Archive
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (January 2025)
We finished 2024 with a slightly soft reading, but we began 2025 with a hot reading. Now, my admonition last month about the volatility of December data applies also to January data, although less so in CPI than in some other indicators. However, averaging December and January is probably the right approach.
It still doesn’t look great even if you do that.
Let’s start with the market changes over the last month. You can tell from the table below that short inflation expectations as measured by the column on the far left have come up some, although not as much as you might have expected given all of the concern about tariffs. (For what it’s worth, in this table you can ignore the huge increase in 1-year breakevens – there really isn’t any such animal per se, and Bloomberg’s choice of bonds to use for the 1-year can change that a lot. Focus on the inflation swaps, which is a purer measure.)
The consensus estimates coming into today were for +0.30% on Core CPI and +0.29% on headline CPI. That represented an acceleration over the nice inflation data we saw in December (the best core inflation print since July!), but was expected to be attributable to one-offs such as wildfire effects. In fact, the number printed at an alarming +0.47% on headline and +0.45% on Core CPI, the worst since April of 2023. Here are the last 12 months.
But we are jaded these days because we’ve seen higher figures. Let’s back out a bit. Prior to COVID, we hadn’t seen a Core CPI number this high since 1992!
Okay, so some of these are one-off causes. And it is a January figure after all. Median CPI will be better. My calculation had it around 0.35%, but since the BLS changed weights for the new year in this report I am less confident in my estimate than usual. It should be close. And since last January was a big median print, that means the y/y median would drop to 3.66% or so on base effects. But there certainly doesn’t look to be any really marked improvement here.
Speaking of the reweighting of the CPI: this always sparks conspiracy theories even though the reweighting is very transparent. And the changes are pretty small year to year. Here are the changes from last January’s weights.
The BLS also announces categories that are being dropped or added or renamed. I never point those out because it’s really boring. At least, it is normally. This year, the BLS announced that the series for “Pet Food” has been renamed to “Pet Food and Treats.” Because who’s a good boy? That’s right, you’re a good boy.
Let’s look at some of the main culprits for the upside miss this month.
- Used Cars SA +2.19% m/m – We all expect some upward lift after the wildfires, but I am not sure this is due to that. New Cars CPI only rose +0.04%. But this is the highest m/m increase in Used Cars since 2023
A bigger concern with Used cars is the upward tilt in the overall price level. Remember that the spike during COVID (which happened thanks to the geyser of money that sprayed American consumers who had little else to buy, and few new cars being produced) was a big bellwether and/or driver (mathematically speaking) of the increase in core CPI post COVID. The unwinding of the spike in used cars pushed Core Goods inflation lower and lower, and dragged down Core CPI. But now it looks liked used car prices are again headed higher. This seems a good time to mention that M2 is also inflecting higher. The money supply is 40% bigger than at the end of 2019. Used car prices are only 32% higher. I think the deflation in used cars is over. (I’ve included M2 on this chart.)
AS a consequence of this, and despite apparel being -1.4% m/m (that’s one place tariffs could bite since we don’t produce any apparel in the US…on the other hand, there are lots of suppliers of apparel globally so absent a blanket tariff, we might not see a big effect), Core Goods CPI y/y went to -0.10% from -0.50%. As I’ve noted previously – ad nauseum, probably – to get inflation to 2% you need core goods inflation to stay negative, and pretty decently so. Core Services dipped to 4.3% y/y from 4.4% y/y, but obviously if that part is over 4%, and it’s the bigger part, you need Core Goods to stay flaccid.
- Health Insurance rose +0.74% NSA. Health insurance inflation jumps sometimes in January, so this is not something I’m worried about (plus, the health insurance number is really only calculated once a year and smeared out over the year). But it’s worth noting.
- Lodging Away from Home, +1.43% SA. Normally this is one of those categories that jumps around a lot and so we would expect a reversal next month, but with the wildfires in California I’d expect this to be buoyant for a while even if it is just the Western US being affected. But don’t forget that there are lots of people without homes still in North Carolina. On the other hand, if deportations ramp up a lot more than they currently are this is one place where pressure on prices could be relieved since many illegal aliens are housed in hotels at the expense of the local/state/federal government. That disinflationary effect, though, is months away at best, I think.
- Pharma had a huge month, rising 1.4% m/m SA. That’s the biggest monthly gain in decades. I suspect some of that is because pharmaceutical companies know that they are ‘on the X’ of President Trump’s ire after actively working against him in 2020. The President has recently been talking about how upset he is about US drug prices relative to the same drugs sold in other countries. This is a real threat – in his prior term, he talked about implementing a “Most Favored Nation” clause when it comes to pharmaceuticals (I wrote about it here: https://inflationguy.blog/2020/08/25/drug-prices-and-most-favored-nation-clauses-considerations/ ). So it strikes me as possible that pharmaceutical companies were raising prices in January partly so that they can cut them with great theatrics to show their ‘support’ for the President (and hold off most-favored-nation as long as possible). I do not expect to see this repeated next month, unless tariffs affect APIs (active pharmaceutical ingredients) in the near-term.
- Hospital Services were also high, at +0.95% m/m SA, but this is less unusual for that series which jumps around a lot like Lodging Away from Home. Still, that was the highest print since March.
On the good side – while Rent of Primary Residence was a little higher than last month (+0.35% vs +0.30%), OER was the same (+0.31%) and rents overall continue to decelerate. However, they are decelerating at a declining rate. It looks like the dip that I expected is never going to happen, as the growth rate of rents looks to be converging with our model in the high 3s. And it doesn’t need to be repeated, but I will anyway, that there is no sign of broad deflation in rents coming.
Food and energy were additive this month, although less than I expected. Food at home was +0.46% m/m, and I expected about double that. Eggs were +13.8% m/m (NSA), and +53% y/y, and are getting a lot of press. But that’s not an inflation thing, that’s a lack-of-chickens thing and egg prices will eventually come down (in, approximately, the time it takes a chicken to get to adulthood). Food away from home was relatively tame at +0.24%.
So what’s the big picture?
What we saw today was mostly the trend. I continue to think that the new ‘middle’ on Median CPI is the high 3%s, low 4%s area, with occasional forays above and below that level. Over the course of 2025, as tariffs are implemented, we are likely to see a slightly higher run rate. Tariffs are a one-off, and they aren’t a large effect unless applied in a blanket way to all imports. Remember (and review my recent blog https://inflationguy.blog/2025/01/29/trump-tactical-targeted-tariffs-a-reminder-of-the-impact-of-tariffs/ and podcast https://inflationguy.podbean.com/e/ep-131-how-tariffs-affect-you-three-things-you-maybe-didnt-know/ on the topic) that despite what some hyperventilating Congresspeople say, consumers do not usually pay the majority of a tariff except in narrow circumstances where demand for the good from that particular supplier is inelastic. If the Trump Administration imposes a blanket tariff of 20% on all imports, with no exceptions, it might cause an increase in inflation of 0.5%-1.0%. But that’s a one-time (level) effect unless tariffs keep being ramped higher, and the effect gets smaller the higher the tariff goes (a 1000% tariff will not raise prices any more than a 900% tariff, because at that point we aren’t importing anything). So, all else equal, we should expect slightly higher inflation in 2025 than we previously would have expected, and probably for the first part of 2026, but then the tariff effect will be over and the level of inflation we settle in at will be once again driven mainly by money growth.
On that score the news isn’t great, with M2 rising at a 5.8% annualized rate over the last quarter and 3.9% over the last year. 4% would get us to 1.5%-2% inflation in the long run, probably; 6% will get us into the high 3s, low 4s. Some think that if inflation ends up ratcheting a little higher, the Fed might raise interest rates again. But monetary policy has very little control over inflation that is caused by tariffs and it would make no sense to reverse course for that reason. This just accentuates how bad the box is that the Fed got itself into by making a nakedly political ease in the middle of last year. Tightening because of tariffs has no economic justification; it would look nakedly political again. I would be surprised if overnight rates went higher from here. Of course, I’d also be surprised to see them going lower especially since tariffs are also good for domestic economic growth.
So there will continue to be lots of economic volatility from here, but stasis appears to be high 3s, low 4s. Still.
Drug Prices and Most-Favored-Nation Clauses: Considerations
A potentially important development in the market for pharmaceuticals – and in the pricing of the 1.6% of the Consumer Price Index that Medicinal Drugs represents – is the President’s move towards a “most-favored-nation” clause in the pricing of pharmaceuticals. The concept of a favored-nations clause is not new, although this is the first time it has been applied broadly to the pharmaceutical industry. In the investment management industry, it is not uncommon for very large investors (state pension funds, for example) to demand such a clause in their investment management agreements. Essentially, what such a clause does is guarantee to the customer that no other customer will get better pricing.[1] In the context of pharmaceuticals, the “problem” that the President is addressing is the fact that Americans buying a drug will often pay many times what a customer in another country will pay the pharmaceutical company for that same drug.
The optics are terrific for the President, but the economics not as much so. The argument is that demanding such a clause will force pharmaceutical companies to lower prices for American consumers drastically, to something approximating the price of those same products purchased abroad. The reality, though, is not so clear.
This is a story about price elasticity of demand. As I do often, I pause here and give thanks that I studied economics at a university that had a fantastic econ faculty. Economics is a great field of study, because done right it teaches a person to ask the right questions rather than jumping to what seems to be the apparent answer. (Incidentally, I feel the same way about Street research: done right, the value of that research is in guiding the questions, rather than handing us the answers.)
So let’s start at the ‘free market’ version of the pharmaceutical company’s profit-maximization problem. Let’s start by assuming that the marginal cost of production of a little pill is close to zero, or at least that it’s no different for the pill sold in one country versus the pill sold in another country. Then, the firm’s profit-maximizing linear programming problem is to maximize, independently for each country, the price where the marginal revenue is essentially zero – where in order to sell additional units, the price must be lowered enough that selling those additional units costs more in lost profit on the other units than it does on the incremental units. (If I sell 10 units at $10, and in order to sell the 11th unit I have to lower the price to $9, then I go from $100 in revenue to $99 in revenue and so if I am a profit-maximizer I won’t do this).
This point will be different in each country, and depends on the demand elasticity for that drug in that country. If the demand for a drug is very elastic, then that market will tend to clear at a lower price since each incremental decline in price will produce a relatively large increase in incremental quantity demanded. On the other hand, if the demand for the drug is very inelastic, then that market will tend to clear at a higher price since each additional increase in price will result in the loss of relatively few units of quantity sold. Now, every country and every drug will have different price elasticities. A lifestyle drug like the little blue pill will face fairly elastic demand in a Third World country, while a malarial drug probably does not.[2]
As an aside, one of the things which creates a more-elastic demand curve is the availability of substitutes. So, if the FDA makes it more difficult for a new statin drug to be approved than does the equivalent agency in Italy, then demand for a particular statin drug (all else equal) will be more elastic in Italy, where it faces more competition, than in the US. If you want lower prices, promote competition. But back to our story:
Now the Trump Administration adds a constraint to the drug company’s linear programming problem, such that the maximization is now joint; the problems are no longer independent maximization problems but the company must find the price that maximizes revenue across all markets collectively. If the free market has found a perfect and efficient equilibrium, then any such constraint must lower the value of the revenue stream to the drug company because if it did not, then it implies the company would already have be operating at that single-price solution. Constrained solutions can never be more valuable than unconstrained solutions, if both are in equilibrium.
What the drug company most assuredly will not do, though, is immediately lower the price to the American consumer to the lowest price charged to any other country. What it will do instead is take the highest price, and then add the incremental market that has the most inelastic demand, and see how much total revenue will increase if they have to lower the universal price to induce demand in that market. Note that this outcome may lower the price in the high-priced country, but it will also raise the price in the low-priced country. Since the lower-priced countries probably have more-elastic demand than the high-priced country…which is suggested by the fact that they had lower prices when they were being separately optimized…it is easy to imagine a scenario where the drug company ends up only supplying the high-priced country because the large increases in price for other countries essentially eliminate that demand. And that outcome, or indeed as I said any constrained outcome, is likely to be bad for the drug company. But what it will almost certainly not do is cause drug prices in the USA to drop 70%, or a massive decline in the Medicinal Drugs portion of CPI.
It may cause a decline in US drug prices, but that is not as certain as it appears. If the optimal strategy is to supply the drug only in the United States, then prices need not change at all (the US would then be the Most Favored Nation because it’s the only customer). In fact, the drug company might need to increase prices in the US. That happens because when you allow price discrimination, any customer who pays more than the variable cost of the product (which we assume here is close to zero) contributes something to the fixed overhead of the company;[3] therefore, a company that understands cost accounting will sometimes sell a product below the total cost per unit as long as it is above the variable cost per unit. When a US company, then, sells a pill to Norway at a really low price but above the cost of production, it defrays some of its overhead. If a most-favored-nation clause prevents a company from doing this, it will need to raise the price of the product in its remaining markets in order to cover the overhead that is not being covered any longer by those customers.
OK, so that’s just one iteration. I suspect that most pharmaceutical companies will end up lowering prices a little bit in the US and in other countries where prices are similar, and only selling them in countries that now pay a very low price to the extent that those foreign countries and/or international charities subsidize those purchases. But then we get into the financial and legal engineering part of this: what happens if Pfizer now licenses the formula for a particular drug to an Indian company that is legally distinct and doesn’t sell to the United States? Does the licensing agreement also fall under the MFN clause? What if Pfizer spins off its South American operations, sharing the intellectual property with its spinoff? For that matter, it might be the case that for some drugs, it is optimal to sell it everywhere in the world except the US, because the value of the unconstrained-non-US portion of the business is greater than the constrained-US portion of the business.
Now wouldn’t that be a kick in the head, to see pharmaceutical companies leave the US and refuse to sell to the US consumer because it makes them subject to the MFN clause? In the end, it seems to me that this is a great political gesture but it will be very difficult to get the results the President and his team wants.
[1] As an aside, in investment management this has caused the universe of strategies available to institutions demanding this clause to be reduced, hurting their investors. There are many circumstances in which an investment manager will offer outstanding, and sometimes outlandish, terms to investors who are the first in a new strategy, or who are low-touch easy/sophisticated customers, etc; a later entry by a large, high-maintenance customer may not be economic under the same terms.
[2] I am not at all an expert on how drug price elasticity behaves in this riot of market/product combinations, so readers who are should give me a break! I’m just illustrating a point.
[3] Cleverly called “variable contribution.”
