Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (May 2025)
Well, this was an odd one to sort out.
Going into the CPI announcement this morning, the economist consensus was for +0.17% (seasonally adjusted) on headline CPI m/m and +0.28% on core. Market changes this month have been very contained, partly because of the usual summer doldrums kicking in and partly (most likely) because of the degree of uncertainty surrounding all of the chaotic policy changes that have taken place in 2025. The effects of these changes (and more to come!) are still making their way through the system.
This is a calm surface over a roiling ocean. Economists continue to debate (and their analysis, to me, seems in many cases to be colored by the political lens they are looking through) about the impact that the current tariff structure will have, about the effect of future tariff changes – and what those will be, about the impact of the Most-Favored-Nation policy on pharmaceutical pricing and availability, about the effect the deportation of illegals (and self-deportations) will have on housing (rent inflation softer, but how much?) and labor supply (wages upward, but how much?) and Lodging Away from Home.
Actually, I’m overstating that a little bit. Most classically-trained economists mostly agree about how horrible this will all be, because tariffs bad. My own estimates have tariffs pushing inflation a little higher in the near-term, but not terribly. I also think that mass deportations would be very disinflationary because of the effect on rents but it is looking less and less like ‘mass deportations’ means tens or hundreds of thousands, not millions, and that effect likely won’t be huge.
Meanwhile, the Fed is keeping rates slightly above neutral but money supply growth has re-accelerated to a level that’s not likely to be consistent with inflation at 2%. Underlying trend median inflation is running about 3.5% or so, and is unlikely to fall a lot further given the current configuration of fiscal and monetary policy.
Let’s get into the data, then. The actual CPI was +0.08% (SA) on headline and +0.13% on core. That’s a significant miss, especially on core.
Core inflation has recently been missing low on a fairly regular basis, although most of the misses have been small. Median inflation in most cases hasn’t been confirming those misses, because they’ve generally been one-offs that don’t really wiggle median too much. It’s still a positive sign if the ‘tails’ are to the downside so that core CPI is below median CPI, but Median tells us not to get too excited. This month, though, Median also showed an effect. My estimate is that Median CPI will be the lowest since last July, at +0.25% m/m. It’s still difficult to see a major disinflationary trend here.
There’s more uncertainty than usual around my Median guess, but let’s take it as a given for now.
You don’t have to look too far to see one of the major culprits for the miss this month. Primary Rents were up +0.21% m/m, which is a lot slower than they had been running at.
Owners’ Equivalent Rent was also soft, and between those two surprises it’s probably roughly 5bps of the Core CPI miss. Let’s be clear – rents are not collapsing and indeed, we’ve just converged with our model.
Let’s be clear: if you are in the camp that we’re going to get back to 2%, you need this to not be an aberration. You need shelter inflation to continue to decelerate. But as you can see from the chart of month/month primary rents above, sharp movements in rents tend to be reversed in subsequent months. This looks a lot to me like last July’s surprise, which was reversed in August. We will see. But ex-shelter, year/year Core CPI rose, to 1.87% from 1.78%.
What is interesting to me as I write this, looking at some of the other commentary, is that folks don’t seem to be focusing on this. Of course it’s all tariffs, all the time, and everyone is scratching their heads over why we are seeing price declines in some of the categories where you’d expect the tariffs to help. Key example (and significant example) is autos, where the CPI for Used Cars and Trucks was -0.54% m/m after a similar decline last month, and New Cars were down -0.29% m/m. If there is one place that economists were certain we would see tariff-induced inflation, it was in autos. Not so much, at least yet. This might be because the lags are longer than we expect in a just-in-time manufacturing world, or it might be because demand elasticity is bigger than people thought.
But even with autos, Core Goods inflation accelerated to +0.3% y/y from +0.1% last month.
Remember, above I said that core goods ex-shelter had accelerated. I don’t want to fall into the trap of taking out all of the things that go down, to make the insightful conclusion that everything else went up – but that acceleration in core goods included the weighty autos contribution to the downside so you can tell that there are indeed upward pressures. Just not in the big things.
One place we saw increases was in Tenants’ and Household Insurance, which rose 0.84% last month, and in Motor Vehicle Insurance, which rose 0.68%. That helped keep core services inflation at +3.6% y/y, even with the slowdown in housing. On the other hand, Airfares suffered a third straight significant decline, -2.74% m/m. And while we are surprised to see auto prices decline, given the tariffs, we are also surprised to see Medicinal Drugs prices increase, given Trump’s new “Most Favored Nation” policy. Pharma prices were +0.54% m/m (although the y/y increase slackened some and is only +0.35% y/y). Core Services less Rent of Shelter (aka “Supercore”) is down to 3.11% y/y, and that’s good news even if it’s still quite a bit higher than it was pre-COVID. The trend is your friend, and this is a good trend for now.
As with the market itself, then, we’re seeing a lot of movement in both directions; it’s just all canceling out into a relatively tame increase in the overall CPI basket. That’s not likely to be the ultimate outcome. The last four year/year increases in Median CPI (assuming I’m vaguely right about the m/m, and we’ll know that in an hour or two) have been 3.53%, 3.48%, 3.46%, and 3.44%. That does not give the impression of a series that is in a hurry to get down to 2.25%-2.5%, which would be roughly consistent with sustainable core CPI around 2%. Again, you need to get shelter prices to really decelerate significantly further.
Now, even if that does happen, it isn’t going to keep y/y measures on a steady deceleration track for the next year. While we haven’t seen a major impact from tariffs yet, and my view is that it won’t be a huge impact in any case except for particular items, I am pretty sure we will see something and median and core inflation will see acceleration over the balance of this year and into next year. Thereafter, it depends on what happens with policy in the interim. On that score, while the current numbers still give the Fed no good reason to ease it also should pretty much remove any notion that monetary policy is about to get tighter. M2 growth is back to 4.4% y/y, and 6.4% annualized over the last quarter. That’s back to what was normal when we were experiencing the tailwinds of globalization and positive demographics. It is too fast now that those are headwinds.
But as I said, that’s the story for later this year and it could change. In the meantime, we keep waiting for the tariff effect. If three months from now we still haven’t seen an effect, then things will get very interesting.
One final announcement. If you’re an investor in cryptocurrencies (in particular, stable coins) and have a Telegram account, consider joining the read-only USDi_Coin room https://t.me/USDi_Coin where the USDi Coin price is updated every four hours or so…and where these charts are also posted shortly after CPI just as I used to do on Twitter before they changed the API to make auto-tweeting charts very difficult.
Why a 4.5% Nominal Rate is Roughly Equilibrium…Hmmm, Sounds Familiar…
I was planning to write today about why a 4.5%-5.0% nominal Treasury rate is not only not the end of the world, but actually sort of normal. Naturally, the reason I am even thinking about the topic is because of all of the apparent alarm because the current long bond recent peeked above 5% and the 10-year note at 4.50% continues to flirt with those levels. Because we haven’t seen the 10-year rate above 5% for a sustained period in about 18 years, it is natural that some of the young folks who were raised in an era of free money would think that this is the end of the world.
I’ve previously written about the return of some of the phenomena that we used to take for granted, such as the presence of optionality in the bond contract. After most of two decades of unhealthy interest rates produced unhealthy leverage habits among other unwelcome developments (including the leveraging of the government balance sheet because it was so cheap to borrow for one’s programs with no cost), I suppose it shouldn’t be surprising that there is so much wailing and gnashing of teeth, rending of garments, etc. But for those people who expect the Fed to lower rates significantly, because “after all 2% is the normal level of interest rates,” I am here to say that you probably don’t want the crack-up that would be necessary to make that plausible. The current level of interest rates is inconvenient for many organizations with a borrowing problem, but it is really quite normal.
Anyway, I’d intended to write a longer version of that, and as I started to write something bugged me and I looked back and noticed that I’d already written essentially the same thing a few years ago. At the time (June 2022) I was explaining “Why Roughly 2.25% is an Equilibrium Real Rate,” and of course if you add reasonable inflation expectations of 2.5%-3% you get to 4.75%-5.25% as an equilibrium nominal rate (and a bit higher than that for the 30-year, which also incorporates a modest additional risk premium). If you go and read that article directly, you can also get my screed on how models trained on the last 25 years of data leading up to the inflation spike only survived if they forecast a very strong reversion to the mean, and so *eureka* all of those models missed the entire inflation spike. But here is a reprinted snippet (reprinted by permission from myself) outlining the argument for why the current level of long-term real interest rates is about right.
Kashkari made a different error, in an essay posted on the Minneapolis Fed website on May 6th.[1] He claimed that the neutral long-term real interest rate is around 0.25%, which conveniently is where long-term real rates are now.
However, we can demonstrate that logic, reinforced by history, indicates that long-term real rates ought to be in the neighborhood of the economy’s long-term real growth rate potential.
I will use the classic economist’s expedient of a desert-island economy. Consider such an island, which has two coconut-milk producers and for mathematical convenience no inflation, so that real and nominal quantities are the same. These producers are able to expand production and profits by about 2% per year by deploying new machinery to extract the milk from the coconuts. Now, let’s suppose that one of the producers offers to sell his company to the other, and to finance the purchase by lending money at 5%. The proposal will fall on deaf ears, since paying 5% to expand production and profits by 2% makes no sense. At that interest rate, either producer would rather be a banker. Conversely, suppose one producer offers to sell his company to the other and to finance the purchase at a 0% rate of interest – the buyer can pay off the loan over time with no interest charged. Now the buyer will jump at the chance, because he can pay off the loan with the increased production and keep more money in the bargain. The leverage granted him by this loan is very attractive. In this circumstance, the only way the deal is struck is if the lender is not good at math. Clearly, the lender could increase his wealth by 2% per year by producing coconut milk, but is choosing instead to maintain his current level of wealth. Perhaps he likes playing golf more than cracking coconuts.
In this economy, a lender cannot charge more than the natural growth in production since a borrower will not intentionally reduce his real wealth by borrowing to buy an asset that returns less than the loan costs. And a lender will not intentionally reduce his real wealth by lending at a rate lower than he could expand his wealth by producing. Thus, the natural real rate of interest will tend to be in equilibrium at the natural real rate of economic growth. Lower real interest rates will induce leveraging of productive activities; higher real interest rates will result in deleveraging.
This isn’t only true of the coconut economy, although I would strongly caution that this isn’t exactly a trading model and only a natural tendency with a long history. The chart below shows (1) a naïve real 10-year yield created by taking the 10-year nominal Treasury yield and subtracting trailing 1-year inflation, in purple; (2) a real yield series derived from a research paper by Shanken & Kothari, in red; (3) the Enduring Investments real yield series, in green, and (4) 10y TIPS, in black.
The long-term averages for these four series are as follows:
- Naïve real: 2.34%
- Shanken/Kothari: 3.13%
- Enduring Investments: 2.34%
- 10y TIPS: 1.39%
- Shanken/Kothari thru 2007; 10y TIPS from 2007-present: 2.50%
It isn’t just a coincidence that calculating a long-term average of long-term real interest rates, no matter how you do it, ends up being about 2.3%-2.5%. That is also close to the long-term real growth rate of the economy. Using Commerce Department data, the compounded annual US growth rate from 1954-2021 was 2.95%.
It is generally conceded that the economy’s sustainable growth rate has fallen over the last 50 years, although some people place great stock (no pun intended) on the productivity enhancements which power the fantasies of tech sector investors. I believe that something like 2.25%-2.50% is the long-term growth rate that the US economy can sustain, although global demographic trends may be dampening that further. Which in turn implies that something like 2.00%-2.25% is where long-term real interest rates should be, in equilibrium.[2] Kashkari says “We do know that neutral rates have been falling in advanced economies around the world due to factors outside the influence of monetary policy, such as demographics, technology developments and trade.” Except that we don’t know anything of the sort, since there is a strong argument against each of these totems. Abbreviating, those counterarguments are (a) aging demographics is a supply shock which should decrease output and raise prices with the singular counterargument of Japan also happening to be the country with the lowest growth rate in money in the last three decades; (b) productivity has been improving since the Middle Ages, and there is no evidence that it is improving noticeably faster today – and if it did, that would raise the expected real growth rate and the demand for money; and (c) while trade certainly was a following wind for the last quarter century, every indication is that it is going to be the opposite sign for the next decade. It is time to retire these shibboleths. Real interest rates have been kept artificially too low for far too long, inducing excessive financial leverage. They will eventually return to equilibrium…but it will be a long and painful process.
At the time I wrote the passage above, 10-year TIPS yielded about 0.25%; today they yield 2.125%. It turned out that returning to equilibrium wasn’t at all a long process. But it certainly was painful!
Returning to the original point: just because 10-year rates are now approximately at equilibrium is not at all a prediction that they will remain at equilibrium. Indeed, if I made that prediction I would be making a very similar mistake to the one I criticized above. Mean reversion in rates is not a particularly powerful force, when set against an active central bank and a profligate legislature. But if it matters at all, it is very important to correctly identify the mean to which rates should revert.
And it’s not 2%.
[1] https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2022/policy-has-tightened-a-lot-is-it-enough
[2] The reason that real interest rates will be slightly lower than real growth rates is that real interest rates are typically computed using the Consumer Price Index, which is generally slightly higher than the GDP Deflator.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (April 2025)
Before the CPI analysis, I always try to give some context for where we are in the ‘story’ about the evolution of inflation right now. It’s really difficult to do that, though, because of all of the massive policy changes that are happening – and often in opposite directions with respect to the effect on inflation. Here is the Baker, Bloom & Davis Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, which is derived by scraping news sources. Even strong supporters of President Trump’s have to admit that his Administration has been a whirlwind on economic policy (for many of them, of course, that’s a feature and not a bug).
Here goes, anyway. Remember that last month, core CPI crashed but Median CPI actually accelerated. This kept us from actively celebrating the great inflation news; we knew that the good news was concentrated in a few one offs. In particular, Airfares (-5.3% for March), Lodging Away from Home (-3.5%), Used Cars (-0.69%), Car and Truck Rental (-2.66%), and Medicinal Drugs (-1.30%). But, as Median showed last month, there was really no reason to think that inflation was behind us…even before any effect from tariffs.
Speaking of tariffs, prior to this month we hadn’t really expected to see any effect yet and most economists thought that we shouldn’t see that much impact in the April figures either since the big tariffs on everyone went into place early in that month. However, remember that Mexico, Canada, and China had all faced escalating tariffs prior to April, so if there is going to be an impact we should expect to see something soon. I don’t expect a lot in most categories, but some impact in a few. It will be hard to discern how much of any monthly price change is tariffs, of course. We will look at Apparel, where demand elasticity in the short run is not terribly low. Broadly, though, remember that demand elasticity and foreign content percentage are both important…and foreign content in most goods is pretty low. I’d also look to Medicinal Drugs, since a lot of APIs are China-sourced and the demand for many drugs is pretty inelastic in the short-run, but I didn’t expect a lot of impact there (pharma companies will have had inventories), and going forward it will be muddied by Trump’s announcement of the Most-Favored-Nation policy in pharmaceuticals.
Speaking of that announcement, this month’s review of changes in inflation swap levels is seriously polluted because that announcement combined with the 90-day pause on China tariffs caused a massive crash in 1-year inflation expectations.
Despite the drop in tariff rates on China (for now), remember average tariffs remain the highest since the Great Depression (ominous music)! Of course, back then the US was a significant net exporter, so reciprocal tariffs were a bigger problem. Imports were only about 2-3% of GDP.
(Chart above is from https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2019/may/historical-u-s-trade-deficits)
(Chart above is from https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2020/march/evolution-total-trade-us)
There you go. That’s the context. Now onto the number.
CPI for April was expected to be +0.25%, and +0.27% on Core. The actual prints were 0.221% and 0.237%, respectively, so a mild surprise lower (although it turned the +0.3%/+0.3% rounded expectations to +0.2%/+0.2%, looking more dramatic a surprise than it actually was). Core is right about where it has been for the last 6 and 12 months (0.244% and 0.229% average, respectively) with the big January spike and the March plunge basically offsetting each other.
Amazingly, of the eight major subgroups only Housing, Medical Care, and “Other” increased on a m/m basis. What is especially surprising in that light is that Apparel – where the tariff canary in the coal mine lives – was down on the month.
Core goods continues to hook higher, now at +0.13% y/y. Remember, this is before any tariff effect has really been felt. In my mind, this is more the underlying ‘deglobalization’ effect: as I’ve said for a while, the deep deflation in core goods that we saw was a partial retracement of the COVID spike and we should expect going forward to see a small positive inflation in goods. Core services is decelerating nicely, and it will need to continue to do that if we’re ever going to see downward pressure in median inflation from where we are now.
Speaking of Median CPI, my early estimate is +0.308% m/m, putting the y/y at 3.43%. That’s about where we’ve been, and where we’re likely to be going forward.
Looking at some of those one-off categories from last month, Airfares fell another -2.83% m/m after that -5.3% prior decline. Some of that is jet fuel, some is tourism I suspect. Lodging Away from Home went flat (-0.1% m/m) from -3.54% prior. I think we’ll see continued downward pressure in that category, as hotels in some big cities are gradually emptied of illegal migrants and get added back to the stock of available rooms, but March’s drop was just too big. Used Cars’ decline (-0.53%) surprised some people, because the private surveys showed that prices advanced last month, but the seasonal assumption was a decent hurdle this month that wasn’t cleared. However, if you were worried about how the spike in car parts tariffs would cause car prices to spike…because that’s what the news was hyperventilating about…you needn’t have. New Car prices were also slightly down, -0.01% compared to +0.1% last month.
As for shelter, it continues to flatten out, with Primary Rents 3.98% y/y and OER at 4.31% y/y. Actually, Primary Rents were flat on a y/y basis compared to the prior month, and have basically converged with our model, which is around 3.7%. From here we should expect very slow deceleration, but rents should stay above 3.25% or so on a y/y basis.
Supercore is looking great. This is about the best news in the report, because if Shelter is just about tapped out and Core Goods is trending just above zero we’d need Core Services to continue to dive.
That’s the good news. The bad news is that the spread of median wages over median prices has returned to its long-run average, which means that it will be hard to see additional sharp declines here…it isn’t going to come from squeezing wages further.
Outright, the Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker – the best measure of wages in my opinion – is at 4.3% y/y. That’s right where it was in November. It’s going to be very hard to squeeze services prices lower if wages don’t decelerate further.
Finally, let’s circle back to pharmaceuticals. I’m going to point you again to my article from 2020, which is the first time that the President mooted the idea of a Most-Favored-Nation clause affecting the pharmaceutical industry. https://inflationguy.blog/2020/08/25/drug-prices-and-most-favored-nation-clauses-considerations/ The upshot is that even if the MFN policy takes place exactly as the President states, retail drug prices are unlikely to decrease anything like as much as he has said. In fact, there could even be some circumstances in which drug prices rise because companies stop selling in foreign countries at levels lower than in the US (because they face a more-elastic demand there) but which contribute to the total profit of the drug company. There may be others in which the drug company stops selling the drug at all in the US. Furthermore, drug prices overall have only risen 7% since pre-COVID, compared to 23% for core prices generally (the black line in the chart below is the overall CPI for Medicinal Drugs; the blue is the core CPI price level – both normalized to December 2019).
By the way, if I was concerned about importing APIs from China and wanted the US to start producing more of them, I don’t think I’d be trying to crush end-product prices and reduce the incentive to spin up production of the APIs. So there will be a lot of exceptions to the MFN policy, and you can tell from the performance of pharma companies yesterday after the news (big up with the market, not down!) that investors don’t expect any important impact on the bottom lines of pharmaceutical companies. I agree. I think Medicinal Drugs going forward will probably decline a bit for some celebrated cases, but not in a big way that pushes CPI lower significantly.
The big conclusion here is that inflation continues to run at about 3.5% or so (Median), and there is no sign of a significant further deceleration to come. As long-time readers know, this has been my theme for a couple of years, that we will end up in the ‘high 3s, low 4s’ on median inflation, because the overall backdrop of deglobalization and demographics argue for a higher floor. If the Fed keeps money growth very low, my opinion could change (and I’d already amend my target to ‘mid to high 3s’ as the mode), but I am not very optimistic on that.
However, I also don’t think there is anything about the inflation picture that argues the Fed has a lot of room to drop rates significantly. I said last month “The right answer to uncertainty from a policymaker perspective is to increase the hurdle for taking action. The right answer is to make no changes to policy. I am not confident that the Federal Reserve will correctly separate the ‘price of risk’ effect from the ‘economic growth’ effect. They are correct to note that tariffs by themselves are not inflationary in that they are one-off effects. If they believe that, and they think there’s a big recession coming, they’ll cut rates. That would be a mistake, especially given the uncertainty.” I still think that’s the case. At the moment, there is no reason to cut rates any further than the ‘let’s help Biden’ cuts did, except to appease the President and I see little urgency from this Fed to do that. I wouldn’t expect any big moves from the Committee, any time soon.
One final announcement. If you’re an investor in cryptocurrencies (in particular, stable coins) and have a Telegram account, consider joining the read-only USDi_Coin room https://t.me/USDi_Coin where the USDi Coin price is updated every four hours or so…and where these charts are also posted shortly after CPI just as I used to do on Twitter before they changed the API to make auto-tweeting charts very difficult.
Inflation After 100 Days
It is hard to believe that a third of the year is already past. Some people, of course, would say that it seems like a hundred years have passed in the first hundred days of Trump’s second term, but to me it seems like a blink.
Here’s a quick mark-to-market summary of where I think we stand with respect to inflation and the economy generally…after which I actually have another point for this column:
Uncertainty. That’s the watchword, of course. One place this shows up is in the huge spread between survey data and hard data. The survey data is tinted with fear of uncertainty, and is very negative (and likely influenced by the media deciding that Trump’s Administration signals the End of Days); the hard data is clearly softening but not dramatically so – and frankly, that was already under way in some ways since at least 2023 when the Unemployment Rate started heading slowly higher. In my view the softening of the hard data won’t ever get to be dramatic in this recession, and this will end up being more like a garden-variety recession we used to have pre-2000.
Inflation will be higher than it would otherwise be, because of tariffs, but lower than many people think because people greatly exaggerate the effect of tariffs. Tariffs only affect goods, and only significantly if they are goods facing inelastic demand. There will be some shortages in the near-term, and unlike during COVID when many of the shortages were caused by too much demand induced by money-drops to consumers, in this case it really will be supply constraints. Look out for things like ibuprofen, which is 90% sourced from China which makes it hard to completely switch supply to domestic suppliers. But these are short-run or in some case medium-run disruptions as supply chains shift. As domestic or lesser-tariffed countries replace the highly-tariffed suppliers, the supplies will respond and prices will come back down – not all the way to where they were, but it will feel like deflation in some cases because we mentally refer to the most-recent price, not to the year-ago price.
But either way, the tariffs are a jump-discontinuity, a one-time effect. The uncertainty, less so but that will fade (as an aside, and as I’ve noted previously, the high uncertainty had the effect in Q1 of causing money velocity to decline very slightly for the first time in a couple of years). By the end of the year, things will be much more settled and inflation will be stabilizing again…but the story continues to be that inflation will stabilize in the high 3s, low 4s, not at 2%. This probably means the Fed will not be easing much, although if there is a significant slowdown not caused from net trade – the Q1 drag was significantly from the surge in imports due to front-running tariffs – the Fed will ease even if inflation hasn’t come down. They’ll point to tariffs being transitory, although I sincerely doubt they will use that word! And they’ll be right, but they’ll also be wrong. Money supply growth is still too fast to accommodate 2% inflation especially in a deglobalizing world.
We’ll talk more about all of these things in columns here and in my podcasts over the next few months. But today I am still very preoccupied with getting USDi[1] launched, getting investors involved, talking to crypto ecosystem providers, etc. And I want to address one question I get routinely these days – not just about USDi, which exactly tracks CPI but adds nothing on top, but about the underlying investment strategy that I’ve been running/marketing for 3.5 years. The question is, “why should I buy something that returns CPI when inflation is at 3% and I can buy Tbills and earn 4.25%?” Here are two important pieces of the answer – and they’re just as important to investors who operate wholly in the traditional finance world as it is to people operating in the crypto world.
The first part of the answer is that while Tbills are above inflation now, that is not exactly guaranteed. In fact, for the last quarter-century it has been fairly unusual.
Sure, if you go back to the 1980s and early 1990s, when inflation was high and coming down and the Fed was following inflation down, you can find a lengthy period when Tbill rates were above inflation. Is the current period, with inflation where it is, comparable to the period when inflation was descending from double-digits and the FOMC was dominated by hawks? Do you think Trump will replace Chairman Powell and other Fed governors whose terms expire, with hawks? It doesn’t seem that way to me. I think it’s important to realize that is the bet you’re making, if you hold short cash instruments as an inflation hedge.
The second part of the answer is that holding a cash instrument does not protect you during an inflation spike because the Fed cannot respond fast enough, and a cash instrument in nominal space does not protect you from a dollar crisis. Almost nothing does, in fact, as stocks and bonds both do poorly in those cases as do ‘inflation hedge’ products based on equities or bonds. Here is a chart of the recent inflation spike. How well did your Tbills, or short-duration bonds (VTIP) or long-duration inflation bonds (TIP), keep up? Did they ever catch up?
To me, any allocation to low-risk securities that is meant to serve as a volatility buffer for a portfolio, but does not hold inflation beta, is completely missing the value of that beta in certain scenarios where very little else is helpful. When inflation spikes, stocks and bonds become correlated (down). You can (and should) add commodity allocations to your portfolio, but those consume part of your risk budget and push out the equities, hedge funds, private equity, and other higher risk asset classes. If you can get the inflation beta from a very low-risk part of your portfolio, you ought.
The foregoing is, transparently, partly self-serving. But the products I’ve been involved with developing have never been developed because they produce big fees or are easy to sell.[2] I’ve developed them because they’re useful to investors. And, parenthetically, I do think that the worker is worthy of his wages.
If you want to find out more about USDi, I urge you to visit the home page https://usdicoin.com, where you can see the current value of the coin increasing minute-by-minute with inflation. If you’re a denizen of the crypto world, then you might also be interested in joining the Telegram read-only group for the USDiCoin, available at https://t.me/USDi_Coin. That group is where we will make announcements about the coin, post the price of the coin periodically (at least daily; automation in process), post the monthly reports confirming the collateralization of the coin, announce new market-makers and markets…and also post some inflation-related charts, such as I used to do on Twitter on CPI morning, when Twitter allowed such automation. If you’re at all interested in inflation and/or the inflation-linked coin, hop on.
[1] If you don’t know what USDi is yet, read my prior article https://inflationguy.blog/2025/04/15/announcing-usdi-inflation-linked-cash/
[2] Understatement of the century.
Announcing USDi…Inflation-Linked Cash
As many of you know, one of my goals in life – for decades – has been to expand the inflation-linked investing ecosystem to other structures (e.g. options), other legs of the liquidity triad (e.g. cash, swaps, futures), other more-specific inflation (e.g. medical care), and in every other way I could. Barclays originally moved me into the US CPI Derivatives seat not because they thought I’d be a tremendous trader (there was nothing to trade) but because they thought I’d be a good evangelist for the product. I’d like to think they were right. Certainly, I’ve been a durable one.
Over the years, through my time at Barclays and Natixis and Enduring, I’ve developed a lot of structured products – some which traded or were issued, but a lot that died on the drawing board or for lack of customer demand – and trading/hedging methods, funds, models, etc. But nothing, I think, is as impactful as what we’re announcing today. Because what we (at USDi Partners) are announcing is likely to be considered a security, I have to be somewhat careful about how I discuss this product. So, I am just going to post the press release, and let it speak for itself for now…although I would be remiss if I did not also refer to Elizabeth Stanton’s excellent article on Bloomberg (subscription required).
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USDi Partners Notes Launch of the USDi Coin, the First US Currency to Permanently Preserve Purchasing Power
Basking Ridge, NJ – April 15, 2025
USDi Partners today launched its first cryptocurrency project, which will allow investors to hold an asset that is permanently linked to the purchasing power a US Dollar had in December 2024.
The coin (an ERC-20 token on the Ethereum blockchain) will be available to accredited investors from market making firms that have passed USDi Partners’ AML/KYC process and are able to mint or burn the token directly. Once an investor buys a USDi coin with ‘normal’ dollars, the value of that coin will rise every day on the basis of the increase in the Not-Seasonally-Adjusted US Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers, calculated and released by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is the same index on which trillions of dollars’ worth of U.S. TIPS bonds are based.
A Coin that Always Buys What a Dollar Buys Today
Holding the USDi Coin will effectively be the same as holding a dollar whose purchasing power rises as the cost of goods and services increases. If the US CPI index rises 10% from the launch date, the value of a USDi Coin will be $1.10 in terms of the current dollar, so that the investor’s purchasing power is undiminished. “The idea for USDi was inspired by the Chilean Unidad de Fomento (UF), a non-circulating currency that since 1967 has been indexed to the price level in Chile. The UF is often used as the basis for contracts in Chile, allowing counterparts to agree on terms without worrying about how inflation will change the significance of the sums exchanged,” explained Michael Ashton, Co-Founder of USDi Partners. “But, unlike the UF, the USDi Coin will actually circulate.”
The USDi Coin is collateralized by reserves that are managed by an inflation-hedging specialist to keep up with inflation in both the short- and long-term. The Coin itself, however, will not fluctuate on the basis of investment returns but will always track US CPI exactly. (Because of the public release schedule of the CPI, the value of the USDi Coin on any given day will always be known from 2-6 weeks in advance.)
The CPI index on which the USDi Coin is based is calculated according to a publicly-available handbook of methods and released publicly, along with hundreds of subcomponents and regional indices, on the website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This makes it ideal for Phase 2 of the USDi project.
Finally, Medical Inflation (and Other Things) Will Be Investible
In Phase 2, the USDi Coin will become splittable, so that an owner of a USDi Coin will be able to divide it into subcomponents that track the inflation rate of individual parts of the consumption basket, and trade them separately. For example, upon the launch of Phase 2 it will be possible for the first time ever to invest in Medical Care CPI directly. This is an innovation beyond just crypto, says Andy Fately, Managing Partner and Co-Founder of USDi Partners. “What you have never been able to do before, but will when we launch Phase 2, is to buy a collateralized coin to track Medical Care or College Tuition inflation explicitly. This hasn’t even been done in the Trad Fi world, but the low frictions of the crypto world make it the ideal venue for this breakthrough.”
About USDi Partners
USDi Partners LLC was formed in mid-2024 following an off-mic discussion after recording an episode of Cents and Sensibility: the Inflation Guy Podcast. Michael Ashton asked Andy Fately and Susan Joseph, his guests on the podcast, whether anyone had created a coin that is stable in real space. The answer – no – set in motion a series of intense discussions about how best to do this in a way that was financially sound and regulatorily acceptable. USDi Partners was formed to offer and make markets in this new real-stable coin while it also expands its roster of partnered external market-makers in order to bring this innovation – and other future innovations – to the world.
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For more information:
Andrew Fately
***@usdicoin.com
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (March 2025)
Before we get started on today’s CPI, let me add a few wise words from an old market observer:
- The stock market is not the economy. The stock market is the (private real economy) times (price per unit of the private real economy). When the stock market goes down, sometimes it’s because the real economy is contracting, and sometimes it’s because the price people are willing to pay to own a piece of that is declining. Often, it’s both. Furthermore, the first part of that equation is really (real economic performance) times (capital share vs labor share vs government share) The tariffs will affect corporate earnings, especially for multinationals, and in the short term for domestic firms that single-source from a foreign source. But the effect on the economy will not be dramatic, even though we will see a technical recession because of the huge swings in the trade balance in Q1 and Q2 as imports surged ahead of the tariffs. So the main thing we are seeing in equities is a multiple effect. Stocks were way overpriced, and some of that is unwinding. Bottom line: if a bear market in equities causes you serious angst or damages your long-term financial goals, you’re too long equities. If a bear market in equities causes you serious damage to your short-term financial goals, you’re too long equities. It’s okay. A bear market does not mean we are headed for a depression.
- The amount of complaining about how the Administration didn’t consult Wall Street or think about how their actions would affect big equity holders and firms is amazing and the complainers are missing the point. That isn’t a bug of the policy, and most of the country doesn’t see it as a bug. It’s the main feature. Because if you consult those guys they all would have said “yeah, go get China with a 2% tariff and of course don’t touch anyone else.” These are the same guys who freaked out when Trump slapped tariffs on China in his first term…which were obviously in retrospect way too small to matter. The experts and Wall Street mainly want to make sure no one rocks the boat. But rocking the effect here isn’t a side effect. It’s the main point.
I have a third observation, but it’s inflation-related with all the rest so I will save it for the end. Let’s get into today’s number.
Heading into the number, the general consensus was that core CPI would be generally in the range it has been, around 0.25% or so, and headline would be soft due mainly to energy that was weaker than the seasonal adjustment accounts for. This month’s CPI, though, is a sidelight in the same way that the FOMC minutes are a sidelight when something really big happens subsequent to the last meeting: it isn’t March inflation we are interested in but rather inflation over the next 3-6 months as tariffs go into effect and begin to bite. The inflation swaps curve is sharply inverted, and has gotten increasingly so over the last year, as short inflation expectations (1y, 2y, 3y) have been rising while the long end of the curve has actually come down a bit.
Actually, long-term inflation expectations have been pretty steady, even in the recent market volatility, which is one way that you know that (a) this is a market-price event and not an economy event and (b) there aren’t big liquidity issues out there like we had in the GFC. 10-year inflation breakevens have been between 2.20% and 2.30% over the last week despite the record-breaking series of large equity swings. Anyway, back to CPI.
Some people thought we might see a little hint of the first tariffs in this data. Welp, we didn’t. Headline CPI actually declined – prices fell on average (but wait for it) – by -0.05% m/m and headline inflation is only 2.41% over the last year. More surprising was that core inflation crashed lower, and was only +0.06% m/m to bring the y/y down to 2.81%. That was far below expectations.
Unfortunately, it’s here I have to tell you to hold your horses. Because when we estimate Median CPI, we don’t get even a whisper of the same effect. In fact, my early estimate has m/m median inflation the highest it has been in about a year. (This month, several regional housing subcategories are clustering around the median so my estimate of +0.35% is subject to being off by a few basis points depending on how the official seasonal adjustment affects the actual m/m increases in those subgroups, but it will not be far from +0.35%).
The fact that median doesn’t really show any of the deceleration that core does tells us that this is different from the deceleration last May/June/July, when rents had a brief but temporary lull. In March, Owners’ Equivalent Rent was +0.40% m/m, and Primary Rents +0.33% – both of which are faster than last month’s +0.28%/+0.28%. The y/y numbers are still declining but at a decelerating rate. Still right on schedule, and still zero sign of deflation in housing. Sorry!
If rents accelerated last month, how did we get a big dip in core but nothing in median? That tells you that we must have gotten large moves in low-weight categories. Which is exactly what happened.
Medicinal Drugs, -1.30% m/m (last month, +0.18%)
Used Cars and Trucks, -0.69% (last month +0.88%)
Airfares, -5.27% m/m (last month -3.99%)
Lodging Away from Home, -3.54% (last month +0.18%)
Car and Truck Rental, -2.66% (last month -1.25%)
These are, sadly, most of the ‘usual suspects’ when it comes to surprises in either direction. When they all surprise in the same direction, it means we get a core number that is way off. And that, my friends, is why we look at Median CPI. Of this list, the Used Cars one is the only one that was actually a surprise in the sense that people nowadays pay attention to that subcomponent and the private surveys anticipated an increase. I’ve written previously about what I think is happening in Medicinal Drugs, and even had a podcast episode recently to discuss it (Ep. 137: Drug Prices and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause). This is not going to continue, with 100%+ tariffs on China, where most of our Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients come from. I do wonder whether the decline in airfares (more than would be expected from jetfuel prices) and lodging away from home could partly reflect a decline in tourism to the US – both the official kind and the unofficial ‘tourism’ that has been reversing recently with the help of INS – which means it won’t soon be reversed. Not sure on that.
The net effect of these big moves in small categories is that core goods has not yet turned positive (but it will, once the tariffs go into effect, although not by a huge amount) and core services dropped sharply to 3.7% y/y from 4.1% y/y.
Supercore looks great for the first time in a while. Month/month it fell -0.24%, the sharpest decline since COVID. And the y/y dropped towards 3% as if though it was going to miss the bus if it didn’t get there soon.
Before we all get excited, I’ll point out that the three spikes on the m/m Supercore chart below were all March and April numbers. I suspect that part of what we are seeing is due to the changing placement of Easter, along with Spring Break…and if so, those parts will be unwound in the next month or two.
That doesn’t explain the sharp fall in car and truck rental prices. That is a bit of a head scratcher.
There is a little bit of bad news here, but it is away from core. Food Away from Home (which is in supercore) was behaved at +0.36% m/m vs +0.39% m/m last month, but Food at Home was +0.49% seasonally-adjusted compared with +0.01% last month. It wasn’t just Eggs, which rose less than 2% last month at the retail level and are declining at the wholesale level. Milk, Cheese, and Meats/poultry/fish all saw meaningful increases. The proletariat (of which I am one) notices these things, so if we were weighting the index by salience instead of dollars spent they would get a heavy weight. Now, there’s a reason that we take out Food and Energy…the noise generally outweighs the signal. But take administrative note of the small but noticeable acceleration in food prices on a y/y basis.
Overall, even though this was the second pleasant Core CPI surprise in a row it was also the second Core CPI surprise that shouldn’t get you very excited. In both cases, the fact that Median CPI will not echo the deceleration tells you that this is happening in the small categories that tend to mean-revert. They didn’t mean-revert this month, but I suspect they will. Unfortunately, that will happen at the same time that 10% broad tariffs, and large tariffs on Chinese goods, are kicking into effect. We might have a whopper of a Core CPI coming up here in one of the next few months.
In the broader picture, inflation is settling in the mid-to-high 3s (measured by Median CPI), but there are clouds on the immediate horizon from tariffs. But as the stability in the longer-term inflation measures suggests, the market isn’t really yet concerned that another upswing is on the way. Tariffs are a one-off effect, and a reasonably small effect overall although significant in the specific categories where they are leveed. Remember, though, that core goods, where the tariffs mainly fall, is only 19.4% of the overall consumption basket.
The longer-term picture depends on how long the uncertainty lasts. As I have pointed out before, economic policy uncertainty – which is off the charts right now – manifests itself in downward pressure on monetary velocity. I expect that the uncertainty will largely be past us in 6 months, and in the meantime the upward pressure on prices from tariffs that shows up in core goods will probably dominate the downward pressure from policy uncertainty (which causes consumers to keep more precautionary savings, causing the velocity decline). Those effects will probably wear off at roughly the same time so that we will only notice it at the micro level.
Uncertainty also, obviously, lowers the price of risky assets (I’ve also written about this!), in a healthy way. But I am not one of those people who worries that uncertainty will have a large effect on the underlying economic activity. Yes, CEOs may delay making big plans for a month or two. But the uncertainty won’t last forever, and then they’ll make their plans. CEOs who can’t make decisions under at least mild uncertainty aren’t going to be CEOs very long. The domestic economy will be just fine, especially as we continue to produce more of our internal consumption needs, domestically.
And for the Fed? The right answer to uncertainty from a policymaker perspective is to increase the hurdle for taking action. The right answer is to make no changes to policy. I am not confident that the Federal Reserve will correctly separate the ‘price of risk’ effect from the ‘economic growth’ effect. They are correct to note that tariffs by themselves are not inflationary in that they are one-off effects. If they believe that, and they think there’s a big recession coming, they’ll cut rates. That would be a mistake, especially given the uncertainty.
The Coming Surge in College Tuition Inflation
Today’s news is clearly about the imposition of new reciprocal tariffs on US trading partners, and the responses that those countries will have to the tariffs. In terms of the markets’ reactions, it does seem shocking to me that people were shocked and appear to have not been particularly well hedged…considering that the Administration has clearly been telegraphing this action for a long time. For what it’s worth, expect the countries with big surpluses to the US (they sell us a lot more than we sell them) to rapidly cut their trade barriers while countries that are closer to balanced in their flows to beat the drum more. But there is a ton of analysis out there about the tariffs, most of it informed by bad modeling, and I have already expressed my view that this is going to (a) have a smaller price impact in the US than most people are worried about, (b) may produce a technical recession simply because of all of the front-running imports we have seen in Q1-Q2, (c) will increase, not decrease, US employment, although it (d) may well result in longer recessions ex-US. Oh, and furthermore (d) will tend to result in lower global energy prices, which will help further with (a).
Today, though, I want to talk about another policy that is going to work the other way on inflation…but no one else I have seen has mentioned this yet. And that is how the sharp decrease in federal appropriations going to colleges and universities is going to lead to a sharp acceleration in tuition inflation going forward, especially if the stock market continues to decline.
To understand why, consider a simple but descriptive model of how college tuitions are set. Colleges have fairly simple income statements in aggregate: expenses are primarily labor, along with ancillary expenditures on physical plant and other expenses, while revenues consist of tuition, government funding (in the case of public institutions), and endowment earnings (primarily in the case of private institutions). For the purposes of illustration, I randomly pulled the annual report of Indiana University, from https://finance.iu.edu/doc/reports/fy2023.pdf. The tabular numbers are on page 23, but here they are graphically.
So, as I said, compensation expenses are 2/3 of the budget and revenues are half tuition, and another 20% federal grants and contracts (and a little bit from state and local). Some of the ‘auxiliary enterprises’ or ‘other revenues’ may be endowment returns, but those tend to dominate more at private institutions. Either way, Note that the Board of Trustees has no control over endowment returns or government appropriations, even if they have nominal control on some of the other levers. Also, the Trustees have very limited control, especially in the short-term, on compensation and benefits – it isn’t like you can fire your tenured professors and go get cheap ones. So, in practice, the university budget is balanced on the one number the Trustees really do control in the short run, and that is tuition.
So expenses are fairly inflexible and highly driven by inflation (since wages follow inflation). That means that tuitions also increase faster, obviously, when the general level of inflation is faster and vice versa. But on top of that, tuitions tend to increase more slowly when governments are pitching in more (or endowment returns are awesome), and more quickly when governments are pitching in less (or endowment returns are weak). Here is our model, set against an index of tuition from 4-year public universities (sourced from College Board: https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/published-prices-national , author’s calculations). The model simply uses College Board’s information on government appropriations per FTE student from the same report, along with simple equity returns, bond yields, and inflation. The little deviation at the end is interesting in itself because it happens starting at COVID, when tuitions went up less than the model would have expected. Or did they? I wrote at the time (https://inflationguy.blog/2020/09/11/summary-of-my-post-cpi-tweets-september-2020/ for example) that the BLS was assuming no quality adjustment downward despite the fact that many schools were quasi-virtual or fully virtual. That’s an issue – our model also assumes no state change in the quality of education during the COVID years – but other than that, the model worked pretty well.
The point is that a decrease in federal appropriations will result in a large increase in expected tuition inflation. The betas on our model are not helpful, because they assume a homoscedastic relationship…that is, the effect of changes in that variable (beta) does not change with the size of the change in the variable. That seems unlikely here. If federal appropriations per student drop 10%, I feel reasonably confident that we have the scale of the impact right. If they drop 50%, I suspect states will pick up some slack, tuitions will jump, schools will try to cut costs (for a change), flush more from the endowments, and take some financial lumps. But tuition would still experience a really sharp jump in that case.
For scale, consider the following table. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (when admittedly endowments were also in bad shape…it turns out to be a little hard to disentangle those two highly-correlated effects), appropriations for education declined for four years in a row (red cells). Even though inflation overall during that period declined from 5% to -1.4%, and then 1.1%, 3.6%, and 1.7%, tuition inflation actually accelerated from 6.6% to 7.25% before finally decelerating a bit. In the 2013-2014 school year, when appropriations rebounded, tuition rose only 0.6% faster than headline CPI.
Now take those -4% appropriations changes and turn them to -30%. The model says that should give us something like 15% tuition inflation year/year. That seems unlikely to me, and even more unlikely the larger those appropriation declines are. Because colleges will adapt, or close. In the medium-term, the result will be higher tuitions, lower college services (what? No NIL money for the football team? No all-you-can-eat sushi?), tighter operating budgets and fewer ancillary staff. And lots of people will discover they are ancillary staff. In the short-term, it is hard to judge the scale (partly because we really don’t know how much federal aid will decrease). I am comfortable, however, with the direction. College tuition inflation is about to accelerate, and probably a lot.
Inflation Guy’s CPI Summary (February 2025)
Look, I know that traders sometimes think their job is to overreact. And media folks benefit from overreacting. And political strategists have been genetically bred to overreacting. But a bit of rational analysis here is probably worthwhile.
The obvious backdrop to the CPI release this morning is the somewhat-greater-than-usual volatility in the equity market,[1] and some concerns that the economy might finally get that recession that I and others have been expecting for so long – although don’t get too chippy on that, since the Q1 contraction would be mostly due to a surge in imports from front-running tariffs. The narrative has shifted back to the question of how soon the Fed might ease, even if inflation is still a little problem, since Unemployment has risen to the nosebleed level of 4.1% and stocks are in the crapper (technical term).
Geez folks, take a chill pill.
Similarly, don’t cue the trumpets just yet on inflation. The expectations coming into today’s figure were for +0.31% on headline CPI and +0.30% on core CPI. The actual prints were +0.22% and a delightful +0.23% on Core.
Sure, the chart shows this is definitely better than last month! And it’s even better than the average of the last two months (I’d said last month you probably should average between December and January figures). But…it’s also a little early to take a victory lap. Here is Median CPI (last point, as usual, is my estimate for today).
If it’s 0.29% m/m, as per my estimate, then we are at a 3.5% run rate. And that’s basically where we have been over the last six months. Oh, and while y/y Core CPI is down to 3.1%, it’s at 3.5% over the last three and the last six months. We are settling in at the mid-3s.
The culprits behind last month’s spike were used cars, health insurance, lodging away from home, pharmaceuticals, and hospital services. Of those, only Used Cars (+0.88% m/m) contributed very much to this month’s number. On the other hand, Airfares dropped -4% m/m. Here are the Major-8 categories.
The optimistic view is that there isn’t any one category that looks out of control on a y/y basis. That’s also the pessimistic view, because it speaks of a broad – if not particularly high – inflation that is still percolating out there. Core Goods this month was still -0.1% y/y, but Core Services dropped from 4.3% to 4.1% y/y. Pharmaceutical prices, which just had their largest monthly rise in history last month as drugmakers tried to get their licks in before the Trump Administration forces them to lower prices, rose only +0.18% m/m this month. Both Primary Rents and Owners’ Equivalent Rent were +0.281% m/m. These are also settling in, on schedule.
“Settling in” is what is happening in shelter. And that again is both good news and bad news. A lot of the forecasts we have seen over the last couple of years that called for inflation to steadily return to trend depended on the assumption that the rent declines we have seen for new rents in a few cities would become a broad-based trend in all of shelter. But it’s not, for two reasons. On the rental side, costs keep rising for landlords (that’s the basis for our model in the prior chart). And on the home purchase side, there’s just still a big deficit in homes available for sale.
While that could change – it seems to be changing in the Washington, DC area but the people leaving Washington still need homes elsewhere – if deportations pick up a lot, there is no sign yet that shelter is going to do the heavy lifting of getting inflation back to 2%. Neither is SuperCore, although this month it was +0.22% m/m and in general is looking a little better.
But none of this looks exciting. None of this looks like it’s going to be the start of a Fed victory lap on inflation. Even the Enduring Investments Inflation Diffusion Index looks like it’s settling in, and like all of the other stuff we have looked at, it’s settling in at a level higher than pre-COVID.
And while we’re talking about distributions, here’s another one I haven’t run in a while. This is the distribution of y/y changes by the lowest-level CPI components. The big spike in the middle is obviously housing. There is a cluster between 1% and 4%. But look at that big left tail. 20% of the basket is actually deflating, y/y.
What’s interesting about that column on the left is that it is a whole bunch of little things. Breakfast cereal. Pasta. “Other meats” (shudder). Potatoes. Tomatoes. Soups. Snacks. Window coverings. Dishes. Men’s shirts. Audio equipment. In other words, a whole lot of things that are so small, consumers don’t really notice them so much and so they don’t really affect their sense of inflation being high. But they notice eggs.
So this is good news…in that a lot of things are deflating…but also bad news is that a lot of these are things that tend to mean-revert. You’ll notice that some of the categories I just listed are core goods, which are still in deflation…but which are also the things which are going to rise in price when the tariffs start to hit. The largest single piece still in deflation is New Cars, at a 4.4% weight or so. Unfortunately, that’s not going to be in deflation when tariffs hit auto parts and slow the import of non-US vehicles.
So let’s wrap this up.
The conspiracy nuts will say that Trump cooked the numbers, because it was better-than-expected about something that was a campaign promise of his. But this is normal variation, and the bottom line is that the inflation figures look to be converging on 3.5% or so, before the effects of tariffs kick in. The near-term effects on inflation are definitely upwards. Peace in Israel and Ukraine, if it comes, may put a small damper on energy prices but the bigger effect there is US energy being unleashed again, which will take some time. But outside of the peace effect, there are few good near-term trends but also few really bad near-term trends other than the (relatively small) effect of tariffs. Inflation is settling in.
The funny thing is, I don’t think the Fed cares. I think they’re satisfied enough with the progress on inflation, and they still think that recessions cause disinflation (they don’t) so that they feel they can focus on the growth part of the mandate, for now.
[1] Dubbed a ‘crash’, or ‘freefall’, or some other appellation by observers who can’t remember the last time we saw a 10% pullback. Which is only about 6% if you look at the equal-weight, or a 60-40 blend of stocks and bonds. If this warrants the “what do you say to Americans who now can’t retire because they’re seeing their retirement accounts collapsing” line, my answer would be “I would say those Americans probably shouldn’t have been invested in stocks at all if this causes them to delay retirement.”
Gold Prices Are Getting Frothy
Behold, my roughly-annual blog post on gold.
I recognize that there is a good case for gold at a time when the price level is rising steadily and there are upside risks to inflation and downside risks to the dollar. Let me start there.
I get a little confused trying to decide whether, if we find out that Fort Knox doesn’t have as much gold as we thought, that’s bullish or bearish. I think the consensus is that is bullish because it means there’s one less holder that could potentially sell into the market…but doesn’t that mean there is more actual floating supply? Because that gold is out there somewhere. Anyway, that is all idle speculation anyway until we find out whether the unaudited stockpiles at Fort Knox are intact. (As an aside, the whole monetary history of why there are gold stockpiles at Fort Knox or the New York Federal Reserve is fascinating. I just finished reading Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World, which is a little unfair of a title but really interesting.)
But the $2,910 question is whether the case for gold at the current price is good or not. Okay, let’s be real – if people still believed that the current price mattered for future returns then most of the Magnificent 7 stocks wouldn’t be where they are…most of the rest of the equity market, probably too. Certainly bitcoin. For today, though, let’s pretend that trees don’t grow to the sky and that your future returns depend at least a little bit on the price you buy at relative to the future price you will sell at.[1]
Erb and Harvey wrote a paper in 2013 called “The Golden Dilemma” which had a wonderful chart in it (Exhibit 5) that showed the annualized 10-year real gold return versus the starting real price. The key insight is the translation to real values. Because the gold nominal price does, in fact, rise with the price level over time to reflect the diminishing value of the dollar. But whether it is likely to rise faster than the price level, or slower, or even decline over some period of time is obviously really important to the question of whether gold right now is a good inflation-hedging asset.[2] The chart below shows the Erb and Harvey chart, updated to today and with a more meaningful x axis priced in terms of the starting real price. The vertical line is the current gold price. All other gold prices are converted to their values in terms of today’s price level, and then the return calculated over the subsequent ten years.
The chart highlights that when the gold price is high in a real sense…when it has outrun inflation for a while…it is likely to underperform inflation going forward. When it has lagged inflation for a while it is likely to outperform inflation going forward. There is a fork on the chart of two different periods, the first being the gold prices when we used to care about value more (the lower fork, where the lowest point is January 1980), and the second being the more recent period where value mattered, but less so. The most-recent point for which we can calculate the 10-year real return is January 2015 when the nominal price of gold was $1278 but in terms of today’s dollars it was $1738 because we’ve had 36% inflation since then. Either way, the current price of gold would suggest that while the nominal price may rise over the next decade, that’s likely only to be the case if the price level rises more (that is, negative real returns for gold). That says that while gold is probably a better investment right now that equities – which have deeply negative expected real returns from the current price – it’s not likely to be as good an inflation hedge as, say, 10-year TIPS at 2% real yields.
Now, I have to address one possibility. There are nuts out there who will say “the fork here is evidence that the changes made to CPI caused it to understate inflation by 2% per year – gold, relative to the price level, is suddenly doing 2-5% per year better than it would historically have done.” It is crazy talk, but given the chart it is due a reply. There are two parts of the refutation. The first part is that the bottom fork doesn’t end in 1980; in fact that was the only fork evident in the Erb and Harvey 2013 piece. If CPI was monkeyed with in a serious way as the conspiracy nuts claim, it happened in the early 1980s. Maybe no one figured it out for a quarter century. I think a better argument is that the first gold ETF, GLD, launched in 2004. The abrupt ease in the difficulty of owning and holding gold almost certainly led to an increase in the allocation to gold in global investment portfolios. If that’s the cause, then the happy fork in this card should be the aberration and we should start to converge on the lower fork over time once that change in the acceptance of gold as a portfolio allocation has been fully realized.
The second part of my refutation is to point to another way that it looks like gold might be a bit frothy. People have pointed to the divergence of gold from TIPS (including me, back in 2024), since gold tends to behave like a long-term zero-coupon inflation-linked bond – in other words, it has a lot of real duration, but for some reason not recently. But showing the deviation of TIPS from gold could mean that gold is expensive or that TIPS became cheap. Look instead at the following chart, which relates two zero-coupon real assets: owned homes, and gold. The line is the price of gold divided by the Existing Home Sales Median Sale Price in thousands (so, one ounce of gold will currently buy 0.726% of a median home right now or, conversely, you need about 138oz of gold to buy the median existing home.
The chart shows three distinct extremes prior to the current rise. The peak in 1980 and the trough in the early 2000s are both obviously gold phenomena. The spike in 2010-2012 is a consequence of the housing bust after the GFC, when home prices drastically overcorrected to clear the excess inventory. And then we have the current increase in the ratio, which either means that gold prices are getting too high, or home prices are getting too low.
I think it’s hard to make the argument that home prices are getting too low.
[1] It is really hard to imagine how it cannot be true that today’s price matters for your return experience. The only way it could be irrelevant is if the growth rate of the asset is independent of the price, so that when today’s price goes up the expected future price goes up the same amount. But this leads to the absurdity that there is no price at which you wouldn’t buy an asset. I know this is really, really obvious to most of us but you have to realize that the belief that future prices are untethered to any fundamental value is the only reason the price of BTC – which can be redeemed for exactly zero, forever – is not zero. So lots of people clearly believe that everything has a ‘value’ if someone else will buy it today, even if no one will buy it tomorrow.
[2] People also hold gold for an end-of-the-world/fiat-collapse hedge. This is in my mind a separate case. If the price level goes up 500%, then the question of whether gold returns 490% or 510% is fairly irrelevant to me. The argument I am making is only salient for inflation at non-hyperinflation sorts of levels. Just want you to know I recognize that.
Illustrating the Cost of Leverage Effect on Returns
A couple of weeks ago, I presented a blog post called “The Effect of Crazy Time on Portfolio Allocations,” in which I pointed out that the effect of increasing volatility generally is to decrease the optimal portfolio allocations towards safer allocations. It was one of those posts where you initially say ‘well, duh’ but hopefully liked the fact that I ‘proved’ the intuition with the illustrations. While market volatility since then has been almost unbelievably low, it is hard for me to imagine that is sustained. It feels a little like a ‘deer in the headlights’ reaction from investors, as the Trump Train comes on so rapidly that all they can do is pull the shades.
I suspect that at some point, unless the Donald suddenly becomes a milquetoast business-as-usual kind of President, we will see those allocations shift.
But a few days ago I had another realization that called to mind the same old CFA-Level-I charts. I was explaining to someone who wanted me to leverage our really cool inflation-tracking strategy[1] that leveraging a mid-single-digits return makes a lot of sense when the cost of leverage is zero, but not so much sense when the cost of leverage was mid-single-digits. I’ve talked about this before – in October 2023 I published “Higher Rates’ Impact on Levered Strategies.”[2] I showed a table, but there’s a really simple way to illustrate the same thing.
I don’t really need the portfolio efficient frontier here. Maybe the optimizer spits out some share of the optimal portfolio that represents an investment in some hedge fund strategy you really like. Maybe it doesn’t. More likely, you don’t even use an optimizer. But if you really like that strategy, but want higher returns, you ask the manager ‘hey, can you lever that’? The manager says sure. But the manager can’t give you twice the returns for twice the risk – the leverage math doesn’t work that way. If the cost of leverage is 3% – which you can tell it is in this chart because that’s where the line hits the axis, at a risk-free rate of 3% – then your return for twice the risk is (2 x 4% – 1 x 3%) = 5%. So you pick up only 1% return for doubling the risk. And you can see that on the chart, because that’s the point the red line goes through: 5% return, 15% risk. For 3x risk, you get (3 x 4% – 2 x 3%) = 6%. And so on. The slope of the line is such that 7.5% additional risk gets you 1% additional return, no matter how many times you lever it.
So why do people ask for leverage? Well, because since 2008 the overnight rate was mostly at 0%.
If you can borrow at zero then levering simply multiplies risk and return simultaneously. At 2x leverage, your return is (2 x 4% – 1 x 0%) = 8%. You can see where this goes since 0 times anything drops out of the formula.
But this doesn’t work at higher costs of leverage. If the cost of leverage is equal to the expected return, then you just get more risk every turn of leverage you deploy. And if the cost of leverage is above the expected return, you make things worse every time you add leverage.
So it doesn’t make any sense to lever low-return strategies unless the cost of leverage is really low. And by the way, it doesn’t make much sense to lever high-return strategies unless they happen to be low risk. Because this math doesn’t just work with expected returns but also (and more importantly) with actual returns. Suppose you have a strategy that has a 6% expected return and a 15% risk. Say, an equity index. Now, you lever it 2x with the cost of leverage at 5% (by the way, if you use a levered ETF you’re not escaping the cost of leverage…but that’s for another day). Your expected return is now 7%, with 30% risk (check your understanding by doing the math).
Now, however, you get a 2-standard deviation outcome to the downside. Supposedly that happens only one year out of 40, but we know that there are fat tails in equity markets. But whatever the real probability, your unlevered return is now 6% – 2 x 15% = -24%. But now you’re riding the lightning and your return on the 2x leverage is (2 x -24% – 5%) = -53%. (Alternatively, you get to the same number if you just look at the new 7%ret/30%risk portfolio return as 7% – 2 x 30%).
Hedge fund managers understand this math…or should; if they don’t then get out…and it should change the numbers they report in forward-looking statements when interest rates are higher, for levered strategies. I will not comment on normal industry practice…
[1] To be clear, none of the red dots in this article represent the risk/return tradeoff for that strategy. I’m not trying to cagily present our fund’s performance because that would get me in trouble.
[2] This was a golden era for the blog. Right about the same time I also published one of my best posts in years, pointing out how the CME Bond Contract has shortened in duration and also has negative convexity again. “How Higher Rates Cause Big Changes in the Bond Contract.” How I loved that piece.
