely possible that any of them could crash just like any fiat currency sometimes crashes when confidence in the currency issuer vanishes. There is no intrinsic value to a fiat currency – digital, or analog – which means that they are stable only when looked at in a self-referential frame. A US Dollar has a stable value of $1 but is volatile from the viewpoint of a Mexican-peso-based observer. I will return to this observation presently.
Because these fiat cryptos are unstable when looked at by a participant in the analog world, the concept of ‘stablecoin’ was developed. In Coinbase’s summary ‘What is a stablecoin?’, the first two bullet points are:
- Stablecoins are a type of cryptocurrency whose value is pegged to another asset, such as a fiat currency or gold, to maintain a stable price.
- They strive to provide an alternative to the high volatility of popular cryptocurrencies, making them potentially more suitable for common transactions.[3]
Why is a stable price important? The answer goes back to the question of whether Bitcoin and similar cryptos are money, or assets. In the conventional definition of money, such a label only applies to units that provide a medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. First-generation cryptos certainly serve as a medium of exchange but are sketchy on the ‘store of value’ and ‘unit of account’ dimensions. Nothing natively is priced in BTC, so it is not a good unit of account, and the high volatility creates a high barrier to any argument about being a store of value. Cryptos are most assuredly financial assets. It is hard to argue that they are money.
Enter the stablecoin. By pegging the value to an existing currency, a stablecoin ‘borrows’ the characteristics of that currency as a store of value and unit of account. It’s true by mathematical association: if USDC is equal to one US dollar, and the US dollar is money, then (as long as it’s accepted a medium of exchange) USDC is money because it has equal ‘store of value’ and ‘unit of account’ dimensions.[4] A stablecoin maintains its stability by means of holding reserves and being fully convertible on demand into the underlying currency.[5]
But Stable with Respect to What?
Stability, though, depends on the frame of reference. Consider a stablecoin linked to the US Dollar, which always can be minted or burned at $1 (ignoring fees). Consider a second stablecoin linked to the Japanese Yen, which always can be minted or burned at ¥1. Which one is stable?
Figure 1 – US Dollar Frame – US Dollar is stable
Figure 2 – Japanese Yen Frame – Japanese Yen is stable
The answer, of course, depends on your frame of reference. From the standpoint of someone in Japan, who is buying goods and services with Yen, a stablecoin like USDC that is linked to the dollar is most assuredly not stable in any useful sense of the word. Conversely, a US dollar investor would not find a Yen stablecoin to be stable. This, then, is an important element of defining a stablecoin: something which matches the volatility and behavior of the basis of the frame you are in, is stable with respect to you. This raises an interesting question when it comes to stablecoin regulation. A coin could very easily be regulated as a stablecoin in one jurisdiction, and not be regulated as such in a different jurisdiction – even between regulatory jurisdictions that are congruent in their treatment of most assets.
What passes for stability, in short, depends on the transactional frame – literally, the underlying currency in which transactions happen – of the observer.
Stable with Respect to When?
The meaning of stability also fluctuates with the time horizon of the observer. Fixed-income investors are very familiar with the concept of Macaulay duration, which is the future horizon at which the value of a bond holding is completely insensitive to parallel shifts in the yield curve, because the change in the value of reinvested coupons (which goes up with higher interest rates) exactly offsets the change in the value of the remaining cash flows (which go down with higher interest rates). What is the riskiness of a bond with a 7-year duration? Or more to the point of this discussion – which is riskier, a 1-month Treasury bill, or a 7-year zero coupon bond?[6]
As it turns out, it depends on the applicable horizon of the observer.
Suppose an investor pursues one of two strategies: in the first strategy, he or she buys a 1-month Treasury bill, initially at 5%, and then rolls the proceeds every month for 7 years. Alternatively, he or she could buy a 7-year zero coupon bond yielding 5%. Using a simple two-factor model with no drift, I generated 250 iterations of T-bill paths and yield curve shapes, to produce hypothetical monthly time series of returns for the two strategies. For example, here is one such random path (Figure 3):
Figure 3 – Illustrative single random path of cumulative returns for two strategies
The a priori expected return is approximately the same for both strategies; sometimes the T-bill roll strategy ends up ahead and sometimes the buy-and-hold strategy wins. With similar expected returns, a rational investor would therefore choose the one which has the lowest risk. But the riskiness or stability of the returns depends very much on the observer’s time horizon. Each of the following three charts is drawn from the same 250 Monte Carlo iterations, but the cumulative return is sampled at a different horizon. In Figure 4, the cumulative returns are sampled at the 1-month horizon. In Figure 5, the sampling is at the 3-year horizon. In Figure 6, the sampling is at the 7-year horizon. For each figure, the cumulative return for the T-bill strategy is shown on the x-axis and the cumulative return for the zero-coupon-bond buy-and-hold strategy is on the y-axis.
Figure 4 – 1-month T-Bill strategy is riskless at a 1-month horizon
Figure 5 – Both strategies are relatively risky at a 3-year horizon
Figure 6 – The 7-year zero-coupon-bond is riskless (in nominal terms) at a 7-year horizon
Although this conclusion is trivial and inevitable to fixed-income investors, the reason for our observation here is to point out that what is considered ‘stable’ not only depends on one’s functional currency but also on one’s holding period horizon.
Is the Nominal Frame the Most Important Frame?
The prior points are likely obvious to most investors. If you are investing with the intention of spending the proceeds in US Dollars, then a USD frame is most relevant. If you are investing for a known future nominal payout (for example, a life insurance company hedging scheduled annuity flows), then an investment that matures to a given value at the time when the money is needed is the most-relevant frame. However, investors sometimes lose track of one of the most important frames, and that is the “real” frame where values track the price level.
While a $1 bill is ‘stable’ in nominal terms – it will always be worth $1 – it is very unstable in purchasing-power terms.
Figure 7 – A dollar is inherently unstable in the main consumer frame
The framework where we ignore the value of the dollar, in preference for the fixed price of the dollar at $1, is the “nominal” framework. When inflation is low and stable, this frame is a useful shorthand in much the same way that when traveling abroad a tourist in the year 2000 might translate Mexican Peso prices into US Dollar prices by dividing by 10 even though the exact exchange rate differs from 10:1. In the short term, such a shortcut framework makes up for in convenience what it surrenders in precision. But in the long term, what starts out as mild imprecision becomes wildly inaccurate as the Peso exchange rate has gone from 10:1 to 20:1.
Similarly, while the nominal frame is the default for short-term comparisons it is clearly not the most important one to a consumer. Someone who is negotiating a salary at a new job, who knows he or she made $40,000 per year in 2004, would be ill-suited to use that figure as the starting point. The frame that matters over time is the real, or inflation-adjusted, frame. In the chart above, if we plotted the purchasing power of an inflation-adjusted 1983 dollar, it would be a flat line at $1.[7] On the other hand, if we plotted the nominal value of that same inflation-adjusted 1983 dollar, it would show a mostly steady increase from $1 to $3.15 over the same time period.
As before, the frame matters. A dollar that is stable in nominal space is very unstable in purchasing-power space. A unit that is stable in purchasing-power space looks unstable in nominal space.
If an investor or consumer had to choose one frame to care about, it would surely be the one in which his or her money represents not just a medium of exchange and a unit of account, but also a store of value. What this means is that a coin that is native currency and inflation-adjusted in the local price level is the most stable of stablecoins. And what that further implies is that what we currently call ‘stablecoins’ are stable only in the narrow context of being fixed at a certain nominal value of domestic currency…and that is suboptimal since all investors and consumers live in a world where prices change.
Tying Frames Together
What is interesting is that each of these frames describes “stability” in a different context. People in one frame see their own side as stable and the other side as volatile – and the exact same thing is true, in reverse, for the other side.
The various frames do traffic with each other. A holder of US Dollars (in the nominal-USD-short-term-stable frame) exchanges those dollars with a person who holds Euros (in the nominal-Euro-short-term-stable frame). We call that an exchange rate. And what ties together the nominal dollar and the inflation-linked dollar is the price index.
Figure 8 – Exchanging dollars with different purchasing power is functionally the same as exchanging currencies with different purchasing power.
In fact, the relationship between the Dollar and the Euro is so much like the relationship between the nominal dollar and the inflation-linked dollar that in 2004 Robert Jarrow and Yildiray Yildirim wrote a paper describing how to value inflation-protected securities and derivatives using a model designed for foreign exchange.[8] And that highlights the fact that an inflation-linked stablecoin isn’t some strange construct but rather an important new product to be added to the cryptocurrency universe. It is just another currency – one that is fixed in time, rather in nominal dollars, that is exchangeable to today’s dollars at the ‘inflation exchange rate’. If a 1983 dollar existed today, it could be exchanged for $3.15 current dollars because the dollar that was frozen in time in 1983 buys more than today’s dollars. That’s just an exchange rate!
Conclusion
It seems that ‘stability’ is not a stable term. Perhaps a more accurate description of the current crop of ‘stablecoins,’ which are exchangeable 1:1 with the base currency, is “fixed coins.” Only an inflation-linked coin would be a “stablecoin” in the true sense of the word, and only because being stable in purchasing-power space is the most important frame.
[1] http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/milton-rose-friedman-offer-radical-ideas-21st-century
[2] This is not to be confused with the trustless nature of the transaction verification process of the blockchain, where the peer-to-peer nature of the process allows transactors to be certain their counterparty has the amount of bitcoin in question before completing a transaction. Rather, this is a comment on the entire system itself.
[3] https://www.coinbase.com/learn/crypto-basics/what-is-a-stablecoin
[4] Arguing that a coin pegged to gold or other commodities is a stablecoin is a bit of a stretch. Such a coin may be granted intrinsic value by such backing, and it may even be a better store of value in the long run because of such backing, but it is lacking as a unit of account (nothing is priced in gold units) and as a short-term store of value it leaves a lot to be desired.
[5] So-called ‘algorithmic stablecoins’ are mostly stable because of fiat reasons. That is, only because people believe the algorithm can guarantee that the coin is fully backed, will they behave as if they are. My usage of ‘stablecoins’ leaves out algorithmic stablecoins.
[6] I made this a zero-coupon bond to make it easier. A zero-coupon bond has a Macaulay duration equal to its maturity. However, at the 7-year horizon, any bond with a 7-year Macaulay duration has the same risk to a parallel shift of the yield curve: none. The point of this paper, though, is not fixed-income mathematics so take my word for it for the sake of this argument.
[7] Naturally, whether it is truly precisely flat depends on whether the price index we are adjusting with is an accurate representation of changes in purchasing power. Of course, such an index would look different for every person based on his or her consumption patterns so the line would not be truly flat for any person. But it would be much more stable than the non-inflation-adjusted dollar.
[8] Jarrow, Robert A. and Yildirim, Yildiray, Pricing Treasury Inflation Protected Securities and Related Derivatives Using an Hjm Model (February 1, 2011). Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 337-359, June 2003, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=585828
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (June 2024)
Let’s set the stage. Last month (May’s data), core CPI printed at +0.16% and +0.25% on Median. But a lot of that, most of it, was core goods and the question was whether that month was a one-off due to be reversed at some point, or if shelter and other slower-moving things would come along. Coming into this month, the economists’ consensus was for +0.21% on core; the inflation swap market trades headline inflation but actually implied something a tiny bit softer than the economists were expecting. We knew Used Cars was going to be weak again, but it seemed like people were all-in on the idea that the worm has turned and now inflation is going to head sharply lower.
Whether this turns out to be true or not, it’s important to realize that the reason economists think that is because unemployment is rising, indicating that we are either in or very near a recession, and economists think (against logic and data) that wages lead prices so this should herald a disinflationary pulse. Now, I also think inflation is headed lower, but it’s because shelter is coming off the boil and not because the Fed successfully cracked the backs of labor.
So what happened this month?
We saw a very weak headline number of -0.06%, which was mainly the fault of a very weak core inflation number of +0.06%. That’s the second quite weak core figure in a row, and when median CPI comes out later today it should be even weaker than last month, at +0.195% or so. If we could repeat that median every month, it would be tantamount to inflation being at the Fed’s target because median normally tracks a little higher than core except when we are in an inflationary upswing.
But whereas last month’s inflation figure was all about core goods, this month we finally saw a bit of a deceleration in shelter. Okay, yes – core goods slipped further into deflation, because that category exists mainly to make me look stupid by going lower and lower when I keep thinking the disinflation must be nearly wrung out. Core Services dropped to 5.1% y/y from 5.3% y/y.
We had known Used Cars would be weak, and it was at -1.5% m/m. New cars also dragged. But I will say it again because I want to have the chance to appear stupid again next month: goods deflation is running its course. Global shipping costs are rising again, the dollar will be vulnerable if the Fed begins to ease, and while used cars should continue to show large y/y declines for the next few months that’s mostly base effects. On an index level, the used cars price index is almost all the way back to the overall price level. Since COVID, the general price level – what has happened to the average price of goods and services – is up 22.3%. Used Car prices are now only up 27.7%. Not all goods and services will move up exactly 22.3%; the point is that the dislocation in used cars is pretty much over and therefore we should expect at some point that used car inflation will start to look more like overall inflation.
But again, goods aren’t the story we really care about. The question is, what about services? The news here is all non-bad. (Some of it is good, some is just not bad.) This month, the story is that rents abruptly weakened on a m/m basis. Primary Rents were +0.26% m/m (was +0.39% last month), and Owners’ Equivalent Rent was +0.28% (was +0.43% last month). This dropped the y/y rates to 5.07% and 5.45%, respectively.
That’s good news, but it is not unexpected news. The conundrum over the last 3-6 months has been why this wasn’t already happening. On a m/m basis, the rent numbers probably won’t get a lot better, but if they print around this level consistently then the y/y rent numbers will decelerate gradually. Unfortunately, there is no sign of deflation in rents and they are likely to begin to reaccelerate later this year, or early next year. That is an out-of-consensus view, though, and you should keep in mind that the Fed believes we have imminent deflation in rents.
In addition to the softer rents numbers, Lodging Away from Home showed -2% m/m. However, like airfares (-5% m/m), LAFH is not something that is going to be a persistent large drag. It’s volatile. On airfares, this decline in prices matches nicely with the energy figures we saw yesterday that showed a surprising fall in jet fuel inventories. Prices dropped and people flew!
Moving on to “Supercore.” People made a lot last month of the m/m decline in core services ex-shelter, and they’ll make a lot of the fact that it declined m/m again this month. But that looks like a seasonal issue: last year the two softest months were also May and June. On a y/y basis, supercore showed another slight decline. Medical Care Services is 3.3% y/y, with Physicians’ and Hospital Services both holding pretty steady at a high level. I don’t see any major improvement in supercore yet.
Overall, there’s no doubting that this number is soothing for the Fed. It’s soothing for me too. Inflation is decelerating, and as I said last month I think the Fed will almost certainly deliver a token ease in the next couple of months.
The potential issue is that inflation isn’t slowing for the reason the Fed thinks it is. The economy is slowing, and unemployment is rising. I don’t know when Sahm first said it, but for decades I’ve been noting that when the Unemployment Rate rises at least 0.5% from its low, it always rises at least 1% more (here’s a time when I said it in 2011: https://inflationguy.blog/2011/07/10/no-mister-bond-i-expect-you-to-die/ ). Not that I’m bitter that it’s called the “Sahm Rule” now.
So yes, the economy is weakening and the labor market is softening. And that presages a deceleration in wage growth – or, really, a continuation in that deceleration. But the connection between wages and prices is loose at best, and that’s not why inflation will stay low, if it does. In fact, I continue to believe that median inflation will end up settling in the high 3s, low 4s. There has always been an ‘unless’ clause to that belief, but it isn’t ‘unless we enter recession.’ We will enter into one, and probably already are, but recessions and decelerations in core inflation are also only a loose relationship at best. It isn’t the recession which is causing disinflation (after all, the disinflation started long before now). What may is the slow growth in the money supply, combined with the rebound in velocity eventually running its course. We are closer to the end of the velocity rebound than to the beginning, and while M2 is accelerating it isn’t problematic yet. Those are the nascent trends to watch closely.
In the meantime – the Fed has what it wants for now. Soft employment and softening inflation. An ease will follow shortly. Whether that is followed by further eases remains to be seen, but…for now…the trends are favorable for the central bank.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (Apr 2024)
The CPI for April came in pretty close to expectations. CPI came in at 0.31% m/m, and 0.29% on core, versus a priori expectations for 0.37% and 0.30%. This relative accuracy does not necessarily mean that economists now know exactly what is going on in this index, only that all of the misses canceled out. But the misses are interesting, and worth looking at, and we will do that here. Ultimately, reports like this mostly create an opportunity for framing the debate on whichever side you are on. But to my mind, this report does not meaningfully move the ball towards ‘price stability’ and leaves the Fed – if they’re being honest – still in a bind between slowing growth and sticky inflation.
Not all parts of the CPI were sticky, and that’s the point here. Actually, that has been the point for quite a while, but it was very stark in today’s report. Here’s the distribution of y/y changes in bottom-level components in the CPI. Today, the left hand stuff got lefter, the right-hand stuff got a little righter, and the middle stuff stayed about the same.
I don’t usually lead with the distribution, but it is important to keep this in mind. Inflation is not, especially at lowish levels (say, less than 5-8%), a smooth process. I used to liken this to the process of popcorn popping in a bag; the bag inflates but not because all of the kernels popped at once. The good news is that the popping is slowing, as the Fed has removed some of the heat from the bag, but the pops are still happening.
Now, here’s the good news. Thanks to core CPI being on target, the 3-month, 6-month, 9-month (well, never mind that one), and 12-month averages all decelerated.
Median inflation won’t be out for a couple of hours, but my estimate this month is 0.348% m/m, essentially unchanged from last month. That’s sort of the bad news – the y/y median CPI should be stable this month at 4.5%.
So, I think the bold type for the top line is this: inflation is decelerating, but slowly, and in a sticky fashion. The markets loved that answer and stocks and bonds leapt on the report. But that’s all framing. The debate coming into today was never about whether inflation was declining – it has been, for a while, and is expected to (even by me, and I’m on the high side of Street expectations by a fair amount) until at least Q3 and probably into Q4. That wasn’t the question – we have known since the middle of last year that 2024 would see decelerating inflation. The question is whether the deceleration will continue after that, and whether it is decelerating to 3.75%-4.25% or 1.75%-2.25%. There is as yet no sign of the latter and all signs still point to the former, because the sticky stuff is not yet unstuck.
And that continues to boil down to this: deceleration is still being driven by core goods, and resistance to that deceleration by core services.
Core goods fell to -1.3% y/y this month. I have been saying that we’ve squeezed about all we can out of core goods, and then it drops from -0.7% to -1.3%, the lowest y/y figure in 20 years! This happened even though Apparel rose 1.2% m/m. As usual, the main culprits were autos with Used Cars -1.38% m/m after -1.11% last month, and New Cars -0.45% m/m. Ironically, I think the continued softness in autos is due partly to the continued rise in motor vehicle insurance costs (which were +1.4% m/m again). We hear a lot about the affordability of housing, but you gotta have housing. You don’t gotta update your car.
The softness in core goods is welcome, naturally, but that’s the volatile part of CPI. And such low levels are only sustainable if the dollar continues to strengthen.
On the other hand, core services only softened to 5.3% y/y from 5.4%. A lot of that is housing, with OER +0.42% m/m (was +0.44% last month) and Primary Rents slowing to 0.35% from 0.41%. But outside that, ‘super core’ (core services less rent of shelter) is actually still bouncing higher. It’s 4.91% y/y – below the 6.5% it got to in late 2022, but well above the lows from October (3.75%).
Some people will like the fact that the m/m Supercore was “only” 0.42% or so, which is down from recent months. But that’s a little deceiving. Airfares were -0.81% m/m, car/truck rental -4.6%, and the monthly health insurance bump has run its course and is back to a more normal m/m change (positive, but at a 3.5% annualized rate). Longer-term, we still have to worry about the continued acceleration in, say, hospital services, which is +7.7% y/y. I pointed this out last month, and the picture is no prettier this month.
One other comment/update on rents. It is proceeding according to expectations, although I expect a slightly faster rate of deceleration for the next quarter or so. But then, all the signs are that rents are going to re-accelerate. Even those terrible indicators that inflation dummies (this includes Yellen and most of the Fed) relied on to forecast that rents would be in deflation this year…even those indicators are showing a bounce to come. Home prices are accelerating again. And none of this is surprising given that landlords are facing higher costs and increasing demand (6 million immigrants need roofs). And this is why the inflation dummies are inflation dummies – there was never, never, a good argument for why rents should be in free fall, if you just spent 10 minutes talking to an actual landlord. Get your heads out of your models and look around occasionally, dummies.
Okay, so that was a little strident but I am getting a little tired of asking potential clients how they are addressing inflation and hearing them tell me about their economist. Inflation hedging ≠ economists. Come on, people.
Let’s take this around to what we care about, and that’s policy. The Administration is trying to help the inflation figures by delaying the refilling of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve if prices go up, but is also implementing new tariffs on Chinese goods. That answers the first WWJD question (what will Joe do) – in an election year, actions which cause inflation next year are fine…just not anything which causes inflation this year. The other WWJD question (what will Jerome do) is still interesting. Growth is indeed slowing, and has been slowing for some time. Consumers are looking a bit tired, and unemployment is rising slowly. But inflation is not behaving. Median inflation won’t get below 4% until September at the earliest, and even optimistically won’t get to 3% before it starts to bounce. Before, the Fed could pretend that the new rent indicators showing widespread deflation gave it some latitude to move before the rent decreases actually arrived, but that isn’t a plausible argument any more.
However, the FOMC has started to lean more dovish. The significant decrease in the rate of taper that was announced at the last meeting clearly shows which way they are leaning. The case for a rate cut later in the summer (absent some financial crack-up that needs to be addressed) would be based on the Committee members’ sense that the current policy rate is above neutral and can be moved back towards neutral as the risks become ‘more balanced.’ Additionally, doves could argue that they don’t want to be seen easing right before the election so an ease at the end of July is a ‘down payment’ on looser policy later. The inflation data don’t support that, but the Fed doesn’t care only about inflation data. If I was on the Committee, I would not vote to loosen the taper or lower rates, but I would not be surprised to see a token ease at the end-of-July meeting. It would be cavalier, and possibly political, and not supported by the data we currently have in hand…but it wouldn’t surprise me.
One final administrative notice to those of you who subscribe to the Quarterly Inflation Outlook. The Q2 issue is expected to be published this Sunday, so look for it! (And subscribe, if you haven’t).
Rising Mortgage Origination Hints at M2 Turn
One of the successes the Federal Reserve can tout from the last couple of years (and the list of them is pretty short, to be fair) is that after the unprecedented policy actions during COVID caused never-before-seen rates of money supply expansion, subsequent policy avoided normalizing that explosion.
Year over year growth in M2 reached 26.9%. But in 2022, as the Fed started hiking rates and shrinking its balance sheet, the rate of growth slowed until M2 reached its absolute peak in July 2022 and began to slowly decline. As of today’s H6 release, year-over-year M2 has been negative for 13 months in a row.
To be sure, after a massive explosion the level of M2 has not declined all that far as the chart below shows. I also documented this fact back in November in “Where Inflation Stands in the Cycle,” which was really a good piece. You should read it.
So the success of the Fed here can be summarized by saying, ‘at least they didn’t keep blowing up the money supply.’ Since the rise in prices is clearly and closely related to the explosion in the quantity of money we have seen (anyone who still resists this obvious truism after the mountain of recent evidence is added to the prior mountain of evidence), this was a sine qua non for getting inflation back down. It isn’t sufficient, unless it’s continued for a very long time, but it’s necessary. As I illustrated in that article linked to above (which, really, you should read), there are several ways that inflation could evolve from here as the shock to the system gradually unwinds. I’ve talked before about how velocity in the policy crisis behaved as a spring or a capacitor, absorbing a lot of ‘monetary energy’ that is doomed to be released back into the system. Velocity is still rebounding (in Q4, if forecasts for Thursday’s Advance GDP report are accurate, it will rise something like 4% annualized), but if money growth remains negative then that’s really the least-painful way this can resolve. In the last chart from that prior article (have I mentioned it’s worth reading?), slack money growth with decent growth and rebounding velocity is reflected in a movement mostly to the left, with the price level not rising much. Good outcome.
However, that outcome is predicated on the notion that the money supply remains slack. If M2 starts to rise again, then the curve drifts upward and the potential set of outcomes almost certainly involve higher prices. Naturally, I’m mentioning this because of developments that make me concerned on this score.
One thing that I seriously missed in 2022 was the fact that the increase in interest rates helped bring down money supply growth. That’s not at all intuitive, because in general changing the price of a loan tends not to change the demand for a loan by very much – especially when higher inflation is making the spot real interest rate paid by the borrower lower and lower. In other words, I assert with some decent evidence that consumer and industrial loan demand is somewhat inelastic for modest changes in interest rates. Ergo, my belief was that merely raising interest rates would not necessarily cause money growth to decelerate. As it happened, I was saved from my own mistake by the fact that the Fed was also shrinking the balance sheet, which (despite the fact that reserve balances aren’t binding on banks in the current environment, so they are essentially unconstrained in lending) I thought might help money growth to decelerate. Not that I thought we’d keep getting 20% growth, but I didn’t think we would have naturally seen money growth fall below, say, 5%. Fortunately, because the Fed was also shrinking the balance sheet my forecasts were not drastically inaccurate despite being wrongly inspired, and so I forecast 5.1% median inflation for 2023 and we got 5.06%. It’s nice when the ball actually bounces your way.
As it happens, though, for the most part higher interest rates seem to have not affected loan growth very much. C&I loan growth remained strong throughout 2022 and didn’t start to level off until the Fed was just about through tightening, and consumer loans as I expected really only started to level off when the Unemployment Rate started to rise…credit cards, not at all. And that’s because, as I said, most borrowers are not borrowing because they made a NPV calculation that said borrowing makes sense; they’re borrowing because they need to and 1% or 2% or 3% doesn’t really change that calculus very much.
But you know where it did change the calculus a lot? In mortgages. And that’s because a buyer might be reluctant to pay 1% more on a mortgage, but what the buyer also needs is someone who is willing to abandon their awesome loan. As has been noted elsewhere by lots of people, home sales absolutely cratered not because people weren’t wanting to buy but because there weren’t enough people who wanted to sell. So mortgage origination volumes also dried up, as a direct consequence of higher rates. The one large market where interest rates did have a big impact, although not for the reason you’d think, was in mortgages!
You know I wouldn’t say this unless I had a neat chart to show you. Here is the Mortgage Bankers’ Association Purchase index, tracking the volume of new loans for purchasing a home (in black), set against y/y money supply growth, in blue.
Let’s tie this up with a bow:
- Higher rates didn’t affect every kind of loan, but had a big impact on turnover, and thus origination, in one very large loan market: mortgages.
- Lower mortgage origination turns out to have been uncannily correlated with money supply growth. This may or may not be causal, but it at least means that mortgage origination merits consideration as a leading indicator of money supply growth.
- As interest rates have leveled off and even declined some, the housing market is gradually adjusting. We are seeing higher home prices, and mortgage origination has been showing signs of recovering as the chart shows (mortgage origination numbers are released before sales numbers, so expect a rise in home sales coming).
- It is going to be difficult for the Fed to keep the money supply shrinking, if origination of new mortgages rises even a little bit. This doesn’t mean M2 is going to skyrocket, just that it is going to stop shrinking (in fact, it has risen each of the last two months).
- If M2 rises at even a sober 5% pace, combined with money velocity that still has some normalization left, it will be extremely difficult for the Fed to hit its inflation target on a sustainable basis for some time.
And what should you do about it, just in case? For starters, read “Inflation Sherpa.”
Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (Oct 2023)
Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can follow me on X at @inflation_guy. Sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Individual and institutional investors, issuers and risk managers with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments! Check out the Inflation Guy podcast!
- Welcome to the #CPI #inflation walkup for November (October’s figure). This is the next-to-last month I will be doing this!
- If you miss the live tweets, you can find a summary later at https://inflationguy.blog and I will podcast a summary at inflationguy.podbean.com . Those will continue in 2024 after the live tweeting stops.
- Well, this report ought to be interesting. My forecasts are very different from the other forecasts out there. The Bloomberg consensus has +0.09% on SA headline, and 0.30% on core. The swap market, Kalshi, and Cleveland Fed are all in the same ballpark.
- I have 0.14% NSA, roughly 0.22% on headline, and 0.38% on core.
- It is a little wild to me that everyone else is so low, and it makes me concerned that I’m missing something. But I think it comes down to the fact that everyone must be expecting a big give-back on OER this month.
- Used car prices should add this month. Health care insurance pivots from an 0.04% drag to an 0.02% add. Even airfares could rise, despite sliding jet fuel, because fares are too low given the level of fuel.
- All of those are in my forecast (well, I conceded flat on airfares but it could go either way). I assume they’re in everyone’s forecast. So that leads me to believe that the assumption is a correction in OER is in store.
- OK, I see the chart too. It sure LOOKS like OER did something weird last month. If OER prints 0.45% m/m instead of 0.55%, then that takes 2.5bps off my forecast. That still doesn’t get there. You need an 0.35% or something.
- And oh by the way, I’d argue that the jump might just be payback for a too-rapid fall that happened earlier this year. There was no reason to expect monthlies to drop from 0.7% m/m in Feb to 0.48% in March. Rents are not collapsing and home prices are now going back up.
- I know that’s inconvenient to the deflation story but it’s right on par with where my model says it should be. (Our model is Primary Rents but OER is based on rents).
- So okay, I’ll drop my forecast 2.5bps on the assumption we go back to 0.45% m/m for OER. Now ya happy?!? But I’m not assuming any ‘payback’.
- Meanwhile, I haven’t even talked about the fact that I have +1% on Used Cars, but that might be too conservative given how strong auctions were in the latter part of September (not picked up in the last number).
- And I don’t have anything for New Cars – but thanks to the new wage agreement, car prices both New and Used are going to go up again.
- I’ve already spoken plenty about the reversal in Health Insurance; it shouldn’t take anyone by surprise this year.
- The change in method means that the shift from -0.04% to +0.02% per month should only last six months – it shortens the lag but this transition period increases the effect to synchronize.
- With all this, Core CPI should stay at 4.1% y/y, or rise (if my forecast is on point). As I said last month, getting it below 4% is going to be more of a challenge. And Median inflation will fall to probably around 5.25% this month, but again we’re in the hard part now.
- Breakevens have net slumped a bit this month, but that hides the fact that after last month’s CPI they spiked for a week or so. 10y breaks got to 2.50% in the bond market selloff before settling back.
- If the bond bear market continues (and the balance of large government budget deficits, smaller trade deficits, and a Fed in run-off means more pressure on rates to attract domestic savers), breakevens will go back up.
- Not sure that’s a good play in Q4, since this tends to be a good seasonal time for bonds, but a bad CPI could change that. And, naturally, with a recession coming (we think?) it’ll be harder to get higher rates immediately.
- However…the secular bull market in bonds is over so the real question is whether interest rates are aimless for a decade, or in a secular bear market. Too long a topic for a tweet storm!
- So that’s it for the walkup. Pretty simple task today: 1. check OER, 2. check core ex-housing, 3. check core services ex-housing (“supercore” for a finer read on the Fed (?))
- Keep checking the improving distribution of inflation – core below median means the tails are moving to the downside, in a disinflationary signature, but not sure that will outlast 2024.
- Good luck!
- Very soft number! Let’s see how much of this is ‘payback.’
- If it’s CPI day there must be I.T. issues. It’s a law. Headline was +0.045%, Core +0.227%. Used cars was a DRAG, which is completely at odds with surveys. OER dropped to 0.41% m/m, but that by itself wouldn’t be enough for the downside surprise.
- Airfares fell, Lodging away from home fell significantly, New Cars was a marginal decline…and health insurance didn’t add as much as it was supposed to (not sure why) although it was positive. Looks like a well-rounded soft number.
- Here is m/m OER. Back to prior level, but no payback.
- In the big picture, the 3-month average isn’t all that soothing, especially when we look at Used Cars and other quirks that will likely be repaid.
- So Black Book was -1.85% in September, NSA CPI Used Cars was -5.63%. BB was +1.07% in October, NSA CPI Used Cars was -1.40%. Private auctions were strong. This is confounding – might be a seasonal quirk that BLS reflects different seasonals, but the NSA pretty far off.
- m/m CPI: 0.0449% m/m Core CPI: 0.227%
- Last 12 core CPI figures
- M/M, Y/Y, and prior Y/Y for 8 major subgroups
- Primary Rents: 7.18% y/y OER: 6.85% y/y
- Further: Primary Rents 0.5% M/M, 7.18% Y/Y (7.41% last) OER 0.41% M/M, 6.85% Y/Y (7.08% last) Lodging Away From Home -2.5% M/M, 1.2% Y/Y (7.3% last)
- Some ‘COVID’ Categories: Airfares -0.91% M/M (0.28% Last) Lodging Away from Home -2.45% M/M (3.65% Last) Used Cars/Trucks -0.8% M/M (-2.53% Last) New Cars/Trucks -0.09% M/M (0.3% Last)
- Here is my early and automated guess at Median CPI for this month: 0.359%
- Now, this is really the important thing. Median is still 0.36%. That tells you this is left-tail stuff more than the rents stuff.
- Piece 1: Food & Energy: 0.17% y/y
- Food at Home was +0.26% SA; Food Away from Home +0.37%. Food added 0.04% to headline, which was right on my forecast. Look, talk to any restaurateur – wages are still a big problem. Food AFH isn’t going to deflate soon.
- Energy was -0.22% m/m NSA; I’d estimated -0.17% so it was very slightly more drag.
- Piece 2: Core Commodities: 0.0948% y/y
- Piece 3: Core Services less Rent of Shelter: 3.71% y/y
- Piece 4: Rent of Shelter: 6.76% y/y
- Core Goods: 0.0948% y/y Core Services: 5.5% y/y
- Core goods actually ticked up slightly. Despite the decline in Used and New cars.
- This is part of the core goods story – continued acceleration in Medicinal Drugs. Honestly this is something we’ve been expecting for a long time and just surprised how long it has taken. Many of the APIs for pharma come from China.
- Core ex-housing actually ticked up very slightly from 1.97% y/y to 2.05% y/y. That sounds great but prior to COVID it hadn’t been above 2% since 2012 so that’s still too high.
- Largest declines (annualized m/m) in core were Lodging Away From Home (which is quite surprising) at -26% and Car and Truck Rental (also surprising) at -17%. Both core services but only the latter is “supercore”.
- Largest advances Motor Vehicle Insurance +26%, Tobacco +25%, Jewelry and Watches +16%.
- I am probably not going to be exactly right on median because in my calculation the median category is Northeast Urban OER, which means we’re relying on my ad-hoc seasonal adjustment. Could be as low as 0.32% m/m, or a smidge higher. Either way, it’s not price stability.
- I guess on Health Insurance I’ll have to leave the explanation to someone with a pointier pencil. My calculations had the effect being about 2bps/month; this month is was about 0.8bps. I would call that negligible except that previously it had been a 4bps drag.
- Our housing model, updated with the latest data. Kinda right on par. But notice our model never gets anywhere close to deflation in housing. Those calling for such are going to be disappointed.
- This is a strange dichotomy and I wonder if some physician can explain it. Maybe doctors are making their money by channeling expensive services through hospitals. But it’s weird to see hospital inflation so buoyant while doctors’ services are deflating.
- Education and Communication was a little soft. Some of that was a curious (to me) -0.24% NSA m/m decline in College tuition and fees. Probably a quirk. Also Telephone hardware was -1.9% m/m.
- Apparel was soft – partly this is expected because of the lagged strength of the dollar on core goods, but the -5.1% decline in Women’s outerwear seems unusual.
- The EI Inflation Diffusion Index is back almost to flat. Note that doesn’t mean 0 inflation. To get back to persistently having Median CPI around 2-3%, you’d want to see the diffusion index quite a bit negative. I think that’s going to be difficult.
- Last chart, and it tells the story. Left tail is growing, but rest of the distribution is moving left only reluctantly. The big fingers on the right are housing. It’s encouraging that there is more diversity here – a sign that the money impulse that affects everything is waning.
- Here is today’s summary. Core was surprisingly tame but it was largely from some quirky one-offs. Median didn’t improve very much. Neither Core nor Median over the last 3 months is where the Fed wants it. This doesn’t change, therefore, the higher-for-longer meme.
- It also doesn’t demand further tightening, but that’s not news. We already knew the Fed was done.
- Looking ahead, there will be further slow progress on housing, although as I keep saying – not as much as some forecasters think. The problem is that outside of housing, core inflation doesn’t look like it wants to fall much further.
- Naturally all of this depends on what the Fed does going forward. If the money supply keeps bumping along around zero growth, then eventually the velocity rebound will run its course and inflation will go back to 2-3%.
- But higher rates mean that velocity is probably going to do more than just rebound, so higher for longer will need to be longer than people expect – or, possibly, than the Fed can maintain in the face of recession.
- That’s the hard part. This so far has been the easy part. If market rates rise again in sloppy fashion after the new year, despite recession signs…what does the Fed do? Inflation won’t be at target yet, or even close. Stay tuned!
- …and thanks for staying tuned. Have a good day.
The CPI was a happy surprise today, but not so much that I would throw a party. The low miss was partly caused by inexplicable declines in autos and lodging away from home, while the correction in rents basically just went back to the prior level rather than stepping down to a slower pace. Rents are still going to come down, and in some places in the country they are falling – but in some places they are still rising briskly.
That dispersion in experienced rental inflation is actually part of the good news, and it’s good news that we see throughout the CPI over the last several months. It’s the good news that the Enduring Investments Inflation Diffusion Index is capturing: all prices are not moving as one, as they mostly did during the upswing in inflation. A high correlation between unrelated categories tends to suggest a common impulse is causing the movement – and is yet another reason that the notion that inflation was coming from various idiosyncratic supply chain issues should never have been entertained. There was clearly a large impulse acting on all prices: the 20%+ spike in money growth. Now that the money supply is flat, though velocity is rebounding, price dispersion is reasserting.
(Spoiler alert: it isn’t yet happening on the inter-country experience – all countries saw their inflation move in synchrony when it went up, and all are seeing it move in synchrony coming down, so it’s early to say the battle is won.)
We’re still just starting the difficult part, from the standpoint of monetary policy but also from the standpoint of figuring out how quickly inflation can get tamped back down to target. And the dispersion makes that more difficult, because the signal gets lost in the noise – just as it used to, before the money gusher. Next month we’ll have to deal with likely rebounds in Lodging Away from Home as well as increases in autos, reversing this month’s surprises, but we’ll probably get slightly better rent numbers.
What I can say is that the market reaction to all of this is absurd. This just doesn’t move the needle on the Fed. There was no tightening and no easing in the pipeline before this number, and after this number that hasn’t changed an iota. But at this hour stocks are +2% and bonds are soaring. I know the conventional wisdom is that rates are going back to zero…it just seems kind of early to get on that train when median inflation is still 5.3%…
Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (August 2023)
Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy. Sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Individual and institutional investors, issuers and risk managers with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments! Check out the Inflation Guy podcast!
- Welcome to the #CPI #inflation walkup for September (August’s figure).
- At 8:30ET, when the data drops, I will pull down the data and then run a bunch of charts. I think I’ve figured out how to autopost these again, fingers crossed. Then I’ll comment and post some more charts.
- Later, I will post a summary of these tweets at https://inflationguy.blog and then podcast a summary at inflationguy.podbean.com . Thanks again for subscribing!
- This month, after some low prints recently, we’re going to get some higher ones. Not terrible like last year, mind you, but higher. The economist consensus…which I’m again closer to than the swap market estimate…is for a high 0.2% on core and a low 0.6% on headline.
- That will raise y/y headline and drop y/y core (all the way to 4.3%!). Core should also fall again next month due to a harsh comp from Sep 2022. After that, progress will be slower. If there’s progress.
- The last couple of prints have been very low: core of +0.16% in both June and July. These were due to non-repeatable things, and I’ll talk about some of them in a bit.
- But the point is that we’ve gotten most of the positive surprises for a while I think (although I guess that’s the nature of surprises!)
- A positive (drag) today, and ongoing for a while, will be the deceleration in rents. Last month Primary Rents were +0.42% and OER was +0.49%. I am penciling the combined ‘rent of shelter’ in for +0.41% this month. That might be aggressive. But it will keep slowing for a while.
- But there are a few things that are going to be reversing soon. One is health insurance. I wrote about this recently https://shorturl.at/agtCX . It will still drag today but that will reverse in October.
- Used Cars is a little indeterminate. I would have thought it was overdone on the downside but am less sure of that now. Here’s why:
- Black book implies continued downward pressure on used car prices. This is partly because auto finance companies have really jerked back on lending, sharply raising rates along with their cost of funding and actually checking credit occasionally.
- The rates make sense but the rationing not so much – delinquency rates have risen from the 2021 covid-funding inspired lows but are still at normal rates. Anyway the result has been downard pressure on used car prices.
- The rate effect is what people had been expecting from housing – the difference between a 5% car loan and a 0% car loan for 7 years is about 13% higher cost for the non-cash buyer so a budget-conscious buyer lowers his price somewhat as a result. Hasn’t happened in housing.
- But in housing the seller also has a loan with value and so is reluctant to sell at a lower price AND lose the low rate. That symmetry doesn’t exist in autos. I suspect that’s why used car prices have fallen farther than I expected (and I should have seen that).
- The Fed though is done (at worse, ALMOST done), and rates will level off for car loans. So this downward pressure will eventually ebb. And they should end up adjusting to a higher overall price level.
- Used cars will still be a drag today (I have a -3.5% fall in used cars penciled in), but that too should ebb soon.
- The real mystery from last month was airfares. That has been down >8% two months in a row, and the current level is about 15% too low for the level of jet fuel (which is rising).
- Do airfares recover 3%? 8%? 15%? I’m wild-guessing 6% but every 1% is worth 3/4 of 1bp on the core m/m. So I’m projecting it to add 4bps, basically. This is a big source of uncertainty, but mostly on the upside, this month.
- Now, we should also recognize that last month’s CPI was also pretty BROADLY low, which meant that median CPI also printed low.
- That would be wonderful if it happened again (but it’s unlikely). Indeed, between higher headline, core, and median, it will be very easy for some people to get carried away with negativity.
- But still, we’re talk ing about 0.23% on core, maybe rounding up to 0.3% if we get stuff a little high. That’s settling in towards the high-3s, low-4s, which is where I think we are going. But watch the breadth, and median.
- The markets, on net, have done almost nothing this last month. Real yields and nominal yields went up a touch, but longer breakevens and swaps are almost exactly unchanged. Shorter breakevens are wider on the strength in gasoline.
- I think markets recognize that the narrative is turning, from “we are in an inflationary spiral” to “inflation is coming down” to “okay now it gets harder.” And that leaves breakevens a bit aimless for now.
- I do think breakevens are too low!
- Energy is back rising, and this time there’s nothing left in the SPR to hold down gasoline prices. Government deficits are ballooning again, partly because interest costs are skyrocketing.
- Navigation from here, both macroeconomically and in a trading sense, starts to get difficult again. Good luck out there today!
- A bit on the high side. Core 0.278 to three decimals. Working on downloading data now.
- As I said, core was a little higher than expected, but still at the low end of what we’d seen for the prior year.
- CPI for Used Cars and Trucks was -1.23%, less than I expected. Airfares were +4.89% (I had +6%), so in the ballpark.
- M/M, Y/Y, and prior Y/Y for 8 major subgroups
- Core Goods: 0.234% y/y Core Services: 5.9% y/y
- Primary Rents: 7.76% y/y OER: 7.32% y/y
- Further: Primary Rents 0.48% M/M, 7.76% Y/Y (8.03% last) OER 0.38% M/M, 7.32% Y/Y (7.66% last) Lodging Away From Home -3% M/M, 3% Y/Y (6% last)
- Some ‘COVID’ Categories: Airfares 4.89% M/M (-8.09% Last) Lodging Away from Home -2.97% M/M (-0.34% Last) Used Cars/Trucks -1.23% M/M (-1.34% Last) New Cars/Trucks 0.27% M/M (-0.08% Last)
- A little surprising that we aren’t seeing the same effect on New Cars (loan interest rate effect) that we are on used cars.
- Here is my early and automated guess at Median CPI for this month: 0.328%
- OK, this is what I expected. The broad everything-was-soft month was a one-off. Median is still slowwwwwly decelerating, but not collapsing like it appeared.
- Piece 1: Food & Energy: 1% y/y
- The energy story is known – OPEC is cutting supplies in anticipation of weak growth, but so far the main economic driver globally (the US) isn’t having the weak growth. And supplies are low. So headline was bubbly and will probably get more of that next month.
- Piece 2: Core Commodities: 0.234% y/y
- Core Commodities driven lower this month partly by Used Cars of course. But it’s going to be challenging to push it a lot lower. That said, the strength of the USD is putting constant pressure in the traditional way here – but nearshoring is still going to make this sticky.
- Piece 3: Core Services less Rent of Shelter: 3.88% y/y
- This is a little interesting…it’s just a little hook to the upside, but remember one of the big downward pressures here is Health Insurance and that’s due to reverse soon.
- But the other big input is wages, and labor’s recent muscularity along with increases in minimum wage in California is going to keep this from decelerating as much as it ‘needs’ to.
- Piece 4: Rent of Shelter: 7.33% y/y
- This is going to keep decelerating. But not back to zero!
- I had penciled in Rent of Shelter as +0.41%. OER slowed to +0.38% m/m, while Primary Rents (about 1/3 of the impact) was faster this month at +0.49%. But ‘Lodging Away from Home’ dropped about 3%, and that’s why Rent of Shelter was so soft. This should rebound next month.
- Interesting and important dichotomy continues: Food at Home was +0.09% (NSA); Food Away from Home was +0.34% (NSA). The latter is wages. Keep an eye on that.
- Medicinal Drugs was +0.61%m/m. Series obviously bounces around a lot but to my eye it’s creeping higher. I remember in 2020 and 2021 it was confounding that with COVID, there was downward pressure here. Looks like that’s ebbed.
- Doctors’ Services was +0.11% m/m, and remains sort of soft. But Hospital Services (2.3% of CPI) was +0.67% m/m. It had been one of the soft categories last month at -0.44%.
- Lodging Away from Home, as I’d mentioned, dragged down the overall Rent of Shelter. But it’s at the low end of its monthly range of wiggles and will probably add next month rather than subtract.
- Worth pointing out because it’s been in the news. Motor Vehicle Insurance, which is 1.7% of CPI – has been steadily increasing. Causes are higher car prices, and big increases in carjackings as well as some natural disaster losses. This doesn’t look like it’s going away. (charts show m/m and y/y)
- Core ex-housing is down to 2.36% y/y. This sounds low, but prior to COVID it hadn’t been over 2% since 2012. As noted earlier, core goods has squeezed out most good news already and core services – outside of housing – still faces wages growing faster than 5%.
- The biggest-losers list (annualized monthly figures) among core categories is led by Lodging Away from Home (-30%), Misc Personal Goods (-25%), Infants/Toddlers’ Apparel (-20%), and Used Cars/Trucks (-14%).
- Biggest gainers are Public Transportation (+58%), Motor Vehicle Insurance (+33%), Car/Truck Rental (+17%), Footwear (+15%), Car Maintenance/Repair (+14%), Misc Personal Services (+12%).
- The dispersion stuff is actually decent news. Broadly, things are slowing down. That doesn’t mean we are going back to 2% inflation; in fact there are very few signs of that yet. But it does mean that the broad upthrust in the price level is ebbing.
- It would be nice to go back to worrying mainly about relative price changes instead of absolute price-level changes. We aren’t there yet. The volatility of prices, and some of the broad pressures like trade and wages, remind us that we are still in the inflation episode.
- This only FEELS like inflation is low, because we saw what high feels like. But 4% core/median inflation is no picnic. And it will keep correlations elevated.
- Last chart. Here is the weight of categories inflating faster than 4%. Obviously we are getting close to 4% being the median. Now, about a third of the basket is housing so that third is in the >4% category. But if we flip and look at <2%, it’s still not back to the old normal.
- …implication being the same as with the diffusion index, volatility, and correlations – we are on the right path, but not there yet.
- NOW – that does NOT mean that the Fed needs to keep raising rates. That’s fairly ineffective anyway although it looks meaningful in used cars. That’s not the issue though. What the Fed should, and probably will do, is just keep rates steady here. And I think they will.
- The real problem comes later: with burgeoning deficits and upward pressure on long rates (I worried about this here: https://inflationguy.blog/2023/08/02/three-colliding-macro-trends/ ), at some point the Fed is going to be under pressure to start buying Treasuries again.
- That’s a bad path, but it’s going to be hard to resist.
- That’s all for today. Thanks for tuning in! I’ll have the summary posted to the blog in an hour or two, and then the podcast later today. Have a good day.
The CPI number this month delivered broadly as expected (and, as expected, broadly). Used Cars continued to slide, and airfares did not repeat the -8% again. The surprise drop in Lodging Away from Home will likely reverse next month, and airfares will be another add. While Used Cars will remain soggy, we only have one more month of Health Insurance drag of 4bps/month before that reverses.
The upshot is that the balance of this year will likely see more 0.3s for the most part, with some high 0.2s (meaning that it rounds down). The easy lifting on core has been done. Due to base effects core will still drop next month, but after that…it is going to get difficult. Decelerating housing inflation will be a persistent following wind, but all of the other things that were rowing in one direction while housing was rising…are about to be rowing in the other direction. And housing’s drag is already reversing. (If you were looking 12 months ahead at the possible future declines in rents, to be fair you should be looking now at 12 months ahead when we’re going to start to see percolating through the re-acceleration that we’re seeing in spot rents and home prices.
There is no need for the Fed to tighten further. Rate hikes don’t really help very much (except in some categories like used cars!) to restrain inflation, and short rates are a bit above normal. But as noted in the tweet stream, we are converging on what will be a more difficult path to navigate. The Fed made a mistake and overdid the COVID response, and then held it too long. It deserves credit, on the other hand, for pivoting and throwing off the dovish history of the last two decades to begin shrinking the balance sheet and for being steady on that path even as the rate hikes cease. But those were, or should have been, easy decisions from the monetary policy standpoint as the central bank was leaning into the prevailing wind by pursuing restraint when the economy was robust.
Before too long, the Fed is going to face a circumstance where restraint remains necessary because inflation is sticky at too high a level, but longer-term interest rates begin to tick higher. This will put pressure on economic growth, and on the budget deficit, so that their restraint will be seen as wrong-headed. That’s the danger zone, and I think it probably is a 2024 problem. My fear is that it will be very difficult for the Fed to not give in, arguing to itself that “hey, slower growth means lower inflation” even though there’s no evidence for that, outside of energy, and start to temper its hawkish stance.
That would be a big mistake. But it’s probably next year’s mistake. For now, we can sit back and watch the core and median inflation numbers come down. Not as fast as people will be expecting, but the direction is right.
Enough with Interest Rates Already
One of the things which alternately frustrates me and fascinates me is the mythology surrounding the idea that the central bank can address inflation by manipulating the price of money, even if it ignores the quantity of money.
I say “mythology” because there is virtually no empirical support for this notion, and the theoretical support for it depends on a model of flows in the economy that seem contrary to how the economy actually works. The idea, coarsely, is that by making money more dear the central bank will make it harder for businesses to borrow and invest, and for consumers to borrow and spend; therefore growth will slow. This seems to be a reasonable description of how the world works. But this then gets tied into inflation by appealing to the idea that lower aggregate demand should lower price pressures, leading to lower inflation. The models are very clear on this point: lower growth causes less inflation and more growth causes more inflation. The fact that this doesn’t appear to be the case in practice seems not to have lessened the fervor of policymakers for this framework. This is the frustrating part – especially since there is a viable alternative framework which seems to actually describe how the world works in practice, and that is monetarism.
The fascinating part are the incredibly short memories that policymakers enjoy when it comes to pursuing new policy using their preferred framework. Here’s the simplest of examples: from December 2008 until December 2019, the Fed Funds target rate spent 65% of the time pinned at 0.25%. The average Fed funds rate over that period was 0.69%. During that period, core inflation ranged from a low of 0.6% in 2010 to a high of 2.4%, hitting either 2.3% or 2.4% in 2012, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. That 0.6% was an aberration – fully 86% of the time over that 11 years, core inflation was between 1.5% and 2.4%. Ergo, it seems reasonable to point out that ultra–low interest rates did not seem to cause higher inflation. If that is our most-recent experience, then why would the Fed now be aggressively pursuing a theory that depends on the idea that high interest rates will cause lower inflation? The most-recent evidence we have is that interest rates do not seem to affect inflation.
This isn’t just a recent phenomenon. But the nice thing about the post-GFC period is that for a good part of it, the Fed was ignoring bank reserves and the money supply and effecting policy entirely through interest rates (well, occasionally squirting some QE around, but if anything that should have increased inflation – it certainly didn’t dampen the effect of low interest rates). This became explicit in 2014 when Joseph Gagnon and Brian Sack, shortly after leaving the Fed themselves, published “Monetary Policy with Abundant Liquidity: A New Operating Framework for the Federal Reserve.” In this piece, they argued that the Fed should ignore the quantity of reserves in the system, and simply change interest rates that it pays on reserves generated by its open market operations. The fundamental idea is that interest rates matter, and money does not, and the Fed dutifully has followed that framework ever since. As I just noted, though, the results of that experiment would seem to indicate that low interest rates, anyway, don’t seem to have the effect that would be predicted (and which effect is necessary if the policy is to be meaningful).
And really, this shouldn’t be a surprise because for the prior three decades, the level of the real policy rate (adjusting the nominal rate here by core CPI, not headline) has been completely unrelated to the subsequent change in core inflation.
So, to sum up: for at least 40 years, the level of real policy rates has had no discernable effect on changes in the level of inflation. And yet, current central bank dogma is that rates are the only thing that matters.
I stopped the chart in 2014 because that’s when the Gagnon/Sack experiment began, but it doesn’t really change anything to extend it to the current day. Actually, all you get is a massive acceleration and deceleration in core inflation that all happened before any interest rate changes affected growth (seeing as how we have not yet had a recession). So it’s a result-within-a-result, in fact.
Any observation about how the Fed manages the price of money rather than its quantity would not be complete without pointing out that the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s economist emeritus Daniel L Thorton, one of the last known monetarists at the Fed until his retirement, wrote a paper in 2012 entitled “Monetary Policy: Why Money Matters and Interest Rates Don’t” [emphasis in the original title]. In this well-argued, landmark, iconic, and totally ignored paper Dr. Thornton argued that the central bank should focus almost entirely on the quantity of money, and not its price. Naturally, this is concordant with my own view, plus more than a century of evidence around the world that the price level is closely tied to the quantity of money.
To be fair, the connection of changes in M2 to changes in the price level has also been weak since the mid-1990s, for reasons I’ve discussed at length elsewhere. But at least money has a history of being related to inflation, whereas interest rates do not (except as a result of inflation, rather than as a cause of them); moreover, we can rehabilitate money by separately modeling money velocity.
There does not appear to be any way to rehabilitate interest rate policy as a tool for addressing inflation. It hasn’t worked, it isn’t working, and it won’t work.
Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (February 2023)
Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy, but subscribers to @InflGuyPlus get the tweets in real time and a conference call wrapping it all up by about the time the stock market opens. Subscribe by going to the shop at https://inflationguy.blog/shop/ , where you can also subscribe to the Enduring Investments Quarterly Inflation Outlook. Sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Individual and institutional investors, issuers and risk managers with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments! Check out the Inflation Guy podcast!
- Welcome to the #CPI #inflation walkup! To be sure, the importance of this data point in the short run is much less than it was a week ago, but it would be a mistake to lose sight of inflation now that the Fed is likely moving from QT to QE again.
- A reminder to subscribers of the tweet schedule: At 8:30ET, when the data drops, I will post a number of charts and numbers, in fairly rapid-fire succession. Then I will retweet some of those charts with comments attached. Then I’ll run some other charts.
- Afterwards (recently it’s been 9:30ish) I will have a private conference call for subscribers where I’ll quickly summarize the numbers.
- After my comments on the number, I will post a partial summary at https://inflationguy.blog and later will podcast a summary at inflationguy.podbean.com .
- I am also going to try and record the conference call for later. I think I’ve figured out how to do that. If I’m successful, I’ll tweet that later also.
- Thanks again for subscribing! And now for the walkup.
- This picture of the last month has changed quite a bit over the last few days! Suddenly, rates have reversed and the nominal curve is steepening. The inflation market readings are…of sketchy quality at the moment.
- Now, the swap market has also re-priced the inflation trough: instead of 2.65% in June (was in low 2s not long ago), the infl swap market now has y/y bottoming at 3.34% b/c of base effects before bouncing to 3.7% & then down to 3.15% by year-end. I think that’s pretty unlikely.
- Let’s remember that Median CPI reached a new high JUST LAST MONTH, contrary to expectations (including mine). The disturbing inflation trend is what had persuaded investors…until late last week…that the Fed might abruptly lurch back to a 50bp hike.
- These are real trends…so I’m not sure why economists are acting as if they are still certain that inflation is decelerating. The evidence that it is, so far at least, is sparse.
- Also, this month not only did the Manheim used car index rise again, but Black Book (historically a better fit although BLS has changed their sampling source so we’re not sure) also did. I have that adding 0.04%-0.05% to core.
- But maybe this is a good time to step back a bit, because of the diminished importance of this report (to be sure, if we get a clean 0.5%, it’s going to be very problematic for the Fed which means it should also be problematic for equity investors).
- Over the last few days we’ve read a lot about how banks are seeing deposits leave for higher-yielding opportunities. This is completely expected: as interest rates rise, the demand for real cash balances declines.
- You may have heard me say that before. But it’s really Friedman who said that first: velocity is the inverse of the demand for real cash balances. DEPOSITS LEAVING FOR HIGHER YIELDS IS EXACTLY WHAT HIGHER VELOCITY MEANS.
- And it is the reason for the very high correlation of velocity with interest rates.
- So the backdrop is this: money may be declining slightly but velocity is rebounding hard. Exactly as we should expect. Our model is shown here – it’s heavily influenced by interest rates (but not only interest rates).
- And if the Fed is going to move from its modest QT to QE, especially if they don’t ALSO slash rates back towards zero, then the inflationary impulse has little reason to fade.
- You know, I said back when the Fed started hiking that they would stop once the market forced them to. What has been amazing is that there were no accidents until now, so the market let them go for it. And in the long run this is good news – rates nearer neutral.
- But we have now had some bumps (and to be fair, I said no accidents until now but of course if the FDIC and Fed had been doing their job and monitoring duration gaps…this accident started many many months ago).
- With respect to how the Fed responds to this number: it is important to remember that the IMPACT ON INFLATION of an incremental 25bps or 50bps is almost zero. Especially in the short run. It might even be precisely zero.
- But the impact of 25bps or 50bps on attitudes, on deposit flight, and on liquidity hoarding could be severe, in the short run. On the other hand, if the Fed stands pat and does nothing but end QT, it might smack of panic.
- If I were at the Fed, I’d be deciding between 25bps and 0bps. And the only decent argument for 25bps is that it evinces a “business as usual” air. It won’t affect 2023 inflation at all (even using the Fed’s models which assume rates affect inflation).
- Here are the forecasts I have for the number – I tweeted this yesterday too. I’m a full 0.1% higher on core than the Street economists, market, and Kalshi. But I’m in-line on headline. So obviously as noted above I see the risks as higher.
- Market reactions? If we get my number or higher, it creates an obvious dilemma for the Fed and that means bad things for the market no matter how the Fed resolves that. Do they ignore inflation or ignore market stability?
- If we get lower than the economists’ expectation (on core), then it’s good news for the market because MAYBE it means the Fed isn’t in quite such a bad box and can do more to support liquidity (read: support the mo mo stock guys).
- So – maybe this report is important after all! Good luck today. I will be back live at 8:31ET.
- Well, headline was below core!
- Waiting for database to update but on a glance this doesn’t look good. Core was an upside surprise slightly and that was with used cars a DRAG.
- m/m CPI: 0.37% m/m Core CPI: 0.452%
- Last 12 core CPI figures
- So this to me looks like bad news. I don’t see the deceleration that everyone was looking for. We will look at some of the breakdown in a minute.
- M/M, Y/Y, and prior Y/Y for 8 major subgroups
- Standing out a couple of things: Apparel (small weight) jumps again…surprising. And Medical Care is back to a drag…some of that is insurance adjustment (-4.07% m/m, pretty normal) and some is Doctors Services (-0.52% m/m), while Pharma (0.14%) only a small add.
- Core Goods: 1.03% y/y Core Services: 7.26% y/y
- We start to see the problem here: any drag continues to be in core goods. Core goods does not have unlimited downside especially with the USD on the back foot. Core services…no sign of slowing.
- Primary Rents: 8.76% y/y OER: 8.01% y/y
- And rents…still accelerating y/y.
- Further: Primary Rents 0.76% M/M, 8.76% Y/Y (8.56% last) OER 0.7% M/M, 8.01% Y/Y (7.76% last) Lodging Away From Home 2.3% M/M, 6.7% Y/Y (7.7% last)
- Last month, OER and Primary Rents had slipped a bit and econs assumed that was the start of the deceleration. Maybe, but they re-accelerated a bit this month. Lodging away from home a decent m/m jump, but actually declined y/y so you can see that’s seasonal.
- Some ‘COVID’ Categories: Airfares 6.38% M/M (-2.15% Last) Lodging Away from Home 2.26% M/M (1.2% Last) Used Cars/Trucks -2.77% M/M (-1.94% Last) New Cars/Trucks 0.18% M/M (0.23% Last)
- FINALLY we see the rise in airfares that has been long overdue. I expected this to add 0.01% to core; it actually added 0.05%. Those who want to say this is a good number will screech “outlier!” but really it’s just catching up. The outlier is used cars.
- Both the Manheim and Black Book surveys clearly showed an increase in used car prices. But the BLS has recently changed methodologies on autos. Not clear what they’re using. Maybe it’s just timing and used will add back next month. We will see.
- Here is my early and automated guess at Median CPI for this month: 0.634%
- Now, the caveat to this chart is that I was off last month (the actual figure reported is shown), but that was January. I think I’ll be better on February. I have the median category as Food Away from Home. This chart is bad news for the deceleration crowd, and for the Fed.
- Piece 1: Food & Energy: 7.97% y/y
- OK, Food and Energy is decelerating, but both still contributed high rates of change. Energy will oscillate. It is uncomfortable that Food is still adding.
- Piece 2: Core Commodities: 1.03% y/y
- This is the reason headline was lower than expected. Core goods – in this case largely Used Cars, which I thought would add 0.05% and instead subtracted 0.09% from core. That’s a -14bps swing. +5bps from airfares, but health insurance was a drag…and we were still >consensus.
- Piece 3: Core Services less Rent of Shelter: 5.96% y/y
- …and this is the engine that NEEDS to be heading sharply lower if we’re going to get to 3.15% by end of year. It’s drooping, but not hard.
- Piece 4: Rent of Shelter: 8.18% y/y
- …and I already talked about this. No deceleration evident. As an aside, it’s not clear why we would see one with rising landlord costs, a shortage of housing, and robust wage gains, but…it’s an article of faith out there.
- Core inflation ex-shelter decelerated from 3.94% y/y to 3.74% y/y. That’s good news, although mainly it serves to amplify Used Cars…but look, even if you take out the big add from sticky shelter, we’re still not anywhere near target.
- Equity investors seem to love this figure. Be kind. They’re not thinking clearly these days. It’s a bad number that makes the Fed’s job really difficult.
- Note that Nick Timiraos didn’t signal anything yesterday…that means the Fed hasn’t decided yet. Which means they cared about this number. Which means to me that we’re likely getting 25bps, not 0bps. Now, maybe they just wanted to watch banking for another few days, but…
- …the inflation news isn’t good. As I said up top, 25bps doesn’t mean anything to inflation, but if they skip then it means we are back in QE and hold onto your hats because inflation is going to be a problem for a while.
- Even if they hike, they will probably arrest QT – and that was the only part of policy that was helping. Higher rates was just accelerating velocity. But I digress. Point is, this is a bad print for a Fed hoping for an all-clear hint.
- The only core categories with annualized monthly changes lower than -10% was Used Cars and Trucks (-29%). Core categories ABOVE +10% annualized monthly: Public Transport (+46%), Lodging AFH (+31%), Jewelry/Watches (+20%), Misc Personal Svcs (+17.7%), Footwear (+18%), >>>
- Women’s/Girls’ Apparel (+15%), Tobacco and Smoking Products (+13%), Recreation (+11%), Motor Vehicle Insurance (+11%), Infants’/Toddlers’ Apparel (+11%), and Misc Personal Goods (+10%). Although I also have South Urban OER at +10%, using my seasonality estimate.
- On the Medical Care piece, we really should keep in mind this steady drag from the crazy Health Insurance plug estimate for this year. It’ll almost certainly be an add next year. Imagine where we’d be on core if that was merely flat rather than in unprecedented deflation.
- Let’s go back to median for a bit. The m/m Median was 0.63% (my estimate), which is right in line with last month. The caveat is that the median category was Food Away from Home but that was surrounded by a couple of OER categories which are the ones I have to estimate. [Corrected from original tweet, which cited 0.55% as my median estimate]
- I can’t re-emphasize this enough. Inflation still hasn’t PEAKED, much less started to decline.
- One place we had seen some improvement was in narrowing BREADTH of inflation. Still broad, but narrower. However, this month it broadened again just a bit and the EIIDI ticked higher. Higher median, broader inflation…and that’s with Used Cars a strange drag.
- Stocks still don’t get it, but breakevens do. The 10y BEI is +7bps today. ESH3 is +49 points though!
- We’ll stop it there for now. Conference call will be at 9:30ET (10 minutes). (518) [redacted] Access Code [redacted]. I will be trying to record this one for playback for subscribers who can’t tune in then.
- The conference call recording seemed to go well. If you want to listen to it, you can call the playback number at (757) 841-1077, access code 736735. The recording is about 12 minutes long.
In retrospect, my forecast of 0.4% on seasonally-adjusted headline and 0.5% on core looks pretty good…but that’s only because we got significant downward one-offs, notably from Used Cars. If Used Cars had come in where I was expecting (+1.4%) instead of where it actually came in (-2.8%), and the rest of the report had been the same, then core inflation would have been 0.6% and we would be having a very different discussion right now.
As it is, this is not the number that the Fed needed. Inflation has not yet peaked, and that’s with Health Insurance providing a 4-5bps drag every month. That’s with Used Cars showing a drag instead of the contribution I expected. The “transitory” folks will be pointing to rents and saying that it seems ridiculous, and ‘clearly must decline,’ but that’s not as clear to me. Landlords are facing increased costs for maintenance, financing, energy, taxes; there is a shortage of housing so there is a line of tenants waiting to rent, and wage growth remains robust so these tenants can pay. Why should rents decelerate or even (as some people have been declaring) decline?
Apparel was also a surprising add. Its weight is low but the strength is surprising. A chart of the apparel index is below. Clothing prices now are higher than they’ve been since 2000. The USA imports almost all of its apparel. This is a picture of the effect of deglobalization, perhaps.
So all of this isn’t what the Fed wanted to see. A nice, soft inflation report would have allowed the Fed to gracefully turn to supporting markets and banks, and put the inflation fight on hold at least temporarily. But the water is still boiling and the pot needs to be attended. I think it would be difficult for the Fed to eschew any rate hike at all, given this context. However, I do believe they’ll stop QT – selling bonds will only make the mark-to-market of bank securities holdings worse.
But in the bigger picture, the FOMC at some point needs to address the question of why nearly 500bps of rate hikes have had no measurable effect on inflation. Are the lags just much longer than they thought, and longer than in the past? That seems a difficult argument. But it may be more palatable to them than considering whether increasing interest rates by fiat while maintaining huge quantities of excess reserves is a strategy that – as monetarists would say and have been saying – should not have a significant effect on inflation. The Fed models of monetary policy transmission have been terribly inaccurate. The right thing to do is to go back to first principles and ask whether the models are wrong, especially since there is a cogent alternative theory that could be considered.
Back when I wrote What’s Wrong With Money?, my prescription for unwinding the extraordinary largesse of the global financial crisis – never mind the orders-of-magnitude larger QE of COVID policy response – was exactly the opposite. I said the Fed should decrease the money supply, while holding interest rates down (since, if interest rates rise, velocity should be expected to rise as well and this will exacerbate the problem in the short-term). The Fed has done the opposite, and seem so far to be getting the exact opposite result than they want.
Just sayin’.
