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Bounce in Money Growth is Good News and Bad News
The monthly money supply numbers are out. I have bad news and good news.
The bad news is that the contraction in the money supply appears to be over. That’s not bad news per se (see below), but it’s bad in that the anti-inflationary work that was happening is coming to an end before it’s quite finished. Although I would be reluctant to annualize any one month’s change in M2, the $92bln increase in M2 in March was the largest increase since 2021. It only annualizes to 5.5%, so it isn’t exactly running away from us – but it’s positive. The 3-month and 6-month changes are also positive, and the highest since early 2022 in each case. Again, we’re only 0.72% above the ding-dong lows of last October, but the sign is now positive.
With the money supply figures now in, and with the advance Q1 GDP report due this week, we can revisit our chart of “how much more inflation ‘potential energy’ remains.” (see “Where Inflation Stands in the Cycle,” November 2023). As that article (and this chart) illustrates, if M2 doesn’t go down then this gets more difficult. M2 in Q1 rose at a 1.24% annualized rate over Q4. GDP is expected to rise 2.5% annualized. So M/Q…barely moves, as the chart shows.
We will eventually get back to the line, unless velocity is permanently impaired. Despite all of the crazy people who told you it was, there’s no evidence of that. M2 velocity will rise about 1% (not annualized), if the GDP forecasts are on point. That will be the smallest q/q change in several years, and velocity will be getting very close to the 2020Q1 dropping-off point. But there frankly is no reason for velocity to stop there; higher interest rates imply higher money velocity. However, we are getting close.
(Incidentally, if you’re curious how we can be almost back to the dropping-off point of velocity and yet still be 5% below the line in the first chart above, it’s because I’m using core inflation. With food and energy, we’re a little closer to the line and have used up more of the ‘potential energy.’ But food and energy are of course volatile and so while a good spike in energy prices would look like we’ve used up all of the potential energy, that could just be a one-off effect.)
Either way, we aren’t too far away from getting back to home base and that’s good news. Yes, prices by the time we are done will have risen 25% since the end of 2019, and that can’t really be characterized as a ‘win.’ Let’s go Brandon. But we are getting closer.
The good news about the new rise in M2 is that it’s timely. Markets and the economy were starting to show signs of money getting a little tight; losing a little lubrication in the machinery. An economy does need money to run, and while the only way we can get back to the old price level is to have money supply continue to decrease, that’s also a painful process. In the long run, we would have price stability if the change in M was approximately equal to the change in GDP. If we want 2% inflation, then we need M to grow about 2% faster than GDP. Vacillating velocity means that it isn’t purely mechanical like that – the steady decline in velocity since 1997 is the only reason that inflation stayed tame despite too-fast money growth over that period – but the long downtrend in velocity is likely finished since the long decline in rates is finished. Thus, if we get money supply growth back to the neighborhood of 4%, we can get our 2-2.5% growth with restrained inflation over time.
I am not super optimistic that all of that will work out so nice and cleanly like we draw it up on the chalkboard, but I am more optimistic about it than I was two years ago. We still have some sticky inflation ahead of us, but if the Fed keeps reducing its balance sheet then eventually we will get inflation below the sticky zone and back towards ‘target’ (even though there isn’t a target per se any more).
Re-Blog: Volatility and Position Size
This is one of my favorites, and every few years I re-blog some portion of this article. The original, I wrote in 2010. The basic question is, what is the correct way to respond as an investor to increasing uncertainty? In the original blog and in various re-posting edits, I’ve applied a basic idea called the “Kelly Criterion” to explain why responding to market selloffs by trimming a position, rather than adding to it, is often the right strategy (in the sense of it being mathematically optimal, not in the sense of it always producing the best returns). The idea also applies to the question of what to do when the general level of uncertainty and volatility rises (or falls) in markets. With developing uncertainty in the Middle East and the US spiraling towards what looks to be a summer of crazy politics, it is rational – even optimal – to ‘take some chips off the table.’ Read on for why.
(“Kicking Tails” originally appeared February 12, 2018)
Like many people, I find that poker strategy is a good analogy for risk-taking in investing. Poker strategy isn’t as much about what cards you are dealt as it is about how you play the cards you are dealt. As it is with markets, you can’t control the flop – but you can still correctly play the cards that are out there.[1] Now, in poker we sometimes discover that someone at the table has amassed a large pile of chips by just being lucky and not because they actually understand poker strategy. Those are good people to play against, because luck is fickle. The people who started trading stocks in the last nine years, and have amassed a pile of chips by simply buying every dip, are these people.
All of this is prologue to the observation I have made from time to time about the optimal sizing of investment ‘bets’ under conditions of uncertainty. I wrote a column about this back in 2010 (here I link to the abbreviated re-blog of that column) called “Tales of Tails,” which talks about the Kelly Criterion and the sizing of optimal bets given the current “edge” and “odds” faced by the bettor. I like the column and look back at it myself with some regularity, but here is the two-sentence summary: lower prices imply putting more chips on the table, while higher volatility implies taking chips off of the table. In most cases, the lower edge implied by higher volatility outweighs the better odds from lower prices, which means that it isn’t cowardly to scale back bets on a pullback but correct to do so.
When you hear about trading desks having to cut back bets because the risk control officers are taking into account the higher VAR, they are doing half of this. They’re not really taking into account the better odds associated with lower prices, but they do understand that higher volatility implies that bets should be smaller.
In the current circumstance, the question merely boils down to this. How much have your odds improved with the recent 10% decline in equity prices? Probably, only a little bit. In the chart below, which is a copy of the chart in the article linked to above, you are moving in the direction from brown-to-purple-to-blue, but not very far. But the probability of winning is moving left.
Note that in this picture, a Kelly bet that is less than zero implies taking the other side of the bet, or eschewing a bet if that isn’t possible. If you think the chance that the market will go up (edge) is less than 50-50 you need better payoffs on a rally than on a selloff (odds). If not, then you’ll want to be short. (In the context of recent sports bets: prior to the game, the Patriots were given a better chance of winning so to take the Eagles at a negative edge, you needed solid odds in your favor).
Now if, on the other hand, you think the market selloff has taken us to “good support levels” so that there is little downside risk – and you think you can get out if the market breaks those support levels – and much more upside risk, then you are getting good odds and a positive edge and probably want to bet aggressively. But that is to some extent ignoring the message of higher implied volatility, which says that a much wider range of outcomes is possible (and higher implied volatility moves the delta of an in-the-money option closer to 0.5).
This is why sizing bets well in the first place, and adjusting position sizes quickly with changes in market conditions, is very important. Prior to the selloff, the market’s level suggested quite poor odds such that even the low volatility permitted limited bets – probably a lot more limited than many investors had in place, after many years of seeing bad bets pay off.
[1] I suspect that Bridge might be as good an analogy, or even better, but I don’t know how to play Bridge. Someday I should learn.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (Mar 2024)
After a week when the NY/NJ area saw an earthquake, an eclipse, and a gorgeous 75-degree spring day, it is time to get back to work.
Today’s CPI report was not expected to be particularly great. In fact, one of the biggest conundrums of market behavior recently has been the question of why investors seemed to remain very confident that the Fed will cut rates several times this year, even as forecasts for the path of inflation have backed off of what they were last year (when most forecasters had core CPI returning placidly and obediently to the neighborhood of 2% this year). The a priori consensus forecasts for today’s CPI figure were +0.28% m/m on core and +0.33% m/m on headline. The Kalshi market was in line with that, although CPI swaps were a touch lower on headline at +0.29% (seasonally adjusted, but CPI swaps trade NSA CPI). That’s not wonderful: 0.28% on core would annualize to 3.4% y/y.
The assumption has been that even if in March we are annualizing to 3.4%, the coming deceleration in rents will push everything back down to where it needs to be. The problem with this has always been (a) the strongly-held belief that rents would slip into deflation this year were never based on good analysis, and more importantly (b) this assumed that nothing unforeseen would happen in the other direction. It is characteristic of inflationary periods, of course, that bad things happen on the upside. So this was always sort of assuming a can opener,[1] but at least forecasts for the current data were reflecting that these things had not happened yet. To be fair, the consensus on core has been low relative to the actual print for four months in a row, but at least folks are forecasting mid-3s, rather than 2.0.
Now, let’s review one other thing before we look at some charts. The recent story boils down to this: sticky rents, sticky wages. While core goods has been pulling down core inflation, that game was running out of room. The next part of core deceleration relies on un-sticking the sticky rents, and sticky wages.
So here we are. Today’s figure +0.36% on core CPI, +0.38% on headline (seasonally adjusted on both). This makes the last 3 core CPIs 0.39%, 0.36%, and 0.36%. The chart below of the m/m core CPI figures does not really give the impression of a decelerating trend.
We always look these days first at rents, because that is so important to the disinflation story. Rent of Primary Residence was +0.41% m/m, down from 0.46% last month. Owners’ Equivalent Rent was steady, at +0.44%. Remember that there had been some alarm two months ago, when OER for January jumped to 0.56%, that this was due to a new survey method or coverage and it was going to be repeated going forward. That was always pretty unlikely, but now we have had two months basically back at the old level and the January figure appears to be an outlier. 0.41% on Primary and 0.44% on OER is not hot, just sticky. It isn’t going up; it’s just not going down very fast.
Rents will continue to decline. But the failure of rents to slip into deflation is a source…maybe the source…of the big forecast error made by economists about 2024 CPI. Our cost-based model for primary rents, which never got even vaguely close to deflation, has now definitively hooked higher with the low coming in November. Rents haven’t been decelerating as fast as our model had them, but if anything that’s a source for concern on the high side.
Outside of rents, core inflation ex-housing rose to 2.38% y/y. That sounds like “most of the economy is on target,” but that’s not how inflation works. There’s a distribution, and if the ‘rents’ part of the distribution is going to be higher than the target then everything else needs to average something below the target. We aren’t there. And, as I noted above, we’ve squeezed out just about everything we can from core goods. Actually, y/y core goods dropped to -0.7% thanks partly to continued declines in Used Cars (-1.1% m/m) and some decline this month in New Cars (-0.2%). I think the latter might partially reflect discounts on the EV part of the fleet, where cars for sale have been piling up as manufacturers under political pressure have been producing far more of them than people want.
Note that core services, even with the decline in y/y rents, moved higher this month to 5.4% from 5.2% y/y. Some of that was medical care, which was +0.49% m/m driven by another jump (+0.98% m/m) in Hospital Services. The y/y rise in Hospital Services is now up to 7.55% – the highest since October 2010.
Partly driven by hospital services, the ‘super core’ (core services ex-rents) continues to re-accelerate.
Again, this is not what the Fed wanted to see; and it’s driven partly by the stickiness in wages. The Atlanta Fed’s Wage Growth Tracker has decelerated but is still at 5.0% y/y. That’s not the stuff that 2% core inflation is made of.
Let’s take one moment to look at a piece of good news from the report. My estimate of median CPI, which is my forecast variable because it is not subject to outliers like Core CPI, is +0.32% for this month. Because I have to estimate seasonals for the regional housing numbers, actual Median might be a teensy bit higher or lower but in any event the chart of Median CPI is much less alarming than the chart of Core CPI.
I should observe that the news there is not completely good, since a signature of inflationary environments is that tails are to the upside – that is, core is persistently above median. That was true during the upswing, but during the moderation core has gone back below median. But this bears watching, and if core starts to routinely print above median it will be a negative sign. For now, though, the Median CPI is good news. Relatively.
So let’s talk policy.
The Administration always seems to be confused about why, despite strong jobs numbers, consumers consistently report dissatisfaction with the economic situation. There really shouldn’t be any confusion. Consumers, especially those not in the upper classes, hate taxes. And in addition to a high direct take from the government in explicit taxes, consumers are also facing persistent inflation that the Administration says isn’t there. Inflation is a tax, and it sucks worse than direct taxation because you can’t rearrange your consumption very well to avoid it. (You can rearrange your investment portfolio, but a strikingly small number of people seem to have actually done that even three years into this inflation episode. If you’re curious about how, you really should visit Enduring Investments and ask.)
On the other question of policy, and that’s the Fed: I can’t see any rational argument for cutting rates in June. Actually, on the data we have in hand I can’t see an argument for cutting rates in 2024, except for the one the Fed doesn’t consider and that’s that interest rates don’t affect inflation. To cut the overnight rate, the Fed would have to rely on forecasts that inflation is going to get better. And to do that now, when forecasts have been persistently wrong (and not by just a little bit but about the whole trajectory) since 2020, would be incredibly cavalier. The FOMC still consists of human beings, so never say never. And the inflation data should improve as the year goes along and rents moderate. I just don’t see any sign that it’s going to moderate enough to say ‘we’ve reached price stability.’ Sticky in the high-3s, low-4s is still where I think we’re coming out of this.
[1] A physicist, an engineer, and an economist are stranded on the desert island with nothing but a crate of canned food. “How are we going to get the food that is inside of these cans?” asked one. The physicist says “well, we could heat the cans, carefully, in a crucible we make from ocean clays. Eventually the heat will cause the can to burst and we can get the food inside.” The engineer says “that will take too long. What we need to do is take some of these coconuts, raise them up to a great height with a series of ropes I will design, and allow them to smash down onto the cans, breaking them open.” The economist says “I have a solution that is far easier than what you fellows are doing. Here is how we do this. First, assume a can opener….”
