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Changing the Fed’s Target – FAIT non-accompli?
As the steadier measures of inflation (core, median, or sticky depending on your preferences) have started to overshoot expectations slightly – the y/y measures continue to decline, but slower than expected as the m/m numbers have surprised on the high side – the markets have continued to price Fed policy becoming increasingly easier over the course of 2024 and into 2025. While Fed officials continue to push back gently on this assumption, it seems that most of the FOMC is comfortable with the idea that there will be at least some decrease in overnight rates later in the year and the only question is how much.
While inflation has not been settling gently back to target, there have developed two big holes in the narrative that the Fed was depending on. First, there is no reason to think that rent of shelter is going to cross over into deflation, either in 2024 or any time in the future. The belief that the CPI for rents would follow the high-frequency data into deflation was never well-founded, despite some fancy-looking papers that claimed you could get three pounds of fertilizer out of a one-pound bag if you just squeezed it the right way (I discussed “Disentangling Rent Index Differences: Data, Methods, and Scope”, and why it wasn’t going to tell us anything we didn’t already know, in my podcast last July entitled “Inflation Folk Remedies”), and while rents are declining they are not plunging, and home prices themselves have turned back higher and are growing faster than inflation again.
Second, core-services-ex-rents (so-called ‘supercore’) inflation needed to see wages decelerate a lot in order for that piece to get back towards target. They haven’t, and it hasn’t.
This isn’t to say that these things may not eventually happen, but so far the expectation that we would get back to target sustainably by the middle of 2024 looks quite unlikely. Why, then, are people talking about when the first eases will happen? The only way that it makes sense to do so is if the goal to get inflation back to 2% sustainably is no longer driving policy.
This has led to some observers pointing out that the Fed doesn’t actually have a 2% target any longer. In 2019, the Fed moved to Flexible Average Inflation Targeting, or FAIT. Under this rubric, the Fed doesn’t need to regard 2% (or about 2.25% on CPI) as a target that they need to hit at a moment in time but only as an average over some period of time. This obviates the need for overly-aggressive monetary policy in either direction, such as the instantaneous adjustment linked directly to the inflation-miss that is required by the Taylor Rule.
Unfortunately, under that rule the Fed has little if any chance of meeting its mandate. It would have a better chance of hitting 2% in…um…let’s say a ‘transitory’ way, as rental inflation swings lower and we pass close to the target briefly before inflation goes back up to its new equilibrium level. Back in August 2021 I noted that the Fed was already above the FAIT projected from the announcement of that policy, and in fact had used up all of the post-GFC slack. Obviously, it has gotten worse since then. Below, I update the two charts from that article. The first chart shows the CPI from August 2019, along with the average-inflation-targeting line and the forwards suggested by the CPI swap market (showing where inflation futures would be trading, if they were trading).
The second chart shows the CPI back to January 2013. We’ve made up all of the inflation from the post-GFC deflation scare, and then some.
Note that the inflation swap market is not indicating any expectation that prices will return back to the trendline. The market is acting as if the Fed is still operating under the old rules, where the goal was to get inflation to be stable at 2% from here, wherever “here” is. This means one of four things will have to happen, or it implies a fifth thing.
- The Fed needs to re-base its FAIT to start from the current price level. In that case, the red CPI-plus-2.25% line will shift abruptly upward but then will parallel the inflation implied by the inflation market; or
- The Fed can keep the original base, but concede that the actual target now is 3% (about 3.25% on CPI), which means that if the inflation market is right then it should be back on target by late 2029 (see chart); or
- The Fed can dedicate itself to fighting inflation for much longer, and publicly disavow the notion of reducing interest rates in the next few years. If CPI went completely flat then the Fed would be back on the line by sometime in 2028.
- The Fed can abandon FAIT, because it has become inconvenient, and validate the inflation market’s assessment that the Committee would be happy with 2% from here, not on average.
If none of these things happens, and the Fed then implies that the inflation market is going to permanently imply something different from what the Fed claims to be its modus operandi. In that case, it would be very hard to argue that the central bank had not lost credibility, wouldn’t it?
Four Quick Thoughts on Fed Day
Four fairly quick observations on this Federal Reserve meeting day, not all of which have anything to do with the Fed:
1. The FOMC today announced unchanged policy for now on the overnight interest rate, on the pace of QT runoff, and on the collective expectation of the Committee for the number of rate-cuts in 2024 (three, 25bp cuts). But it beats noting that while three cuts is the median expectation, the mean expectation dropped substantially. Only one official sees four rate cuts in 2024, compared to five who saw that many or more, as of the December survey. Those four folks moved to ‘three’, and one of the ‘three’ folks moved to ‘just one.’ Nine of the nineteen dots are for fewer than three cuts this year, so we should say this is a closer call than the market seems to think.
2. The longer dot plots also show some increase in Committee members’ expectations for the neutral short-term interest rate (the so-called ‘r-star’ originally popularized, I think, by Greenspan). The significance of this for investors and traders is that the overnight rate is unlikely to go back to zero unless we get another enormous calamity; the significance for the economy is essentially nil since it is money, and not interest rates, that matter. I’ve written before about why there are good reasons to think of something like 2-2.25% as the neutral long-run real rate, and so if CPI inflation is expected to be 2.25%-2.5% then something around 4.5% is neutral long-run nominal rate. We are mighty close to that now, so there is no compelling reason to think that interest rates should decline markedly from here. At the short end of the curve, we should eventually be lower – but we need to also keep in mind the growing imbalance in the supply and demand for Treasury paper, which (in the absence of recession) will tend to keep rates on government paper higher than they otherwise would be in equilibrium – and as one consequence, by the way, credit spreads will tend to be lower than they otherwise would be for a given level of creditworthiness.
3. The Fed clearly believes that the situation in Commercial Real Estate (CRE) and its effect on the banking sector is manageable. If they didn’t think so, then they would be hastening to lower rates to ease the refinancing problems that are hitting that sector. I have been reading alarmist analyses saying that the $1 trillion in CRE mortgage maturities due this year will lead to ‘hundreds’ of bank failures. This falls into the Big Number is Bad and Scary school of analysis. One trillion is a lot of mortgages and that will cripple banking! Except…
Let’s suppose that 20% of those mortgages go into default – a number more massive than we’ve ever seen before – and that recovery is 80%. For reference, in the 2008-09 crisis CRE values fell by about 36% according to the Greenstreet Commercial Property Price Index (chart below), and that was against a backdrop of 1%ish inflation. The nominal price decline should be less in an environment where underlying inflation is 4% per year, naturally. Since the CRE peak, real values have fallen 31% but nominal values only about 21% on the basis of that index. But the drop from the peak isn’t the relevant part. Even the shorter loans now coming due were struck 3-5 years ago, and the drop from that level is only about 9%. Plus, the initial loan-to-value levels were not 100%. So (and all of this is just to cuff a rough estimate) a 20% loss when selling out the collateral on a defaulted mortgage seems conservative.
Those numbers mean the $1T in mortgage maturities could produce a loss of $40bln (1,000 * 0.2 * 0.2). That’s still a big number, but remember that it is spread over a lot of banks. Suppose that it is spread over only 2,000 banks, and that the losses have nothing to do with bank size. Then you are looking at losses per bank of $20mm. That’s bad for a small bank, but the losses at a small bank will of course be smaller because they have smaller books. Will that sink ‘hundreds of banks’? Only if they are small, fairly insignificant banks.
Will some banks fail because they lent too much against commercial real estate which has fallen in value, at too-high loan-to-value ratios, and end up owning property that they can’t sell? Almost certainly. But after negotiations and forbearances and the eventual foreclosures – in an environment where the price level is rising 4% per year – I just don’t think this is something we should worry about. To be fair, the fact that the Fed is not worried about it is something that makes me worry about it.
4. I have been befuddled recently because airfare prices in the CPI have been higher than would be anticipated given the movement in jet fuel prices. Belatedly, I think I know what is going on. The issues with Boeing planes has meant that (and I didn’t know this) Boeing has greatly reduced its deliveries to airline companies as they sort out the problems with their Max jets. I became aware of this only recently when a Bloomberg story highlighted how Southwest Airlines is cutting capacity and freezing hiring because they aren’t getting the planes they need. Steady demand and constraints on supply means higher airfares, as I also discovered this week when I was booking a flight to Chicago. Yikes! With jet fuel prices also rising again, this is something to factor into CPI forecasts going forward. It’s surely ‘transitory,’ but it takes a long time to build a plane and in the near-term this is more likely to be solved on the demand side if we have a recession, than on the supply side with a sudden influx of planes.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (Feb 2024)
I must say that I didn’t see this one coming. Credit where credit is due, though: while Street economists were just a little low (consensus was +0.40% headline, +0.30% core), the CPI swap market at least got headline right (there being no market for core inflation CPI swaps) by pricing in +0.47%, seasonally adjusted. The actual print was +0.44% on headline CPI, and a lusty +0.36% on core. I was lower, even though I got the big pieces right. I had some tails going the wrong way. Let’s get into it.
The things which threw me were airfares and used cars. Based on declines in jet fuel, I had anticipated that airfares would be roughly -6% m/m, and I merely got the sign wrong as they were +6.6%. Jet fuel was tighter on the east coast, and I suspect regional differences there is what caused this wide divergence. If I’m right, then airfares will underperform jet fuel over the next few months. If, instead, it’s a cost-of-labor or cost-of-equipment thing, or if it’s increased pricing power from airlines because of capacity constraints, then airfares won’t drop back and that would be a bad sign.
Similarly, Used Cars continues to outperform the Black Book survey. I had penciled in -1%, and Kalshi markets were around -1.5%, but Used Car CPI came in +0.5%. This is a volatile series, and this miss is only interesting because Used Cars keeps missing a little high compared to the Black Book survey. That could be an issue of sample mix, but I’m not sure. New Cars were -0.10% m/m. Car and Truck Rental was +3.83% after -0.74% last month, so that’s another upper tail. Overall, core goods was steady at -0.3% y/y.
I said I got the big pieces right. I refer to rents. Remember that last month we had a large deviation between Owners’ Equivalent Rent (OER) and Rent of Primary Residence. Normally, these two track pretty closely, but occasionally they deviate and last month OER was 0.2% higher than Primary Rents. That contributed to the very high median CPI in January, and there was a ton of discussion about whether the BLS had done something weird with the survey – they had, in January 2023, refined the OER weighting method and there was concern that this was a ‘mix’ problem that was going to continue to push OER higher than Primary Rents for a while. The BLS contributed to this sense of confusion by sending out a blast email which seemed to suggest it was so; they had to walk that back and to their credit did a very nice webinar and has spent a lot of time this month explaining in excruciating detail how the OER survey is conducted. Bottom line: there’s nothing to see here; sometimes the two series diverge slightly. Moreover, as I’ve pointed out previously, when natural gas prices are declining it tends to mean that the cost of imputed utilities is declining which, since they’re deducted from the rental survey used for OER means OER should be slightly higher than Primary Rents over time. Not 0.2% per month, though, and I expected this aberration would mostly close this month.
It did, with OER +0.44% m/m (was +0.56% last month) and Primary Rents +0.46% m/m (was +0.36% last month). Year over year, they’re about the same but OER has moved slightly above Primary.
So the surprising part to me was that Primary came up some to help close that gap, not that the gap closed. I continue to expect rents to decelerate, along with everyone else – only, as I will keep saying until I am blue in the face, we are not going to go into rent deflation as so many people have been forecasting (folks seem to be backing off that now!) but rather we should drop into the 2%-3% range y/y before rebounding later this year.
There seems to be evidence of that in the independent rent measures. Below is a chart from a recent Redfin news release. It bears noting, of course, that these rent measures also all went into deflation and misled all of those economists who lean on these high-frequency-but-low-quality data. (Having said that, Redfin does seem to be better than some others, but it’s still measuring something different than what the CPI is measuring).
Now, the story starts to become a little clearer, albeit concerning. Core services rose to 5.4% y/y from 5.2% y/y, while core goods was unchanged as I noted above. Rents are coming down, but outside of rents we are seeing some stabilization at higher-than-pre-COVID levels. The chart below shows Shelter CPI, and Core CPI ex-Shelter, which has been roughly stable for three months around 2.25%. That sounds great, since 2.25% on CPI is roughly equivalent to 2% on the Fed’s PCE target…except that 2.25% is higher than it was pre-COVID. The theme, and we’re seeing it in several places, is inflation being sticky at higher levels than it was pre-crisis.
There were some good parts to the report – notably Food, which was tame m/m for both Food at Home (-0.03% m/m versus +0.37% last month) and Food Away from Home (+0.10%, was +0.47%), although the latter is probably not sustainable given rapidly-rising wages. Still, it’s positive. Unless you’re buying baby food, which is +9.2% y/y!
Actually, babies got a lot more expensive this month. The largest increase in the categories used for Median CPI was Infant/Toddler Apparel. In general, apparel categories were right-tail items this month. But there were not enough of them to explain the high core CPI. Median was +0.39% (my estimate); since that’s right in line with core it says the tails weren’t what moved this number. It’s just that this month, inflation rose at something like a 4.25%-4.75% annualized pace.
With this, and with Core Services ex-shelter (“Supercore”) at +0.47% m/m – which means supercore accelerated to +4.3% y/y – it is inconceivable that the Fed will yet consider cutting rates. It is possible that they may later in the year, but there is far too much exuberance in the bond market about that prospect.
Indeed, there’s far too much exuberance generally. Stocks rose on an inflation report showing that inflation was higher than expected. I’m not saying that equities should crash on this data, but that’s the sort of reaction that you tend to see in bubbles. The market will be semi reserved going into an economic report, but then rallies afterwards regardless of the data. I have seen that sort of environment, where such a thing happened regularly, a couple of times in my career and they never ended well. To jump on this data, as if it was in any way positive, says that people were just waiting until after the number to buy, and they were going to buy no matter what. That’s not a healthy market, especially when that happens at high prices rather than low prices.
I continue to expect median inflation to decline to the high-3s, low-4s, maybe dipping a little lower than that in Q3 if rents bottom then as I expect. The bottom line is that we’re near levels where I have been expecting inflation to get sticky, and it seems to be happening. I didn’t see this particular month being sticky, but the general tenor of the data makes sense to me.
Understanding Biden’s Poll Numbers Despite a ‘Strong Economy’
The Biden team keeps talking about how they can’t believe how underwater the President’s poll numbers are, when the economy is so frickin’ good. “As soon as people figure out how frickin’ good it is, they’ll come running to vote for him.”
At some level, one can be sympathetic with that view. Inflation is down to only 3.1%, the Unemployment Rate is still sub 4% even with the most-recent rise, well below the levels when he took office; Average Earnings are up and gasoline prices are down around $3 after being above $5. What’s not to like? Moreover, put this record next to Trump’s record! When Trump came into office, Unemployment was 4.7% and when he left it was 6.7%!
The problem that the Biden team has – and, frankly, the one it has always had – is that they have no idea how actual people experience the economy, and no idea how actual people think.
Americans, on average, tend to be fair. When people think about the Trump years, they recognize that it isn’t quite fair to saddle him with COVID. While they don’t think this explicitly, their memories about the 2016-2020 period fall into “pre-COVID” and “post-COVID” zones. In other words, if in mid-March 2020 a particular consumer was positively disposed towards the Trump economy, then that’s what their memory is. When COVID hit, it started a new time period in their memory. So to the normal person, they remember Trump coming in with a 4.7% Unemployment Rate and watching as it fell to 3.5% in February 2020. “Then COVID hit.” This works against Trump in little ways too; no one gives him credit for the disinflation that happened between March 2020 and the end of his term.
So this is the way that normal people see Trump’s record:
Now, the best part of Biden’s record is that Unemployment fell from 6.7% when he took office to 3.7% as of January. Other than that, though, his record in the minds of Americans looks unimpressive. (Of note is – and folks, don’t shoot the messenger; I’m just showing the data – that the Biden team persistently claims that real earnings have risen during his Administration, while it isn’t so.)
And so now, let’s put them side by side. Inflation is higher under Biden, gasoline prices have risen under Biden, real earnings are down under Biden, and food costs are up (a lot) under Biden. The unemployment rate has fallen more, but is now higher than it was pre-COVID under Trump!
If you realize that Americans are not going to blame Trump for COVID, then it gets very easy to understand why Trump polls better on the economy.
Recession For Me But Not For Thee?
In late 2022, I often said that while I didn’t think it would be severe I figured we would have a recession in 2023 because we had never seen an energy spike at the same time that the Fed was aggressively tightening and not had a recession. Indeed, it would really be weird if those things could happen and not result in a recession. Then, what causes a recession?!?
And as we all know by now, 2023 was not a recession. So, like any good trader who makes a bad call I want to look and figure out why that happened. Funny thing is…I wasn’t completely wrong on that.
We need to continue to remember that the volatility of 2020-2022 is something that doesn’t just vanish; the oscillations echo and repeat with slowly decreasing amplitude. The story of those years was this:
The economy was mostly shuttered in mid-2020, and the federal government and Federal Reserve showered money on consumers and businesses. Because service-providers were basically closed, the money was poured into goods. This surge in demand led to long port delays and lead times, higher prices for goods, and a boom time for manufacturing. In the chart below, the orange line is the ISM Manufacturing New Orders index where 50 represents a dividing line between expansion and contraction (it’s a survey, so it’s not absolute levels but rather the change that is noted by respondents).
We can also see the boom in industrial production, next chart. The y/y increase in production was at 4% or 5% until late 2022.
In March 2022, the Fed hiked 25bps. They did 50bps in May, 75bps in June, another 75bps in July, and of course they kept going. Crude crested at $123/bbl in June. So by late summer of 2022, goods production started to see this in declining orders (first chart) and weakening production growth (second chart). My sources in industry started to see a buildup in client inventories, leading to lower orders – the celebrated ‘bullwhip’ effect. By late 2022 and for much of 2023, manufacturing was absolutely in a recession. The Conference Board’s Index of Leading Indicators had gone negative m/m in March 2022 and actually is still negative today.
Normally, that set of events would have produced a recession. But they didn’t. Why? Because the reopening of service industries was gathering steam over 2022. Remember that lots of restaurants were not allowed to operate at full capacity until the second half of 2021. You can see the purple line in the chart above jumped higher late in 2021 and from the middle of 2022 remained above the goods-producing orange line. (“New Orders” for services industries is a more complicated concept, but you get the point). Remember how difficult it was for many service providers to find employees willing to work, and the spike in wages that was necessary to lure them? Well, you don’t have to remember, because here’s a chart showing wage growth for services employees (Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker for services, in dark blue) against ‘Supercore’ core-ex-shelter CPI.
The later blooming of services, and the difficulty of service providers to build up capacity, stretched out the services expansion so that while manufacturing was in a recession, services were in an expansion. And, since services are a much larger part of the US economy, this meant that we never recorded an actual recession on overall growth. Moreover, the decline in goods prices helped flatter the increase in pressure on services prices, so that inflation measures turned lower while inventories were being right-sized.
Now, we are starting to see manufacturing start to turn higher – that orange line in the first chart popped above 50 in January and retreated to just below it in February. This is consistent with what I am hearing from my contacts, who are being more discerning about responding to this increase in demand by greatly expanding capacity (and then possibly being burned again). It means that goods prices are no longer falling, and in many cases are rising again. I do think that there are some signs of consumer stress, such as auto loan delinquencies, and the purple “New Orders (Services)” line in the first chart looks to be slowly decelerating. So I think it’s possible that this year we actually do get a recession, but I think it will be mild because manufacturing is oscillating in the upward direction now. That oscillation means that growth will not be as soft as it would be if services and goods were synchronized, which is one reason I believe this will be a mild or ‘garden variety’ recession the likes of which we haven’t seen in a while.
Eventually the two parts of the economy will re-synchronize, but the way the reopening happened is I think why the macro call has been so difficult.
