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Enough with Interest Rates Already
One of the things which alternately frustrates me and fascinates me is the mythology surrounding the idea that the central bank can address inflation by manipulating the price of money, even if it ignores the quantity of money.
I say “mythology” because there is virtually no empirical support for this notion, and the theoretical support for it depends on a model of flows in the economy that seem contrary to how the economy actually works. The idea, coarsely, is that by making money more dear the central bank will make it harder for businesses to borrow and invest, and for consumers to borrow and spend; therefore growth will slow. This seems to be a reasonable description of how the world works. But this then gets tied into inflation by appealing to the idea that lower aggregate demand should lower price pressures, leading to lower inflation. The models are very clear on this point: lower growth causes less inflation and more growth causes more inflation. The fact that this doesn’t appear to be the case in practice seems not to have lessened the fervor of policymakers for this framework. This is the frustrating part – especially since there is a viable alternative framework which seems to actually describe how the world works in practice, and that is monetarism.
The fascinating part are the incredibly short memories that policymakers enjoy when it comes to pursuing new policy using their preferred framework. Here’s the simplest of examples: from December 2008 until December 2019, the Fed Funds target rate spent 65% of the time pinned at 0.25%. The average Fed funds rate over that period was 0.69%. During that period, core inflation ranged from a low of 0.6% in 2010 to a high of 2.4%, hitting either 2.3% or 2.4% in 2012, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. That 0.6% was an aberration – fully 86% of the time over that 11 years, core inflation was between 1.5% and 2.4%. Ergo, it seems reasonable to point out that ultra–low interest rates did not seem to cause higher inflation. If that is our most-recent experience, then why would the Fed now be aggressively pursuing a theory that depends on the idea that high interest rates will cause lower inflation? The most-recent evidence we have is that interest rates do not seem to affect inflation.
This isn’t just a recent phenomenon. But the nice thing about the post-GFC period is that for a good part of it, the Fed was ignoring bank reserves and the money supply and effecting policy entirely through interest rates (well, occasionally squirting some QE around, but if anything that should have increased inflation – it certainly didn’t dampen the effect of low interest rates). This became explicit in 2014 when Joseph Gagnon and Brian Sack, shortly after leaving the Fed themselves, published “Monetary Policy with Abundant Liquidity: A New Operating Framework for the Federal Reserve.” In this piece, they argued that the Fed should ignore the quantity of reserves in the system, and simply change interest rates that it pays on reserves generated by its open market operations. The fundamental idea is that interest rates matter, and money does not, and the Fed dutifully has followed that framework ever since. As I just noted, though, the results of that experiment would seem to indicate that low interest rates, anyway, don’t seem to have the effect that would be predicted (and which effect is necessary if the policy is to be meaningful).
And really, this shouldn’t be a surprise because for the prior three decades, the level of the real policy rate (adjusting the nominal rate here by core CPI, not headline) has been completely unrelated to the subsequent change in core inflation.
So, to sum up: for at least 40 years, the level of real policy rates has had no discernable effect on changes in the level of inflation. And yet, current central bank dogma is that rates are the only thing that matters.
I stopped the chart in 2014 because that’s when the Gagnon/Sack experiment began, but it doesn’t really change anything to extend it to the current day. Actually, all you get is a massive acceleration and deceleration in core inflation that all happened before any interest rate changes affected growth (seeing as how we have not yet had a recession). So it’s a result-within-a-result, in fact.
Any observation about how the Fed manages the price of money rather than its quantity would not be complete without pointing out that the St. Louis Federal Reserve’s economist emeritus Daniel L Thorton, one of the last known monetarists at the Fed until his retirement, wrote a paper in 2012 entitled “Monetary Policy: Why Money Matters and Interest Rates Don’t” [emphasis in the original title]. In this well-argued, landmark, iconic, and totally ignored paper Dr. Thornton argued that the central bank should focus almost entirely on the quantity of money, and not its price. Naturally, this is concordant with my own view, plus more than a century of evidence around the world that the price level is closely tied to the quantity of money.
To be fair, the connection of changes in M2 to changes in the price level has also been weak since the mid-1990s, for reasons I’ve discussed at length elsewhere. But at least money has a history of being related to inflation, whereas interest rates do not (except as a result of inflation, rather than as a cause of them); moreover, we can rehabilitate money by separately modeling money velocity.
There does not appear to be any way to rehabilitate interest rate policy as a tool for addressing inflation. It hasn’t worked, it isn’t working, and it won’t work.
Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (May 2023)
Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy, but subscribers to @InflGuyPlus get the tweets in real time and a conference call wrapping it all up by about the time the stock market opens. Subscribe by going to the shop at https://inflationguy.blog/shop/ , where you can also subscribe to the Enduring Investments Quarterly Inflation Outlook. Sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Individual and institutional investors, issuers and risk managers with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments! Check out the Inflation Guy podcast!
- Welcome to the #CPI #inflation walkup for June (May’s figure).
- A reminder: At 8:30ET, when the data drops, I will post a number of charts and numbers, in fairly rapid-fire succession. Then I will retweet some of those charts with comments attached. Then I’ll run some other charts.
- This month I have to skip the conference call because my daughter has an awards ceremony I need to make. But later in the morning, I will post a summary of these tweets at https://inflationguy.blog and then podcast a summary at http://inflationguy.podbean.com .
- Thanks again for subscribing!
- Although both nominal and real interest rates have risen across the board since last month, breakevens have been fairly stable except at the very short end.
- That represents relative weakness in BEI, which at this level of yields should be moving about 67% as much as 10-year nominal ylds and 2x as much as real ylds. Expectations have been declining partly because of weak energy markets, but then why are short breakevens wider?
- In short, market pricing of medium-term inflation seems very confused right now.
- That’s perhaps not so surprising. In addition to energy market softness, you also can see plenty of talk about how ‘wages might not cause inflation’ and how rents are due to decline (“no, really this time!”).
- Let’s tackle these. First, rents. Ongoing argument on this one. Here’s my take: the former surge in rents was partly a catch-up from the eviction moratorium. I highlighted this divergence back when it first happened.
- Now asking rents are declining and effective rents are still rising, beginning to close this gap. But note that the BLS rents figure never did keep pace with the asking OR effective rents.
- The top lines haven’t converged yet (to be sure, these are quarterly figures) and the bottom line is behind. I know that current rent indicators had looked softer – although they’ve been recovering lately – but I don’t see a good reason to expect a LOT of softness here.
- But if you really think that housing and the rental market are going to collapse like in 2009-10, then you’re going to have a hard time buying breakevens very much higher than you were paying in 2010.
- Except wait…in 2010, 10-year breakevens averaged 2.06%. And they’re at 2.19% now. And we don’t seem to be close to any calamity remotely like we saw in 2008-2010.
- I think these days, investors avoid buying breakevens not because they don’t believe there aren’t long tails to the medium-term upside, but because they’re worried about the short-term spikes to the downside. It’s MTM fear, not value, I think.
- So, rents have been a persistent source of strength to CPI. They are ebbing, but not nearly as fast as the consensus thinks. Last month primary rents were +0.54% m/m. This doesn’t seem wildly high to me. The prior month is the outlier so far.
- The other persistent source of strength, ALSO a story I was on a long time ago, is the core-services-ex-rents or “supercore,” which is significant because that’s where wage inflation lives.
- There was an Economic Letter from the FRB San Fran a couple of weeks ago called “How Much Do Labor Costs Drive Inflation.” https://shorturl.at/fsvEN The author concludes that “labor-cost growth has a small effect on nonhousing services inflation…”
- Well, duh. Obviously, inflation causes more-rapid wage growth, not the other way around. Cost-push inflation isn’t real – if it was, every laborer would love inflation because they would be AHEAD of it. That’s clearly wrong.
- So everyone says “wow, this means that supercore doesn’t matter and the Fed might ease.” Except that nothing changes in this argument. Anyone who said core services ex-rents was important because it CAUSED inflation missed the point anyway.
- Core services ex rents matters because it causes inflation PERSISTENCE by feeding back inflation. It makes inflation sticky. It doesn’t cause it to spiral higher.
- Core services ex-rents will remain firm. That’s a good reason the Fed will not ease any time soon.
- Heading into today’s number, both mainstream economists and Kalshi’s markets are looking for core CPI to match or fall short of the lowest core CPI so far in 2023 (0.385%, in March). I am higher. More on that in a second.
- One reason I think core will be a little higher is that used car prices were roughly unchanged, but the seasonal adjustment expects a decline. So I think that will add about 3.5bps to the SA number by itself.
- Interestingly, the lag structure from Black Book to CPI-Used Cars seems to have changed from 1 month to 0 months. That’s why everyone has been off on used cars recently. No idea why this shifted. Maybe it hasn’t, just a weird recent coincidence. But I don’t think so.
- Headline CPI forecasts are pretty close between economists/market/me. I think Food isn’t going to add very much, which is why I’m below the consensus for headline even though above the consensus for core (Deutsche Bank made a similar point in a note out yesterday).
- Now, the interesting thing is that after this month and next month, the interbank market is projecting essentially zero headline inflation for the balance of the year. Ran this chart in my blog at the end of May. https://inflationguy.blog/2023/05/31/is-inflation-dead-again/
- June to December headline inflation is in the market at 0.125%. Total. That seems unlikely, even though the seasonal adjustment factors would turn that into a +1.4% which isn’t terrible. Still, it is hard to fathom that prices are just going to freeze in place NSA.
- Not today’s problem, however! One step at a time. Good luck. I’ll be up with charts and chats right after 8:30ET.
- Core +0.44%…worse than expected.
- Both stocks and bonds acting like this is good news, so we’ll have to see the breakdown…
- It might take people a minute to figure out that this was a solid miss on core. Yes, it was 0.4% versus 0.4% expectations, but it was just barely rounded down to 0.4% while the forecasts (except for mine) were rounded up.
- Still pulling down data…the BLS is working very hard to make sure people can’t get it quickly. I can see that Used Cars was +4.4% m/m, which was more than I expected. Core Services jumped to 6.8% y/y versus 6.6%. OER was steady at 0.52% m/m; Primary at 0.49%.
- Lodging was +1.80% m/m; but airfares -2.95% m/m (weak again…I just don’t see it!).
- Energy dragged about 9bps on the headline, which was in line with my forecast. Food was +0.21% NSA m/m, about same as last month, but that’s a higher SA contribution. Food at home was +0.05% SA; Food away from home (wages y’all) was +0.47% SA. m/m
- m/m CPI: 0.124% m/m Core CPI: 0.436%
- Consensus missed on core by almost 6bps. My forecast was 0.43%. Headline was soft relative to core.
- Last 12 core CPI figures
- There is absolutely nothing disinflationary about this chart recently. Haven’t even rounded down to 0.3% on core in 6 months.
- M/M, Y/Y, and prior Y/Y for 8 major subgroups
- “Other goods and services” bears some looking into. Otherwise no large surprises.
- Core Goods: 2.03% y/y Core Services: 6.57% y/y
- Core goods maintained its prior y/y level but didn’t extend the bounce despite a nice rise in apparel. Core services is coming off but…not exactly dramatically!
- Primary Rents: 8.66% y/y OER: 8.05% y/y
- Is this the top of the rollercoaster, and how steep is the drop? Yes is the first answer, but ‘not so steep’ is what I think we’ll conclude on the second. M/M annualized are running at 6% or so, and I think we’ll probably end up between 5-6%. Much better than now, but not great.
- Further: Primary Rents 0.49% M/M, 8.66% Y/Y (8.8% last) OER 0.52% M/M, 8.05% Y/Y (8.12% last) Lodging Away From Home 1.8% M/M, 3.4% Y/Y (3.3% last)
- …by the way, the reason is higher taxes, higher wages, short supply.
- Some ‘COVID’ Categories: Airfares -2.95% M/M (-2.55% Last) Lodging Away from Home 1.8% M/M (-2.96% Last) Used Cars/Trucks 4.42% M/M (4.45% Last) New Cars/Trucks -0.12% M/M (-0.22% Last)
- I thought Used would contribute but it was heavier than I thought. New cars being down is surprising. Interesting that core goods was still flat even after this contribution and the contribution from apparel.
- Here is my early and automated guess at Median CPI for this month: 0.427%
- Median category by my calculation was West Urban OER, so the usual caveats apply about my seasonal adjustment. Might be a bit higher or a bit lower than this, couple of bps either way. However you look at it…no continued disinflation.
- Piece 1: Food & Energy: -0.939% y/y
- Piece 2: Core Commodities: 2.03% y/y
- Piece 3: Core Services less Rent of Shelter: 4.38% y/y
- “Supercore” was a little lower, but still at 4.4% y/y.
- Piece 4: Rent of Shelter: 8.12% y/y
- Probably the best news overall is that core ex-housing is down to 3.45% y/y.
- Before I get to ‘other’, let’s look at Medical Care. 0.08% m/m. Pharma was +0.51%, and 3.99% y/y. Doctors’ Services was a drag at -0.50% m/m and -0.09% y/y. Medical Equipment and Supplies was +2.3% m/m (NSA), which is the reason this is positive. Health insurance the usual drag.
- Keep in mind that when Health Insurance gets readjusted next year, Medical Care is going to turn on a dime and be a following wind pushing inflation up, not down. The Health Insurance curiosity is a major source of the apparent core inflation disinflation this year.
- Other Goods and Services was +0.53% NSA M/M. And it was pretty broad. Cigarettes +0.6%, other tobacco products 0.44%, Personal care products +1%, Misc Personal Services +0.69%.
- This is interesting. Really bipolar inflation distribution. Nothing in the middle. A lot of weight to the right, and then a big slug of things to the left. That’s why core is so much lower than median.
- Only non-core things that declined more than 10% annualized in May were Car and Truck Rental (-33%) and Misc Personal Goods (-11.9%). Neither more than 0.15% of the consumption basket.
- OVER 10% are Used Cars/Trucks (+68%), Motor Vehicle Insurance (+26%), Lodging Away from Home (+24%), and Personal Care Products (+12.8%).
- Sort of reinforcing the distribution picture. The weight in “over 6% y/y” is declining but still heavy. Weight in <2% is about 25%, rising but still low.
- Finally the EI Inflation Diffusion Index telling the same story. Upward pressures remain but are lessening. This reinforces the ‘inflation has peaked’ story but does not yet support the ‘inflation will crash to exactly 2%’ story.
- Wrapping up: bonds like this because there is no reason in here for the Fed to reverse its promise of a pause, when they meet tomorrow. The Fed will stand pat. Stocks like this mainly because it removes that uncertainty.
- There is nothing in here that supports the notion that the Fed will soon be able to stop worrying about inflation. M/M core inflation continues to run at a 5% ish level. Y/Y core will likely ease a little further on base effects through September and then level off.
- My point forecast for 2023 Median Inflation has been around 5% since last May. It is starting to look like that might be slightly low but pretty decent I think.
- Sort of the best-case for core CPI at year-end will be 4.25% y/y. Unless rents and wages suddenly (and inexplicably) drop, it’s going to be really hard to get it below that.
- On the other hand, tightening further when inflation measures are gently declining will also be a hard argument. In short, I think the “Fed on hold for a long time” argument won the scorecard handily today.
- We not only need lower inflation prints, but the distribution needs to get more uniform. Wages rising at 6% (Cleveland Fed WGT) is holding up services even as core commodities stop declining. Meeting in the middle still looks like 3-4%. Again, hard to ease, hard to tighten.
- I think that’s about it for today. I’ll have a few more words in my blog and podcast summaries, but that’s the meat of it. I still think breakevens are too low for this environment!! Thanks for tuning in.
The chart of the day is the one of month/month core CPI figures. Here is another look at it, from Bloomberg. Tell me if you can spot the downtrend.
Nope, me neither. December’s was 0.40%, and the five core prints for this year were 0.41, 0.45, 0.38, 0.41, and 0.44. The six-month average is 0.42%. The 12-month average is 0.43%. The 24-month average is 0.46%. So, if there’s a downtrend, it’s a really gentle downtrend. Base effects from last year will cause the y/y number to glide down a little bit further, and base effects in headline inflation may cause that number to decline as well although that’s a lot less clear. We’re tracking towards something like 4-5% inflation. I’m a trifle more optimistic than that, thinking we will eventually settle in the 3-4% range, but my operating hypothesis for a while has been that we have entered a new distribution with a higher mean. I could still be wrong on that, of course, but so far there’s nothing to suggest that inflation is going back to 2%.
Unless, of course, you think rents are about to flop. There has been some recent research on that, and as a result there is near-unanimity of the view that rents are going to be flat to declining “soon.” I’ve read the research, and it’s not convincing. Error bars for the forecast period are very wide right up until we get actual data, and the period over which the relationship is purported to exist is not similar to the period we are in.
Remember, people also thought that home prices would collapse under the weight of higher interest rates. They dropped a couple of percent, and are rising again already. Not only that, but mortgage delinquencies just dropped to the lowest level in 20 years: not what you’d expect if higher rates are crushing homeowners. What higher rates are doing is hurting builders, who will build less as a result, and landlords, who will raise rents as a result. The fact that economists want monetary policy and inflation to work this way isn’t sufficient. It just doesn’t.
This is not to say that there aren’t some good trends in the data. Our diffusion index clearly signals that the pressures towards higher prices are slackening. Some products and services that had seen extreme spikes are retracing. But wage growth is still 6%, and there are still a lot of goods and services which haven’t yet fully adjusted to the new price level. So: there will continue to be volatility in prices for a while, with some good news and some bad news and a gentle trend towards less inflation.
Sounds like “Fed on hold” to me.
CPI Swaps Improving? Not as Significant as You Think
Today we are going to geek out on inflation derivatives a little more.
Since early 2022, just after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 10y US CPI swaps have fallen from about 3.15% to around 2.50% (see chart, source Bloomberg).
This is, on its face, pretty remarkable since median inflation during this time has risen from 4.76% in February 2022 to 7.20% in February 2023, and has now ebbed all the way to 6.98%. Core inflation has fallen farther, largely because of the drag from Health Insurance, but is still at 5.5%. Headline inflation has plummeted to 4.9% y/y. There are clearly some base effects that will pull those numbers lower from here, but 10y CPI swaps at 2.50% still looks pretty sporty. After all, you can pay fixed and receive inflation on CPI swaps (aka ‘buying’ the swap) and enjoy positive carry as long as the monthlies are consistently above 0.20% NSA, and six of the last nine have been.
Unfortunately, what you also get when you buy the swap is the negative mark-to-market as 10-year expectations decline. A cursory glance at the market would suggest that the Fed has successfully stuffed the inflation expectations cat back in the bag. Back in 2018, the rolling-10-year-compounded realized inflation rate got as low as 1.37% (granted, this measured from just before the GFC), and even a few years ago it was around 1.60%. If the Fed is putting the inflation genie back in the bottle (I’m working on getting my metaphor count up), then gosh – maybe there’s more downside to inflation swaps.
Or maybe not. Look at the following chart, which breaks down the 10-year CPI swap into the 5-year CPI swap and a 5-year swap, starting in 5 years. We call the former a 5-year “spot” CPI swap; the latter is a 5y5y forward CPI swap. The 5y5y shows us the rate you could lock in today, paying fixed for 5 years and receiving actual realized inflation from June 2028-June 2033.
These two rates have the relationship that
sqrt[(1+5y rate)(1+5y5y)] – 1 = 10y CPI rate
In other words, you can pay fixed and receive inflation in one of two ways: you can pay the 10y rate and receive inflation, or you can pay the 5y rate and receive inflation for 5 years, and simultaneously lock in the rate where you would do the same transaction in 5 years.
Notice that almost all of the improvement in the 10-year rate since early 2022 is in the spot 5-year rate. Now, the spot rate is always more volatile than the forward, because energy is very volatile in the short term but mean-reverting in the long term. For this reason, policymakers often obsess on the 5y5y, which is perceived to be long enough for the energy volatility to wash out.[1] But in this case, pretty much all of the improvement in inflation quotes is coming from the front of the curve. In other words, if inflation expectations were “unanchored” (at least judging from the market, which as we know is a terrible measure of expectations) back in 2022 then they still are, 500bps of tightening later.
That being said, it’s hard to get terribly concerned about this supposed unmooring because if you back up a little farther it’s obvious that market pricing of longer-term inflation is still damaged from way before COVID. The chart below shows 5y5y CPI going back basically to the beginning of the inflation derivatives market.
From 2003 to 2014, 5y5y was never far from 2.75%-3.00%. There were occasional forays down to 2.5%, and occasional jaunts up to 3.25%, but other than the volatility around the GFC it never varied far from that. Today’s level of 2.58% would be at the lower end of the historical range prior to 2015, and at the upper end of the historical range from 2015 to present.
What happened in late 2014? Well, the dollar soared and oil prices crashed from 100 to 50 in a short period of time. Somehow, this led to a structural change in the shape of the inflation curve. In the old language we used to use, the “risk premium” of 5y5y over spot 5y got squeezed out. I suspect it was because of the structural change to lower volatilities, which lessened the value of the ‘tail’ option in long-dated inflation. But…I may be attributing too much sophistication to the market.
Whatever the reason, long-dated inflation quotes appear to me to still be very low. If the Fed achieves a 2% target for PCE, that’s 2.25% or so on CPI and you lose 33bps versus the 2.58% forward. If the Fed moves the inflation target to 3%, as some people are advocating, then you’re ahead by 67bps.[2] And if the Fed just plain misses, you’re to the good by even more. The only way you lose big is if we slip into a pernicious deflation that lasts a decade – and, since all the Fed needs to do is repeat the recent Bernanke-inspired helicopter-money experiment to avert deflation, this would seem to be an unlikely outcome.
Markets trade where risk clears, not at ‘fair value’ or at ‘market expectations.’ What the current level tells you is that not enough people are demanding inflation protection. If you’re one of the people who needs inflation protection, it is still a very good time to get it at a very affordable price.
If you’re an institutional investor or OCIO who needs help on that topic – visit https://www.EnduringInvestments.com and reach out!
[1] N.B. the level of the 5y5y is still positively correlated to the price of gasoline, which is obviously absurd and another example of exploitable error in inflation markets.
[2] (But listen to my latest podcast, Ep. 67 Three-point Goal? Or go for Two? (Percent), where I point out that the Fed currently pursues Average Inflation Targeting in which the official goal is just not terribly important).
